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PROLOGUE
The 1993 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was punctuated by decisions addressing a variety of
patent-related issues, in areas ranging from jurisdiction to remedies.
The year was also marked by a rather rare, but important, occurrence
in the area of patent law-the rendering of a decision by the United
States Supreme Court.
For ease of reference, this Article is organized into six parts
covering major areas of patent law. Part I discusses the 1993 decisions
of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit relating to jurisdiction and
procedure. In Part II, the decisions pertaining to patentability and
validity issues are summarized. Part III contains summaries of the
Federal Circuit's treatment of interference issues. Part IV discusses
the 1993 decisions dealing with questions of patent infringement,
while Part V summarizes the Federal Circuit's rulings regarding
equitable defenses to patent infringement. The Article concludes
with a section discussing the Federal Circuit's rulings on remedies for
patent infringement.
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I. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. Jurisdiction
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc.,' presented the
question of whether the Federal Circuit's affirmance of a finding of
noninfringement of a patent was sufficient reason for vacating a
declaratory judgment that held the patent invalid.2 The Supreme
Court discussed the rationale behind the Federal Circuit's practice of
vacating declaratory judgments of patent invalidity following determi-
nations of noninfringement.3 The Court observed that this practice
arose from the Federal Circuit's conviction that a finding of
noninfringement resolved the entire controversy between the parties.
Any declaratory judgment of invalidity, therefore, was moot in the
jurisdictional sense.4
The Court noted that the Federal Circuit had considered its
vacatur' practice dictated by two earlier Supreme Court decisions.6
The Court also pointed out, however, that one of the earlier cases did
not involve a declaratory judgment,7 and that the other did not
answer the question of whether, in the absence of an ongoing dispute
between the parties over infringement, an adjudication of invalidity
would be moot.8 The Court addressed that question in Cardinal
Chemical Co.9
The Court indicated that the Federal Circuit's vacatur practice
involved a jurisdictional issue."° The Court ruled that the Federal
Circuit had jurisdiction over Morton's appeal from the declaratory
1. 113 S. Ct. 1967 (1993).
2. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1969 (1993).
3. Id. at 1971.
4. Id. at 1972-73. The Federal Circuit's vacaturpractice stems from the 1987 decisions of
Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that
determination that patent was not infringed renders declaratoryjudgment on invalidity moot),
and Fonar Corp. v.Johnson &Johnson, 821 F.2d 627,3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(concluding that finding of noninfringement moots patent invalidity issue).
5. Vacatur practice is a rule or order by which a proceeding is vacated.
6. Cardinal Chem., 113 S. Ct. at 1973. The two previous decisions are Electrical Fittings
Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) (holding that where court finds patent valid
but not infringed, successful defendant could demand that finding of validity be vacated because
issue was raised as affirmative defense), and Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943) (finding
that noninfringement determination does not dispose of issue of validity where it has been
raised in counter-claim).
7. Cardinal Chem., 113 S. Ct. at 1973 (noting that Electrical Fittings Corp. involved ruling on
affirmative defense).
8. Id. at 1973-74 (explaining that court in Altvater found that controversy did not end on
dismissal of bill for noninfringement).
9. Id. at 1967.
10. Id. at 1974.
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judgment of invalidity, even though it had affirmed the lower court's
holding of noninfringement." The Court noted that because the
Federal Circuit is not a court of last resort, it is not precluded from
considering a question of validity merely because the lower court
deemed it moot.12 The Court further observed that once jurisdic-
tion has been established, courts are, entitled to presume that
jurisdiction continues.13 Because the district court had original
jurisdiction over the actions, the Federal Circuit had appellate
jurisdiction over Morton's claim. 4 The court, therefore, had the
power to decide all issues raised on appeal, because neither party
came forward with a showing of a material change in circumstances
that would entirely terminate the controversy. 5 The Court held that
the Federal Circuit's current vacatur practice was neither compelled
by the Court's precedent nor required by the "case or controversy"
requirement of Article III of the Constitution. 6
In addition, the Court found no other grounds to support the
Federal Circuit's vacatur practice. 7 The Supreme Court noted that
although it is often more difficult to determine whether a patent is
valid than whether it has been infringed, there are other important
countervailing concerns that militate against such a vacatur prac-
tice."8 For example, there is a strong public interest in the finality
of judgments in patent litigation.' 9 Moreover, the Federal Circuit's
practice denies the patentee appellate review, prolongs the life of
invalid patents, and encourages endless litigation, or at least causes
uncertainty, over the validity of the patent.2" Consequently, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit erred in vacating the
district court's declaratory judgment of invalidity.2
As noted in Cardinal Chemicals, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from all U.S. district courts in patent-related




15. Id. at 1976.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1976-77.
18. Id. at 1977.
19. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) (noting that
validity question is of greater concern to public than infringement issue).
20. Cardinal Chem., 113 S. Ct. at 1977.
21. Id. at 1978. In a concurring opinion on remand, Judge Mayer chided Morton for
requesting the Supreme Court to reverse, rather than affirm, the Federal Circuit's vacatur
judgment, and said that Morton, by doing so, conceded invalidity. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal
Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1471, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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litigation.2 2  In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Watkins,23 the Federal
Circuit noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1)24 "grants [the Federal
Circuit] exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a federal district
court, 'if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part,
on [28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)]."'1
In Cedars-Sinai, a patent application assigned to the medical center
was involved in an interference 6 with another party's application. 7
Shortly after the interference had been instituted, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy served Cedars-Simi with a determination under 42
U.S.C. § 5908; the U.S. Government asserted title over U.S. and
foreign rights to the invention that was the subject of Cedars-Sinai's
application.2 8  Cedars-Sinai failed to request reconsideration of the
determination, which subsequently became final.' Rather,
Cedars-Sinai filed suit in district court seeking, inter alia, a declaratory
judgment under § 2201"0 based on the following issues: whether the
theories of laches, waiver, and estoppel barred the Government from
asserting title to Cedars-Sinai's invention under § 5908; whether
chapter 18 of title 35 of the U.S. Code superseded § 5908; and
whether the determination itself was unlawfully issued.3 1 The district
court granted the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds.32
Before turning to the merits of the appeal, the Federal Circuit
considered whether it had jurisdiction under § 1295(a) (1) 3 to hear
the appeal. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction was determined by
whether the district court's jurisdiction had been derived from
§ 1338.' The court noted that § 1338 provides, in pertinent part,
that district courts have original jurisdiction over a civil action "arising
22. Cardinal Chem, 113 S.Ct. at 1971.
23. 11 F.3d 1573, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (1988).
25. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188,
1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 1295(a) (1) (1988)). 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) reads: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any act of
Congress relating to patents .... "
26. An interference proceeding is one in which the Patent and Trademark Office
determines priority of invention between two or more parties claiming the same patent.
27. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1576, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
31. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1576, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
32. Id. at 1577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988) (stating that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeal from federal district court if "the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or
in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338").
34. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
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under any Act of Congress relating to patents."" The court therefore
considered whether the declaratory judgment action arose under a
patent-related statute.36
Faced with a declaratory judgment action, the court applied the
principles articulated in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 7 to determine whether § 1338 jurisdiction existed. 8
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule,39 the court constructed a
hypothetical injunctive action by the Government against Cedars-Sinai
to enforce the assignment rights declared in the determination.
4
0
The court then determined that this hypothetical cause of action
arose in part under 42 U.S.C. § 590841 and that the case was there-
fore distinguishable from cases involving simple contractual dis-
putes.42 Rejecting the argument that the statute, which in essence
mandated the issuance of a patent to the Government rather than to
the inventor, merely concerned the administrative functioning of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Commissioner, the court
determined that § 5908 was an Act of Congress clearly related to
patents.43  Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that it had
jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of the case for lack
of ripeness and, thus, lack of article III jurisdiction.44
The court noted that the Supreme Court, in Abbott Labs v.
Gardner,4 had delineated a "two-prong test for applying the constitu-
tional doctrine of ripeness: (1) are the issues fit for judicial decision,
that is, is there a present case or controversy between the parties; and
(2) is there sufficient risk of one party suffering immediate hardship
to warrant prompt adjudication of the case."46 Regarding the first
patent question, the court stated that, were the action based solely on
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
36. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1578, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
37. 463 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667
(1950)).
38. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1578, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
39. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)
(articulating principle that federal jurisdiction is lacking if federal question only arose out of
defense to state-created action).
40. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1578, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 5908 (1988) (mandating that patent of invention made by person under
contract to Secretary of Energy will belong to United States).
42. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1579, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (noting that if cause of
action was merely contractual issue, Federal Circuit would lack jurisdiction over case).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1580, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
45. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
46. Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1580-81,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (referring to ripeness test
laid out in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)); see also Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972) (following ripeness test delineated in Abbott Labs.).
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Cedars-Sinai's "domestic patent rights, the case would be barred, both
by Article III and the discretionary consideration of conservation of
judicial resources, because of the pending interference."47 The court
nonetheless found that the first prong of the Abbott Labs test had been
satisfied because the determination adversely affected Cedars-Sinai's
ability to license its foreign patents and that the pending interference
was immaterial to Cedars-Sinai's foreign patent rights.4"
The second prong of the ripeness test, however, was not satisfied.
The court found that Cedars-Sinai failed to show jurisdiction 49 when
it did not demonstrate facts sufficient to support its contention ,that
it would suffer hardship, to its title to its foreign patents, resulting
from the determination. ° Thus, noting the constitutional limita-
tions on jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
case.
51
Another case stemming from a declaratory judgment action and
addressing thejurisdictional question of whether an actual controversy
existed was BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp.2 As the court
explained in BP Chemicals, the existence of an actual controversy
involving patent rights requires more than the mere presence of an
adversely held patent.5 3 There must be both "(1) an explicit threat,
or similar action, by the patentee that creates a reasonable apprehen-
sion in the declaratory plaintiff that it faces an infringement suit, and
(2) present activity by the plaintiff that could constitute infringement,
or some concrete steps taken with an intent to conduct such
activity." 4
The issue on appeal in this case was whether the district court
properly dismissed the action for failing to meet the requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 2201 that there be an actual controversy; an issue that
encompasses concepts such as ripeness, standing, and the prohibition
against advisory judicial rulings.5  BP had filed a declaratory
judgment action against Union Carbide seeking a declaration of
invalidity or unenforceability of Union Carbide's patent and a
47. Cedars-Sina4 11 F.3d at 1581, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
48. Id. at 1582, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
49. SeeKVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936) (holding that party seeking
to invoke jurisdiction has burden of establishing jurisdiction).
50. Cedars-Sina, 11 F.3d at 1583, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193 (noting that Government's
motion to dismiss challenged Cedars-Sinai's contention that it had suffered legal wrong).
51. Id.
52. 4 F.3d 975, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
53. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124,
1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 977, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
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declaration that the patent was not infringed by a process licensed by
BP and potentially practiced by BP's licensees.56 The district court
had granted Union Carbide's motion to dismiss the action for lack of
ajusticiable controversy, finding that Union Carbide did not threaten
BP or its licensees with suit or place them in reasonable apprehension
of suit.5,
BP argued on appeal that the totality of the circumstances
demonstrated that the requirements of a declaratoryjudgment action
had been met, pointing to its commercial competition with Union
Carbide. 8 BP also noted that the Federal Circuit had not yet
considered the situation where a licensor's business is undermined by
threats directed through its actual or potential licensees." BP
further pointed to its potential liability for contributory or inducing
infringement and its contractual obligations to indemnify its licensees
as factors giving rise to a "controversy."6" Union Carbide responded
that it did not threaten either BP or any licensee with suit, that the
patent was not infringed, and that BP was seeking an opportunity to
litigate Union Carbide's patent prospectively in order to obtain an
advisory opinion on its validity and scope.61 Union Carbide also
argued that any remarks it made about the patent during licensing
negotiations were made to support its attempts to license the process
and not to threaten or intimidate.62
Characterizing the case as presenting a "close factual question on
the issue of reasonable apprehension of suit,"63 the court neverthe-
less affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. The Federal
Circuit noted that the district court heard testimony about the actions
and statements of the parties concerned, made credibility determina-
tions when there was conflicting testimony, and applied an objective
standard in determining whether there was reasonable apprehension
of suit.' The court noted that although Union Carbide's officials
refused to promise BP that it would not enforce its patent against BP's
licensees, a fact that was relevant but not dispositive in determining
reasonable apprehension of suit,65 Union Carbide's officials repeat-
56. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.






63. Id. at 980, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
64. Id. at 979, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
65. Id. at 980, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d
885, 889, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1627, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that court may consider
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edly expressed a desire to amicably resolve any problems that might
arise.6" Addressing BP's statement that its licensees would use BP's
process but for Union Carbide's patent, the court noted that a party's
"interest in practicing another's invention did not satisfy the two-part
list for an actual controversy.
67
The court was not persuaded that injuries to BP's interests,
allegedly resulting from the possibility of suit by Union Carbide and
from the inhibitory effect of its patent, presented an actual controver-
sy-' The court stated that while BP's interest as patent licensor may
be adversely affected by competitive activity from Union Carbide, BP
cannot bring a declaratory judgment action against Union Carbide
unless that competitive activity constitutes a threat to sue BP's
potential licensees.69 After emphasizing the concept of standing that
underlies the actual controversy requirement, ° the court noted that
BP's interest, whether as an indemnitor or based on possible liability
for contributory or inducing infringement, was no more definite than
that of its licensees.
7'
The court also found that the absence of the parties that BP
described as intending to infringe Union Carbide's patent reinforced
the finding that this action was brought simply for marketing and
competitive purposes.7 2 The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the action for failing to present an actual
controversy.
73
As noted in the previous discussion, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1)
provides that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an
appeal from a final decision of a district court ifjurisdiction is based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.74 Section 1338 of Title 28 provides, inter alia,
that district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action
circumstances surrounding statement of intent to enforce patent); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz,
716 F.2d 874,881, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (concluding that statements
of intent to enforce patent made after filing of declaratory action are part of totality of
circumstances).
66. BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 980, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
67. Id. (citing International Medical Prosthetics Research Assoc., Inc. v. Gore Enter.
Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 576, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 281 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
controversy does not exist simply because patent exists)).
68. Id. at 980-81, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
69. Id. at 981, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
70. See id. (noting that indemnitor's standing is only derivative).




74. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (1988); see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing
jurisdiction of Federal Circuit).
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arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.75 The next
case involves a question of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
In Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata Inc.,76
Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. (Adcon) challenged
the propriety of the removal of its business disparagement case from
Texas state court to a U.S. district court.7' Adcon had filed suit in
a state court claiming interference with its business due to Flowdata's
statements to Adcon's customers that Adcon's product infringed
Flowdata's patent.7' After Flowdata caused the case to be removed
to the district court, Flowdata answered Adcon's complaint and then
counterclaimed for patent infringement.79  The district court
granted partial summary judgment of patent infringement and issued
a permanent injunction barring Adcon from infringing Flowdata's
patent.80 Adcon thereafter moved to remand the case to state court,
claiming that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction."
The present appeal arose from the district court's denial of this
motion.8
2
Adcon challenged the legality of the removal of the business
disparagement case to federal district court.83 The Federal Circuit
noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) a defendant may remove an
action to federal district court if that court has subject matter
jurisdiction.' The district court had premised its jurisdiction on 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a).' The Federal Circuit therefore considered
whether the district court correctly decided this jurisdictional
question.
The court observed that the Supreme Court had construed 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) as conferring jurisdiction to the district courts not
only over causes of action created by federal patent law, but also over
causes of action involving a substantial question of patent law.87
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
76. 986 F.2d 476, 477, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
77. Additive Controls & Movement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477, 25








85. See id. (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
civil actions relating to patents).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 477-78, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799-1800 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (1988) (holding that
scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) includes causes of action involving substantial question of federal
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Although the Federal Circuit found that Adcon's state-law business
disparagement claim was not created by federal patent law, the court
found that resolving this claim involved a substantial question of
patent law-whether Adcon's product infringed Flowdata's patent.'
Under Texas state law, proof of business disparagement required
proof that the allegedly disparaging statement was false.89 Thus,
Adcon was required to prove that Flowdata's statements that Adcon's
product infringed Flowdata's patent were false.9" Because Adcon's
right to relief depended on resolving the question of infringement-a
substantial question of patent law-the Federal Circuit found that the
district court properly refused Adcon's motion to remand the case to
state court.9'
In another case dealing with jurisdiction, Katz v. Lear Siegle; Inc.,
9 2
the issue in question was Katz's ownership of certain patents and thus
Katz's standing to sue. 3 Because the party invoking federal jurisdic-
tion bears the burden of establishing standing,94 the question of
patent ownership was also one of jurisdiction. 5
The district court had granted summaryjudgment, finding that Katz
had no standing to sue Lear Siegler, Inc. and Smith & Wesson Corp.
(collectively LSI) because Katz did not have title to the patents.95
The district court held that the inventor, Theodore, had assigned his
patent rights in writing to Armament Systems and Procedures, Inc.
(ASP), thereby placing legal and equitable title to the patents in ASP,
before assigning the patent rights to Katz.97 The district court also
held that Katz could not void the unrecorded Theodore-ASP
assignment under 35 U.S.C. § 261"s "because Katz was not without
notice of that [assignment]."' Theodore and ASP had executed an
patent law)).
88. Id. at 478, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 479, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.
92. 5 F.3d 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1069
(1994).
93. Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 5 F.3d 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 114 S. Ct. 1069 (1994).
94. SeeLujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (holding that burden
of establishing standing falls on party invoking jurisdiction).
95. Katz, 5 F.3d at 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
96. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
97. Id.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). Section 261 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]n assignment
... shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser... for a valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its
date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase." Id.
99. Katz 5 F.3d at 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
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agreement granting ASP an exclusive license to make, use, and sell
devices covered by Theodore's patents in return for ASP paying
Theodore royalties."0 Theodore and ASP had subsequently execut-
ed an amendment to the exclusive license agreement, which stated
that Theodore was assigning his entire right, title, and interest in
certain patents, including the patents at issue, to ASP. 101 The
amendment also granted ASP the right and sole discretion to sue for
patent infringement.02 Theodore's attorneys later sent a letter to
ASP announcing that he was rescinding the agreement and ordering
ASP to stop using the patents, but ASP asserted that it had never
received the letter.
0 3
Katz, who had become interested in the patents at issue, had at
some point contacted Theodore.'O° Katz averred that he had made
a search of the assignment records of the PTO, but found no record
of any prior assignment of the patents. 5 Katz and Theodore then
executed documents assigning Theodore's entire right, title, and
interest in the patents to Katz. 0 6 In addition, Theodore and Katz
had executed another agreement assigning Katz all rights in the Theo-
dore/ASP exclusive license agreement, including the right to sue
ASP. 0 7  This Theodore/Katz agreement, however, made no men-
tion of the amendment to the Theodore/ASP agreement.
08
Meanwhile, ASP continued to manufacture products covered by the
patents until Katz began suing ASP's customers, including Lear
Siegler, Inc." 9
LSI had moved for summaryjudgment on the ground that Katz had
no standing to sue."0 As noted above, the district court granted
LSI's motion, finding that ASP, not Katz, had title to the patents."'
On appeal, Katz argued that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment because a genuine issue of fact existed regarding
whether Katz had notice of the earlier assignment to ASP within the
meaning of § 261.112 Accepting Katz's assertions that Katz had no
100. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
101. Id.
102. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 n.6.
103. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
104. Id.
105. Id.






112. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
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actual notice of the amendment to the Theodore/ASP assignment
and that Katz had searched the PTO records and found nothing
about the patents, the Federal Circuit found no error in the district
court's grant of summary judgment." 3
The court explained that the "notice" required by § 261 "includes
constructive and inquiry notice."" 4 The Federal Circuit noted that
the district court had not rested its decision on the grounds that Katz
had actual notice, but had considered the dispositive issue to be
whether, as a matter of law, Katz could be charged with constructive
or inquiry notice.1 5 .The court rejected Katz's contention that
constructive notice is limited to the notice provided by the recording
system of § 261.11' The court indicated that "constructive notice
may also be based on any facts within the purchaser's knowledge, or
means of knowledge, that should logically lead him, through
removable inquiry, to knowledge of the prior unrecorded assign-
ment."
1 17
The undisputed facts convinced the court that Katz was properly
held to inquiry notice."8  The court noted that Katz was experi-
enced in acquiring and enforcing patents and his purpose in
acquiring the patents at issue was to enforce them; Katz knew of the
Theodore/ASP license agreement; Katz also knew that ASP had been
manufacturing and selling products covered by the patents, and ASP
had never paid any royalties required by the license agreement but
not required by the amendment; Katz had twice contacted ASP
regarding the patents; and Katz had a continuing working relationship
with Theodore."9 The Federal Circuit found, as did the district
court, that under such circumstances, a person exercising ordinary
care should have asked minimal, obvious questions concerning
Theodore's contractual relationship with ASP.'2
Because there was no evidence of such an inquiry by Katz, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding
that Katz could not rely on 35 U.S.C. § 261 for standing.'2' None-
theless, the court vacated the summary judgment because the district
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Film Tec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1574, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1508, 1512-13 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Taylor Engines, Inc. v. All Steel Engines, Inc., 192 F.2d
171, 174, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1951).
115. Katz, 5 F.3d at 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting ALBERT H. WALKER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 281 (4th ed. 1904)).
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court had not considered whether the amendment to the
Theodore/ASP license agreement was void for lack of consideration,
a question that implicated Katz's standing to sue and, therefore, the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.
1 22
In addition to having jurisdiction over appeals from district courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a) (1), the Federal Circuit also hasjurisdiction
over various appeals from the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences 123 (Board). For example, under 35 U.S.C. § 141, a
party to an interference, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the
Board on the interference, may appeal the decision to the Federal
Circuit.1 24
The Federal Circuit addressed the question of whether it had such
jurisdiction over an appeal from the Board in Davis v. Loesch,' a
case which arose from an interference proceeding. Davis and
Granger, who were named as joint inventors in the patent and in the
reissue application involved in the interference action, had been
deemed a single party designated as "Davis et al." in the interference
proceeding.1 26  Similarly, Loesch, St. John, and Mints, who were
named as joint inventors in their application, had been deemed a
single party designated as "Loesch et al." 27 The court faced the
question of whether it had jurisdiction over the appellant where the
notice of appeal did not bear the names of both Davis and Granger
as seeking review, but instead was captioned "DAVIS ET AL."
128
The court noted that in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,'29 which
involved application of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure,3 ° the Supreme Court held that the appellate court
lacked jurisdiction over a party that is not named in the notice of
appeal from ajudgment of a district court and that the words "et al."
in the notice of appeal were not sufficient to identify the party.1
3
1
The Federal Circuit noted that Davis involved not Rule 3, but Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which deals with the
review of orders of administrative agencies, boards, and commis-
sions.3 2 Noting that the language of Rule 3 is very similar to that
122. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1988).
124. Id.
125. 998 F.2d 963, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
126. Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 963, 966, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 965-66, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
129. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
130. FED. R. App. P. 3.
131. Davis, 998 F.2d at 966, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
132. Id.
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of Rule 15 and that the rationale of Torres appeared to apply in a Rule
15 context, the court assumed, without deciding, that the Torres
rationale applies generally to Rule 15 appeals. 3 The Federal
Circuit determined, however, that the Torres rationale did not govern
the case at hand because Davis, unlike Torres, did not involve more
than one appellant."
The court observed that, according to the long-standing interfer-
ence practice of the PTO, the PTO had deemed each set of joint
inventors as constituting a single party and had designated them as
such.13 5 Thus, "Davis et al.," although signifying two inventors, was
but one party.3 6 In contrast, the "et al." designation in Torres had
signified multiple parties.3 7 Therefore, the court held that it had
jurisdiction as the notice of appeal met the requirement of Rule




Katz v. Lear Siegle, Inc.i3 9 also involved a question relating to
venue. Katz had brought the action against LSI in the Western
District of New York.' 40 ' LSI defaulted, but before entering judg-
ment on the default, the New York District Court granted LSI's
motion to set aside the entry of default and entertained its motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer for improper venue.141 The
district court, after analyzing the question of venue, found that New
York was not the proper venue because LSI neither resided in New
York nor had a regular and established place of business in New
York.142 Furthermore, Katz failed to show that LSI committed any
acts of infringement in New York. The district court therefore




135. Id.; see also Manny v. Garlick, 135 F.2d 757, 768, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 388 (C.C.P.A.
1943) (stating that joint inventors are designated single party by PTO in interference
proceedings).
136. Davis, 998 F.2d at 966, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
137. Id.
138. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
139. 5 F.3d 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1069
(1994).
140. Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 5 F.3d 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1069 (1994).
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § li00(b) (1988) (permitting district court to transfer case to
proper venue instead of dismissing case).
143. Katz, 5 F.3d at 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
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On appeal, Katz did not dispute the substance of the venue
determination. 14' Instead, Katz argued that LSI had "waived any
objection to venue by its default and that the objection could not be
revived by the district court's setting aside of the default."'45 LSI
argued, and the district court agreed, that "no authority is inconsis-
tent with allowing" a challenge to venue, following a default, once
that default has been set aside. 4 ' The Federal Circuit, however,
determined that previous cases and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure make it clear that in a case such as this, LSI waived its
objection to venue.'
47
The court pointed to the well-established principle that venue is
Waived by a defaulting defendant.'" The court rejected LSI's
argument that the setting aside of the default per se revived its ability
to object to venue.149 The court held that LSI's assertion of a lack
of proper venue was waived because it was not made before the time
when LSI was required to appear in response to the complaint, as
indicated by the plain wording of Rule 12(h)(1).5o Accordingly,
the court held that the New York District Court erred in transferring
the case under § 1406(a) for improper venue. 5'
C. Choice of Law
As explained in Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok International Ltd.,5 2
the Federal Circuit reviews procedural matters under the law of the
regional circuit in which the district court sits. 53 The Federal
Circuit also defers to the law of the regional circuit when addressing
substantive legal issues over which the Federal Circuit does not have




147. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (1) ("A defense of.
improper venue ... is waived ... if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included
in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof.. . ."); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343
(1960) (holding that defendant who fails to assertvenue, orwho defaults, thereby waives venue).
148. 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3829 (2d ed. 1986).
149. Kat4 5 F.3d at 1502, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (citing Bavouset v. Shaw's of San
Francisco, 43 F.R.D. 296, 299 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ("The fact that a court has allowed a party in
default to proceed in the suit and answer the complaint does not automatically put the
defaulting party in the position of one who is making a timely response to a complaint.")).
150. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
151. Id.
152. 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
153. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 987, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
154. Id. at 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
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issues within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, including patent law,
the Federal Circuit applies its own law.
155
During 1993, the court consistently applied these choice-of-law
rules. As discussed below, a question raised in Delta-X Corp. v. Baker
Hughes Production Tools, Inc., 56 relating to a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), was decided by applying the law
of the Fifth Circuit; this question was a procedural one, not pertaining
to the court's statutory mandate as a national court of appeals.'57
Similarly, in Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 58 the Federal Circuit
applied the law of the Sixth Circuit in reviewing and affirming a
decision of the district court denying Herman Miller, Inc.'s motion
for permissive intervention.'59
In contrast, in Broyhill Furniture Industries, Inc. v. CrafimasterFurniture
Corp., 6 the Federal Circuit, after noting that it generally defers to
the law of the regional circuit, in reviewing a ruling on a Rule 60(b)
motion, did not accord such deference because the district court's
ruling on the Rule 60(b) motion turned on substantive matters
unique to patent law-i.e., whether a consent judgment enjoining
infringement should be set aside following a judicial determination
that the patent was procured through inequitable conduct in the
PTO. 6' In Payless Shoesource, discussed above, 62 the court also
applied its own law in reviewing a denial of a motion for preliminary
injunctive relief for alleged design patent infringement.
63
D. Law of the Case
In BIG Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc.,'64 the
Federal Circuit held that its prior opinion 165 in the case did not
preclude the district court from considering BIC's defense of absolute
155. Id. at 988, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
156. 984 F.2d 410, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
157. Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 412, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1447, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
158. 12 F.3d 1090, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159. Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090, 1092, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368, 1369-70
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that when reviewing procedural matter not unique to patent law,
Federal Circuit uses law of regional circuit).
160. 12 F.3d 1080, 1084, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
161. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1084, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
162. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
163. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985,987-88,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1518 (Fed Cir. 1993).
164. 1 F.3d 1214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
165. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 228 U.S.P.Q. 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cer. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986) (WindsuYfing I).
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intervening rights that was raised at the damages phase of the
trial.'66 In general, the "doctrine of law of the case points that once
a court decides a rule of law, that decision should govern the same
issue throughout later stages of that case."167  In Windsurfing I,
however, the court was presented only with the issue of a
codefendant's waiver of an equitable intervening rights defense to an
injunction.16 Because the court had only addressed equitable
intervening rights during the liability phase of the case, consideration




Ordinarily, an order denying or granting discovery is not appeal-
able."' As noted by the court in the following case, however, an
"order denying discovery of a nonparty, issued ... ancillary to the
subject action, is final and appealable."'
Katz v. Batavia Marine & Sporting Supplies, Inc.172 arose out of a
suit filed by Katz against Batavia for infringement of a patent for a
combined key chain and tear-gas sprayer.17' During discovery, Katz
had learned that Batavia had purchased tear-gas products from Smith
& Wesson. 4 Seeking to identify these products, Katz served Def-Tec
Corporation, the successor in interest to Smith & Wesson's tear-gas
enterprise, with a notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum
175
The subpoena issued by the district court requested a broad range of
documents, including any documents in Def-Tec's possession or
control relating to acquisition or sale of any patent and any docu-
ments relating to the development, manufacture, marketing, or sale
of MACE®.7 6
Def-Tec sought relief from the third-party discovery, contending
that Katz sought discovery of trade secrets and proprietary informa-
tion, that one of Def-Tec's competitors was a party to the suit, and
166. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also infra Part VI.D.1. (discussing intervening rights).
167. BIG Leisure Products, 1 F.3d at 1222, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (citing Christianson
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)).
168. Windsurfing 1, 782 F.2d at 997, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562.
169. BIC Leisure Products, 1 F.3d at 1222, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
170. Katz v. Batavia Marine & Sporting Supplies, Inc., 984 F.2d 422, 424, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1547, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
171. Id.
172. 984 F.2d 422, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
173. Batavia Marine, 984 F.2d at 423, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
174. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-48.
175. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
176. Id. at 423-24, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
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that the notice did not contain reasonable particularity as required by
Rule 30(b) (6).1 77  In particular, Def-Tec argued that the subpoe-
naed information was irrelevant and included confidential material,
and therefore should not be subject to discovery. 78 The district
court quashed Katz's subpoena, holding that Katz had failed to show
that the discovery was "necessary and relevant in response to Def-Tec's
prima facie showing that it was oppressive."1
79
Katz argued in his appeal that he was not seeking confidential
information and that none of the requested information had been
specifically identified as confidential by Def-Tec.8 ° Further, Katz
argued that the documents had been reviewed by Def-Tec, or its
counsel, or the district court for confidential content. 181  The
Federal Circuit observed that relevancy for purposes of Rule 26(b),
which applies to discovery of parties and nonparties, is broadly
construed, and that nonparty status may be considered in weighing
the burdens imposed by discovery requests.8 2 The court held that
Katz had not established a need for the breadth of information
requested sufficient to overcome Def-Tec's showing that the requested
discovery was burdensome.' The court observed that the litigation
concerned the patented key-ring/tear-gas product, but held that the
pertinence of the requested documents far exceeded this narrow
subject matter.8 4 The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the
district court had not abused its discretion in denying the discov-
ery.
8 5
Similarly, in Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Mille, Inc.' the Federal
Circuit reviewed a district court's denial of a motion to compel a
nonparty's production of documents. 87  Haworth had sued a
number of parties, including Allsteel, for infringing patents asserted
against Herman Miller.88 The Allsteel litigation was terminated
177. Id. at 424, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
178. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
179. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
180. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
181. Id.
182. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548; see also Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d
1318, 1326, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1701-02 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that for purposes of
discovery, relevancy to subject matter is construed broadly); American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer
Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 738, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that nonparty
status weighs against disclosure in discovery request).
183. Batavia Marine, 984 F.2d at 425, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 998 F.2d 975, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
187. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 998 F.2d 975, 976, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1469,
1469 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
188. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
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following settlement 89  In the present case against Haworth,
Herman Miller sought discovery of the documents relating to the
other litigation, including documents concerning Haworth's position
regarding various Allsteel products and correspondence between
Haworth and Allsteel.90 Although Allsteel had produced several
thousand pages of documents in response to Herman Miller's
demand, it refused to provide details of its settlement agreement with
Haworth on the grounds that production would violate the duty of
confidentiality imposed by the agreement. 9' Herman Miller then
filed a motion to compel production in a district court outside the
jurisdiction where the present suit was pending. 9 The district court
denied this motion on the grounds that judicial economy and
efficiency required Herman Miller to first try to obtain the settlement
documents from Haworth, the opposing party, in the district court
presiding over the underlying case. 93
Herman Miller argued on appeal that: (1) the district court clearly
erred in finding that Herman Miller had not sought production of
the settlement documents from Haworth; (2) the district court could
not properly require Herman Miller to seek discovery of documents
from Haworth before requesting a third party to produce them; and
(3) the district court's denial of discovery was improper because the
scope of the subpoena would include settlement documents in
Allsteel's sole possession. 94 The Federal Circuit noted that, in
situations in which discovery is pursued outside the jurisdiction of the
pending suit, local jurisdiction may be involved to decide discovery
matters in an ancillary proceeding,'95 and then proceeded to
consider Herman Miller's arguments.
1 96
The Federal Circuit rejected Herman Miller's first argument that it
had sought production of the Haworth-Allsteel settlement documents
from Haworth. 97 The court observed that when Herman Miller
moved to compel production from Allsteel, Herman Miller had
merely served Haworth with a production request under Rule 34, and
had not sought to compel production. 98
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 977, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
192. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 977-78, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
195. id at 978, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471 (citing Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 870
F.2d 642, 643, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1247, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
196. Id. at 977, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
197. Id. at 978, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
198. 1&
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Regarding Herman Miller's second argument that nonparty status
did not defer its rights to discovery, the Federal Circuit held that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to require
Herman Miller to first seek discovery of the settlement documents
from Haworth.'99 The court pointed out that Rule 26(b) allows a
district court to limit discovery if it determines the requested discovery
may be obtained from some other source.00
Finally, the court rejected Herman Miller's argument that the
documents possessed by Haworth were not the same as those
possessed by Allsteel. 20 1 Noting that the "convoluted scenario" spun
by Herman Miller's attorney to explain why potential evidence might
appear only in Allsteel's files revealed the "vast expanse of Herman
Miller's fishing net,"212 the Federal Circuit concluded that Herman
Miller had engaged in overzealous discovery and affirmed the district
court's denial of the motion to compel.
20 3
F Compulsory Counterclaim
The compulsory counterclaim rule is provided in Rule 13(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 214 In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO
Corp.,205 the court considered whether Beech's patent assignment
action against EDO was a compulsory counterclaim that should have
been asserted in a previous trade-secret misappropriation litiga-
tion.
20 6
Beech and EDO had entered into four contracts providing that
EDO would design, develop, and construct a wing structure for a new
composite aircraft.0 7 Under these contracts, EDO had developed
the "H" section technology for attaching spars to the wing skins.
208
EDO had previously filed suit against Beech, alleging, in part, that
Beech had misappropriated trade secrets by using and procuring a
patent to the "H" section technology.209 Before filing its amended
answer in this previous litigation, Beech had become aware, from a
deposition of an EDO employee, of a patent and divisional applica-
199. Id.




204. FED. R. C]V. P. 13(a).
205. 990 F.2d 1237, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
206. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1245-47,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572,
1579-81 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
207. Id. at 1240, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1241, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
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tion filed by EDO on the "H" section technology.20 Beech, howev-
er, failed to file a counterclaim seeking assignment of EDO's
application for the patent.211 The district court then held that the
"H" section technology had become the property of Beech by virtue
of the contracts between the parties and, consequently, that Beech
had not misappropriated any of EDO's trade secrets. 212 Two years
later, Beech made a motion to the district court to enforce the
judgment in the previous litigation, requesting that EDO be ordered
to assign its patent and divisional application on the "H" section
technology to Beech.2 3  The district court declined, stating that
"Beech neither requested nor received any affirmative relief in the
previous litigation 1 4 and noted that Beech's request was barred as
untimely under Rule 59(e).1 5
In the present case, Beech filed a motion for partial summary
judgment asking that EDO's patent and application be assigned to
Beech. 216  Although the district court determined that Beech was
not precluded by the compulsory counterclaim rule, or any other
rule, from requesting that EDO be ordered to assign its patent and
divisional application to Beech, the district court nonetheless denied
Beech's motion.1 7 Beech's primary argument on appeal was that
its assignment claim was not based on any of the contracts between
the parties, but was based on the judgment in the previous litigation,
and, therefore, that Rule 13(a) did not bar Beech from asserting its
assignment claim.
218
The Federal Circuit disagreed and explained that the district court's
judgment in the previous litigation did not create any ownership
rights in Beech against EDO and did not effect an assignment.
21 9
The court found that Beech's assignment claim undeniably arose from
the same contractual relationship at issue in the previous litiga-
tion.220 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the compulsory
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1241-42, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. The decision in the previous case is
reported at EDO Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 990 (D. Kan. 1988), aftd, 911 F.2d
1447 (10th Cir. 1990).
213. Beech, 990 F.2d at 1242, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
214. See id. (citing district court's refusal to enforce judgment of previous litigation).
215. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576-77.
216. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
217. Id. at 1244, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (holding that court was unable to grant relief
requested because it was for PTO to determine effects of court's previous judgment).
218. Id. at 1245-46, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
219. Id. at 1246, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
220. Id.
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counterclaim rule precluded Beech's belated claim for assignment in
the present case.22'
G. Summary Judgment
In 1993, the Federal Circuit reviewed several summary judgments
entered by trial courts. The first three cases discussed below deal with
the standard courts follow in making summary decisions, while the last
case discussed in this subsection deals with the question of when a
district court can sua sponte enter summary judgment.
As explained in Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock,
Inc.,' summary judgment is proper only in situations in which the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and administration
on file, along with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to
judgment.23 A fact is material if it is relevant and necessary to the
proceedings and may affect the outcome of the decision.22 '4  The
moving party shows the existence of a genuine issue by presenting
evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable fact-finder to decide the
question in favor of that party.225 The evidence submitted by the
nonmovant in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is to be
considered true, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the
nonmovant's favor.2 In its de novo review of a summary judgment
motion, the Federal Circuit applies the same legal standard as used
by the district court in determining the propriety of summary judg-
ment.
227
"This standard," said the court in Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v.
KLM Laboratories, Inc.,22 "provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
229
Summary judgment thus is not proper where the evidence presents
221. Id.
222. 997 F.2d 1444, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
223. See Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1449, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
224. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
225. Keystone, 997 F.2d at 1449, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248).
226. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
227. Id. at 1450, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
228. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
229. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1184-85, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248).
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a disagreement sufficient to require submission to a jury, but is
proper where the evidence is so one-sided that a party must prevail as
a matter of law.230
The Federal Circuit emphasized the required absence of a genuine
issue of material fact in McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.
231
Observing that the moving party bears the initial burden of demon-
strating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact,232 the court
found that Arkansas Power & Light (AP&L) had satisfied its burden.
To support its motion for summary judgment regarding shop
rights,2 3 AP&L presented three affidavits, deposition testimony, and
a statement of uncontested facts as required under Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 The burden, therefore, shifted
to McElmurry to come forward with evidence showing specific facts
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.235  The court held that
McElmurry's reliance on conclusory statements and denials in the
pleadings23 6 was insufficient to raise the genuine issue of material
fact necessary to avoid summary judgment.
237
In another case where the Federal Circuit applied the summary
judgment standard, Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock,
Inc.,238 the question was whether Keystone's evidence regarding
overall similarity raised a genuine issue of material fact precluding the
district court's granting of a motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement of Keystone's design patent.239  In opposing the
motion, Keystone had submitted evidence of actual confusion between
Keystone's blocks and the defendant's blocks.240 Crediting this
evidence and giving Keystone the benefit of all inferences, the Federal
Circuit held that Keystone failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact regarding overall similarity because Keystone's evidence
was primarily relevant to the unpatented wall and not to the claimed
230. Id.
231. 995 F.2d 1576, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
232. McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1578,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
233. See infra Part V.E (discussing holding on shop rights).
234. McElmuny, 995 F.2d at 1578, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
235. Id.
236. Id. (noting that McElmurry denied many of AP&L's uncontested facts and requests for
admissions as well as responding that it lacked information necessary to answer many
interrogatories).
237. Id.
238. 997 F.2d 1444, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
239. Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Another issue raised was whether, in granting summaryjudgment
of noninfringement, the district court misapplied the law of design patent infringement. The
portion of the opinion dealing with this issue is discussed below.
240. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1994] 1283
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1259
design of the individual blocks.241 Accordingly, because Keystone's
evidence opposing summaryjudgment failed to show a genuine issue
of material fact, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had
not erred in granting the motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement.
242
In all of the above cases, the Federal Circuit considered the issue
of whether summary judgment should have been granted. In
International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Manufacturing Co.,243 the
Federal Circuit was faced with the question of whether a ruling of
summaryjudgment of noninfringement was precluded merely because
the party found not to infringe had not moved for summaryjudgment
on that particular theory.2'
International Visual Corporation (VC) filed a complaint alleging
that Crown's device infringed IVC's patent.245 Crown then counter-
claimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity,
and unenforceability. 46 IVC then moved for summary judgment on
the issues of infringement, willful infringement, and Crown's invalidity
defense.247 Crown responded by moving for summary judgment on
the issues of invalidity and unenforceability, but not on the issue of
noninfringement. 2 8  The district court denied IVC's motion,
granted Crown's motion on noninfringement grounds, and dismissed
the case. 249
On appeal, IVC argued that the district court was precluded from
granting the summary judgment for noninfringement because Crown
had not specifically moved for summary judgment on that particular
issue." ° The Federal Circuit noted that district courts have the
power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, as long as the losing
party was notified that it had to come forward with all of its evi-
dence." a Because IVC had notice that the issue of noninfringement
was before the court on the parties' cross-motions, 2 the district
241. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03.
242. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
243. 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
244. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 768, 26 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1588, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 1993).





250. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
251. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (holding that district court
may grant summary judgment on issue properly before court)).
252. Id. at 770, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. IVC had stated that "the infringement issue
is now ripe for summary adjudication," and had argued the issue on several occasions. Id.
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court was not precluded from sua sponte granting summary judgment
for noninfringement." 3
As the above cases illustrate, a proper entry of summary judgment
will preclude the issue summarily decided from reaching a jury."
This should be distinguished from the right to a trial by jury, which
is addressed in the next case.
H. Right to a Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides for the
right to a trial byjury."5 In Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM
Laboratories, Inc.,2 6 the court was presented with the question of
whether a patentee has a right to ajury trial on the issue of culpable
intent, which is a factual element of the defense of inequitable con-
duct. 7 Acknowledging that statements in a number of Supreme
Court cases refer to intent as an issue to be resolved by a jury, the
Federal Circuit distinguished the present case by explaining that those
cases did not involve intent in the context of an equitable de-
fense.258
The court noted that the patent-infringement defense of inequita-
ble conduct is entirely equitable in nature and cited precedent for the
proposition that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is
applicable to actions at law, but not at equity. 9 Thus, a disputed
finding of intent to mislead or deceive the PTO during the prosecu-
tion of a patent application, a finding that is material to the equitable
issue of inequitable conduct, is an issue for the judge, not the jury, to
decide.2 °
As the above cases show, there are a variety of possible impediments
a litigant may face in trying to get their case before ajury. Even when
a litigant is successful in presenting the case to a jury and obtaining
a verdict, the litigant may be confronted with other obstacles to
253. Id.
254. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
255. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII.
256. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
257. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court previously held in Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst
Lighting Co., that the decision regarding inequitable conduct is a discretionary decision to be
made by the judge on her or his own factual findings. 820 F.2d 1209, 1211-13, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2015, 2017-19 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
258. Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567-68.
259. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568; see also United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706
(1950) (stating that Seventh Amendment is not applicable to equity actions and only applies to
actions at law).
260. Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
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gaining the benefit of the jury's verdict, as the cases in later subsec-
tions illustrate. 61
. Jury Instructions
As observed in Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Production Tools,
Inc., 2 2 when a review of jury instructions in their entirety reveals
that errors in the instructions, taken as a whole, clearly misled the
jury, an appellate court will order a new trial.2 63  To prevail in a
challenge to the correctness of jury instructions, a party must show
not only that there was a fatal error in the jury instructions, but also
that the party properly preserved the issue for appeal by requesting




In Delta-X the appellant, Baker, contended that several isolated
references in the instructions could have confused the jury about its
role in interpreting patent claims. 26' Baker had objected to the jury
instructions at trial and asked the judge to interpret the claims and
resolve issues about the meaning of the word "comparator" in the
claims.266 In particular, Baker had requested that the judge instruct
the jury that, as a matter of law, a comparator and a computer are not
the same.26 The judge denied the request and submitted the
dispute over the meaning of claim terminology to the jury.21 On
appeal, Baker argued that the district court had instructed the jury
that the court would interpret the claims, but never did so. Baker
contended that this created uncertainty about whether the jury had
properly interpreted the claims.269
The Federal Circuit found that excerpts from the jury instructions
did suggest that the district court would interpret the claims for the
jury.270 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the instructions were
261. See infra Part I.I-K.
262. 984 F.2d 410, 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1450-51 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
263. Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1447, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
264. Id. (citing Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2957 (1992)); see also Goodwall Constr.
Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751,755, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420, 1423-24 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that district court had no obligation to issue curative instructions because Goodwall's
closing argument, which was alleged by Beers to be inconsistent with Goodwall's position in
prosecuting its patent before PTO, did not affect validity or enforceability of patent and
because parties' consent order foreclosed introduction of validity issues at trial).
265. Delta-Z 984 F.2d at 414-15, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51.
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not misleading when considered in their entirety.271 Reviewing the
jury instructions for prejudicial error, the Federal Circuit found that
the instructions made clear that the jury was to resolve evidentiary
disputes concerning claim terms and to determine whether Baker's
products infringed the patent.272  Because the jury returned a
finding of infringement, the court concluded that the jury must have
resolved the dispute over the meaning of "comparator."2 73 Thus,
there was no error "so egregious as to mislead the jury and require a
new trial."274
J. Jury Verdict Form
The court considered the propriety of a jury verdict form in
Goodwall Construction Co. v. Beers Construction Co.2' The court's
verdict form gave the jury a blank to answer "yes" or "no" to the
question of literal infringement and a blank to answer "yes" or "no"
to the question of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for
each asserted patent claim.2 76 According to the court's instructions,
however, the doctrine of equivalents was not to be addressed if the
jury found literal infringement.277  For each claim, the jury an-
swered "yes" to the question of literal infringement but, as instructed,
answered "no" to the question of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.278 On post-trial motions, the district court determined
that the jury instructions had precluded the jury from finding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 279 The district court
granted Goodwall's motion for judgment on infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents under Rule 50(b)2 0 after finding that the
tripartite test was met and that the recognized limitations on the





274. Id. (citingJamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 756 F.2d 1556, 1558, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 253, 255 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
275. 991 F.2d 751, 756-57, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420, 1424-25 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
276. Goodwall Constr. Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751,756,26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1420, 1425
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 757, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
279. Id.
280. FED. R CIv. P. 50(b).
281. Goodwall Constr., 991 F.2d at 758, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425. See Part IV.B.2 for
discussion regarding the tripartite test and recognized limitations, i.e., the prior art and
prosecution history.
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The Federal Circuit determined that the district court had acted
properly but should have invoked Rule 49(a), rather than Rule
50(b).8 2 Because neither party had objected to the verdict form
that was used, both parties waived the right to a jury trial on
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents if the jury found
literal infringement.2 3 Rule 49(a) was the appropriate vehicle for
the court to enter judgment because the jury had provided answers
to some, but not all, verdict interrogatories and those answers
disposed of the case.
284
K Judgment As a Matter of Law/Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Appealing a judgment entered on a jury verdict after denial of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(b), the appellant must show that: "(1) reasonable
persons could not in light of the evidence before them have found
the facts necessary to support the verdict; or (2) the facts properly
found cannot in law support the verdict."285  But, as the decisions
below illustrate, an appellant must first move for a directed verdict at
the close of evidence to obtain review of a denial of a Rule 50(b)
motion.
Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,286 raised the question of
whether the sufficiency of evidence underlying a district court's denial
of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict287 on a jury's
verdict of infringement was reviewable on appeal where the alleged
infringer moved for summaryjudgment before trial but failed to move
for a directed verdict at the close of evidence. 288  The Federal
Circuit determined that it was precluded from reviewing the sufficien-
282. Goodwall Constr., 991 F.2d at 757, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425. Rule 49(a) provides
that if, when a court employs special interrogatories, it "omits any issues of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted
unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue
omitted without such demand the court may make a finding .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
283. Goodwall Consir., 991 F.2d at 757, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
284. Id.; see also Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that failure to demand that issue be presented to jury results in consent to
judicial judgment on issue); Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553-54, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (concluding that motion on issue not resolved
byjury is motion for judgment under Rule 49(a)).
285. Mentor v. Coloplast, 998 F.2d 992, 994, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
286. 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
287. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir.
1993). The case was heard and decided before December 1, 1991, the effective date of the
amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), which now refers toJNOV as "judgment as a matter of
law." Wang; 993 F.2d at 860 n.1, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770 n.1.
288. Id. at 869, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
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cy of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict of infringement as the
alleged infringer, NEC, failed to raise this factual issue in a timely
manner.
289
The court acknowledged that the standard for summary judgment
is virtually the same as that for a directed verdict-that there is only
one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.29° Under Rule 50(b),
however, a motion for a directed verdict is a prerequisite to a motion
for JNOV.1' NEC's motion for summary judgment before trial was
not a substitute for a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all
the evidence.292 The court, therefore, held that the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying the district court's denial of JNOV was
unreviewable.
293
L. District Court Findings
Cablestrand Corp. v. Wallsheine4 highlighted the importance of
findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 52(a), as
providing a basis for review." Following a bench trial, the district
court had issued a final judgment, which contained a general verdict
stating simply that defendant Melvin Wallshein takesjudgment against
plaintiff Cablestrand Corporation on defendant's counterclaim and
that defendant Weiss is awarded judgment."6 The district court had
not filed any findings of fact or conclusions of law.297 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit faced a number of issues, including patent validity,
infringement, laches, estoppel, and personal liability. None of these
issues had been mentioned in the district court's judgment.298 The
Federal Circuit held that the judgment of the district court provided
an insufficient basis for reviewing such a complex case.299 Conse-
quentiy, the court vacated the decision and remanded the case for
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 (a).300
289. Id. The court disagreed with NEC's contention that the issue of infringement, entailing
the issue of claim construction, could be decided as a matter of law without reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence. Id.
290. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
291. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
292. Wang, 993 F.2d at 869, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
293. Id.; see also Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that district court erred in granting
JNOV motion without motion for directed verdict).
294. 989 F.2d 472, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
295. Cablestrand Corp. v. Wallshein, 989 F.2d 472, 473, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079, 1079
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
296. Id.
297. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
298. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
299. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
300. Id.
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Similarly, in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,3 ' the court,
for a second time in this case, vacated and remanded the district
court's judgment because the district court did not provide findings
of fact as required by Rule 52(a).0 2 On the first remand, the
district court had found that:
the patent was not invalid under the on sale bar because Faytere
had failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a sale or offer
for sale by Atlantic prior to the critical date. While Atlantic had
negotiated with Triangle before the critical date, the district court
held that these preliminary negotiations were directed to the
necessity of further testing and development. The court therefore
reaffirmed its findings that Atlantic's activities before the critical
date were for experimental purposes, and not for profit.30 3
The court, with one judge dissenting,"' found that this opinion set
forth, rather than the relevant factual findings, conclusory findings
regarding the question of patent validity under the on-sale bar of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) and remanded the case a second time.3°5
M. Motion for Setting Aside Judgment/New Trial
A party may move to set aside judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Circuit reviewed an
order denying a motion under Rule 60(b) (3) to set aside judgment
on grounds of fraud in Fraige v. American-National Watermattress
Corp
06
Fraige and Vinyl Products (collectively Vinyl Products) sued
American-National claiming infringement of Vinyl Products' patent to
a waterbed mattress containing certain fibers for reducing wave
motion.0 7 Vinyl Products moved for a preliminary injunction,
which American-National opposed, submitting in support of its
opposition, false and forged documentation."0 ' American-National
submitted declarations by its president falsely attesting that an
301. 5 F.3d 1477, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
302. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1478, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
303. Id. at 1478-79, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344-45.
304. The dissent indicated that "the record itself discloses an unmistakable path to the
district court's legaljudgment." Id. at 1482, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (Rader,J., dissenting).
The majority replied,"That the record may support findings that could be implied from the
district court opinion does not satisfy the requirement that findings adequate to support the
judgment be 'specially' found." Id. at 1480, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347.
305. Id. at 1481-82, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347. The on-sale bar is discussed below.
306. 996 F.2d 295, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
307. Fraige v. American-National Watermattress Corp., 996 F.2d 295, 296, 27 U.S.P.QJ
2 d
(BNA) 1149, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
308. Id.
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advertisement, which was altered to show the presence of fibers inside
a waterbed mattress, predated the filing date of the application that
matured into the patent in suit."0 American-National's president
also falsely attested that his company's predecessor had sold
fiber-filled mattresses more than one year before the filing of the
patent application."0 Relying on this false evidence, the district
court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction."
While the case was being tried before ajury Vinyl Products became
aware of American-National's fraud and attempted to present
evidence of the fraud to the court. 12 After American-National's
counsel denied any misconduct, represented that experts would refute
the fraud allegations, and objected to Vinyl Products' attempts to have
the evidence on fraud admitted, the district court excluded the
evidence and ruled that it would hear the matter after the trial."'
After trial, the court entered judgment based on the jury's special
verdicts that the patent was infringed but invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102, 103, and 112.14 At the post-trial hearing, American
-National's attorneys admitted that they did not have any expert
testimony to refute Vinyl Products' allegation.1 After the post-trial
hearing on the fraud issue, the district court found that
American-National's president had practiced a fraud on the court
and, therefore, the court imposed sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."1 6 Vinyl Products then moved
under Rule 60(b) (3) for the court to set aside the verdict of invalidity
based on American-National's fraud. 7 The district court acknowl-
edged that American-National's president had filed false and forged
documents relevant to the question of whether the claimed mattress
was in the prior art, but nonetheless denied the Rule 60(b) motion
based on its belief that the tainted evidence had not infected the trial
and on its conclusion that invalidity was sustainable on grounds
independent from the § 102 on-sale bar.1 The district court









317. Id. at 297, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
318, Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150-51.
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though it acknowledged that certain witnesses who testified had seen
the forged advertisement."1 9
The Federal Circuit found that the district court committed clear
error in finding that the tainted evidence was neither presented at
trial nor shown to any witness who testified.32 The court further
determined that even if the jury's verdict of invalidity under § 112
could not have been affected by the fraud, the judgment could not
stand." The Federal Circuit therefore held that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment of invalidity
and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the question
of invalidity.
3 22
In Broyhill Furniture Industry, Inc. v. Crafimaster Furniture Corp.,
23
the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to grant
Craftmaster's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a consent judgment.3
2 4
This consent judgment enjoined Craftmaster from infringing a
Broyhill patent.3" After this consent judgment was entered, anoth-
er district court, resolving an earlier filed lawsuit, found that Broyhill's
patent was unenforceable because Broyhill had engaged in inequitable
conduct during prosecution before the PTO. 26 Following the
invalidation of the patent, Craftmaster moved the court to void the
consent judgment and for permission to bring counterclaims against
Broyhill for fraud against both Craftmaster and the court.217 The
district court granted both of Craftmaster's motions.
328
319. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
320. Id. at 298, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
321. Id. at 297, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151 (finding persuasive Supreme Court's rationale
behind order setting aside judgment in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238 (1944)). Following the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit determined that: first, the fraud
was clearly established because American-National's president had deliberately schemed to
interfere with the judicial process; second, the fraud was not only a wrong against the judicial
system and Vinyl Products, but involved a matter of public concern; and, finally,
American-National was in no position to dispute the effectiveness of its fraud, and the fraud's
impact on the jury's invalidity verdicts was merely speculative. Id. at 298-99, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1152.
322. Id. at 300, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153.
323. 12 F.3d 1080, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
324. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1081, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
325. Id. at 1082, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
326. Id. (noting that original ruling finding Broyhill's patent unenforceable was appealed
and remanded, and that patent was again invalidated).
327. Id.
328. Id. As the Federal Circuit recounted, the district court had voided the consent
judgment because "'[i]f Broyhill does not possess a valid patent, Craftmaster cannot infringe
Broyhill's patent.'" Id. at 1083-84, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (citing district court opinion).
A second reason for voiding the consentjudgment given by the district court was that "Broyhill
had committed a 'fraud upon the court' within the meaning of the provision in [Rule 60(b))
stating that 'this rule does not limit the power of a court ... to set aside ajudgment for fraud
upon the court.'" Id. at 1083, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
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The Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred in
concluding that the consent judgment enjoining infringement was
void, because Craftsmaster could not infringe Broyhill's unenforceable
patent." 9 The Federal Circuit held that a judgment is void under
Rule 60 (b) (4) only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked
jurisdiction or failed to act in accordance with due process of law.33 °
Because neither of these bases for voiding the consent judgment was
present, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in
granting the motion on the basis of Rule 60 (b) (4).3'
The Federal Circuit also determined that the district court erred in
concluding that Broyhill had committed a "fraud upon the court"
within the meaning of the savings clause. 3 2 The court explained
that such fraud embraces only those species of fraud that subvert or
attempt to subvert the integrity of the court or that have been
perpetuated by officers of the court. 3  Finding that Broyhill's
inequitable conduct before the PTO was not such a species of fraud,
the court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion
in setting aside the consent judgment on the basis of the savings
clause .3' The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's order and
remanded for a determination of whether relief would be appropriate
under other provisions of Rule 60(b)."'
Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc.,33 involved a motion for a new trial.
Mendenhall and his exclusive licensee had sued Cedarapids, alleging
infringement of Mendenhall's two reissue patents relating to a process
for preparing hot-mix asphalt using recycled asphalt.3 37 After a jury
trial, the district court entered a judgment of invalidity in favor of
Cedarapids, accepting the special verdicts that: claims one through
eleven of the first reissue patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103
for obviousness; claims twelve and thirteen of the same patent were
not invalid for obviousness, but claim twelve was invalid under the
second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for indefiniteness; and all claims
329. Id. at 1087, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
330. Id. at 1084, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1085, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
333. Id. at 1085-87, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1087, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. The court indicated that the district court
had correctly concluded that Craftsmaster could not obtain relief under subsection (3) of Rule
60(b), which provides that a court may set aside ajudgment for "fraud," because the motion had
not been filed within the one-year time limitation applicable to this subsection. Id. at 1086, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88.
336. 5 F.3d 1557, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
337. Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1559, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1083
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
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of the second reissue patent were invalid under the public-use bar of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 3 8 Mendenhall filed a motion for a new trial,
which the district court denied. 3 9
The Federal Circuit rejected each of Mendenhall's arguments that
a new trial should have been ordered.340 The court disagreed with
Mendenhall's contention that inconsistencies in the jury's special
verdicts regarding invalidity necessitated a new trial.341 Noting that
a court may properly accept some special verdicts for those issues that
are resolved according to the evidence and law while rejecting
others,34 2 the court held that the district court had not relied on all
of the special verdicts in its judgment, and that there was no
inconsistency in those verdicts on which the court relied. 43 Specifi-
cally, the court saw no inconsistency in the jury finding claims one
through eleven of the first reissue patent obvious while finding claims
twelve and thirteen of the same patent nonobvious, because there
were additional limitations in the latter claims that were properly
given controlling significance.3 44  Concerning the second reissue
patent, the court found that the special verdict, holding that the
claims were not invalid for obviousness and viewed in light of the
principle that "anticipation is the epitome of obviousness," did not
require that the court set aside the verdict of invalidity under the
public-use bar.45
The court also rejected Mendenhall's argument that the jury
instructions were erroneous. 346  Finally, in rejecting Mendenhall's
challenge, the court did not agree that the district court erred as a
matter of law when it admitted the judge's opinion from earlier
litigation against another party involving the patents presently in suit,
which had resulted in a judgment that the patents were not inval-
id.347
338. Id. at 1561-62, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
339. Id. at 1562, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
340. See id. at 1562-76, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086-98 (refusing to grant new trial).
341. See id. (rejecting arguments claiming inconsistent verdicts, erroneous instructions, and
incorrect evidentiary rulings).
342. Id. at 1562-63, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086-87 (citing Quaker City Gear Works, Inc.
v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1136 (1985)).
343. Id. at 1563, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
344. Id.
345. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086-87.
346. See id. at 1563-66, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087-89.
347. Id. at 1566, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
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Reviewing the decision excluding the proffered evidence for an
abuse of discretion,' the court first noted that the opinion in the
previous case could not be used as a collateral estoppel, because
Cedarapids was not a party to that case.' 9  The court then ex-
plained why, contrary to Mendenhall's arguments, the previous
opinion was not controlling under either the court's precedent3 0
or under principles of stare decisisYs51 The court explained that the
two prior cases on which Mendenhall relied dealt with using a district
court's opinion from a previous litigation concerning validity as legal
precedent, not as substantive evidence of disputed facts. 52 After
pointing out that stare decisis is generally inappropriate on the issue of
patent validity,53 the court noted that Mendenhall had failed to
recognize that stare decisis applies only if the underlying factual
findings of the two cases are the same, not merely the evidence."s
Furthermore, whether stare decisis applies is a legal matter for the
judge to decide, not the jury.
355
Turning to Rule 403,56 the court determined that the district
court properly considered all of the proffered evidence in camera and
neither committed error nor abused its discretion in refusing to admit
the opinion from the prior litigation as substantive evidence on all
overlapping issues, especially in light of the high likelihood of
prejudice and confusion that would have resulted if it had been
admitted.3 57  Thus rejecting all of Mendenhall's arguments, the
Federal Circuit upheld the denial of Mendenhall's motion for a new
trial.3
58
348. Id. at 1568-69, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (citing Block v. R.H. Macy& Co., 712 F.2d
1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1983)).
349. Id. at 1569,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (citing Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971), and recognizing that Mendenhall did not assert
collateral estoppel argument).
350. Id. (citing Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 723, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1923, 1926 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
351. Id. at 1570-72, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092-94 (stating that because factual findings
underlying legal determinations were not same, stare dedsis did not apply).
352. Id. at 1570, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092-93.
353. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (citing Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 711,218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 974).
354. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
355. Id. at 1570-71, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
356. FED. R. EvID. 403 (permitting court, at its discretion, to exclude evidence that is
otherwise admissible, but which raises dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or waste
ofjudicial resources).
357. See Mendenhall, 5 F.3d at 1572-75, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094-97 (discussing and
rejecting Mendenhall's argument that evidence or prior patent litigation should be excluded
under Rule 403 because of its prejudicial effect).
358. Id. at 1576, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
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II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
The general requirements for a valid utility patent have a basis in
chapters 10 and 11 of the patent statute, Title 35 of the United States
Code. With respect to the conditions for patentability, the "utility"
requirement is provided at 35 U.S.C. § 101." The "novelty"
requirement is spelled out at 35 U.S.C. § 102," while the
"nonobviousness" requirement is provided at 35 U.S.C. § 103.361
Even if an invention is useful, new, and nonobvious, an inventor
will not be granted a U.S. patent to the invention without fulfilling
other requirements. The patent must be based on an application
having a specification and one or more claims meeting the require-
ments listed at 35 U.S.C. § 112.362 The first paragraph of § 112
contains the "written description," "enablement," and "best mode"
requirements that must be met by the specification. 6 Under the
second paragraph of § 112, the specification must conclude with one
or more claims meeting the "definiteness" requirement and reciting
what the applicant regards as his or her invention. 4
Depending on the type of patent, other requirements must be met
as well. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 171 specifies conditions for a design
patent,3' while 35 U.S.C. § 161 specifies those for a plant pat-
ent.
31
359. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.")
(emphasis added).
360. See iU. § 102 (describing conditions under which novelty exists).
361. See id. § 103 ("A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.").
362. See id. § 112 (outlining specification requirements).
363. See id. ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.").
364. See id ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention").
365. See id. § 171 ("Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
tide.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for design,
except as otherwise provided.").
366. See id. § 161 ("Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and
new variety of plant, including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings,
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this titie.
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Issues relating to some of the general requirements for a valid
utility patent were raised in several cases decided by the Federal
Circuit in 1993 and are discussed in subsection A below. Because the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patentability under
§§ 102 and 103 are common to utility, design, and reissue patents, the
portions of the cases dealing with prior art issues pertaining to these
types of patents are discussed in parts 2 and 3 of subsection A.367
Decisions on issues relating to special requirements for specific types
of patents, namely reissue patents and design patents, are discussed
in subsection B and C respectively.30
I
A. Standard Patentability Requirements
1. 35 U.S.C § 101
Section 101 requires that an invention be "useful."38 9 As apparent
from Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon, Inc.,370 an argument that a
claim encompasses inoperable embodiments or species goes to
whether a claimed invention has practical utility pursuant to § 101
and whether the specification enables one skilled in the art to "use"
the claimed invention pursuant to the first paragraph of § 112.71
A case may also raise the issue of whether the practical utility
requirement and, consequently, the how-to-use requirement have
been met in the context of a prior art rejection. 72 As apparent
from In re Ziegler,73 if a reference is applied as prior art under 35
U.S.C. § 102 (e), an applicant may attempt to "antedate" the reference
by establishing entitlement to a priority date of an earlier application
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for plants,
except as otherwise provided.").
367. See infra notes 379-444 and accompanying text; see also supra note 359.
368. See infra notes 445-99 and accompanying text.
369. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
370. 997 F.2d 870, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
371. Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1126
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (construing Shandon's indefiniteness argument-that Miles' patent claims were
invalid under § 112, second paragraph, because they covered inoperative embodiments-as
challenge to validity under utility requirement of § 101 or enablement requirement of § 112,
first paragraph; court held that claims were not invalid on these grounds because record showed
that challenged embodiments would be operative); see also In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-01,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reporting that "how-to-use" prong of
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 incorporates as matter of law, requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 101 that specification disclose as matter offact, practical utility for claimed invention).
372. See Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1199-1203, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1603 (determining whether practical
utility existed in light of "how-to-use" prong of enablement requirement where there was prior
art rejection).
373. Id. at 1197, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
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under 35 U.S.C. § 119." To establish such entitlement, the prior
application must be shown to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, including the how-to-use requirement, which incorporates the
utility requirement.375
Section 101 also provides the basis for a "double-patenting"
rejection of an application claim by specifying that an inventor is only
entitled to a .single patent for an invention. 76  Thus, where an
inventor obtains a patent claim covering one invention and files
another patent application having a claim of identical scope, the
application claim is unpatentable on the ground of statutory double
patenting.3 77 Where the application claim has a scope that is not
identical to the scope of the patent claim and where a question of the
former's obviousness in view of the latter's is raised, the
double-patenting analysis proceeds to an inquiry under the doctrine
of obviousness-type double patenting.
78
2. Obviousness-type double patenting
As explained in In re Goodman,379 the doctrine of equivalents exists
to prevent extension of the patent right beyond the statutory period
and so rejects claims to subject matter that is not patentably distinct
from subject matter claimed in a prior patent to the same inven-
tion. 8 Thus, a court will inquire whether an application claim
defines an obvious variation of a prior patent claim; if so, the court
will sustain the PTO's rejection for obviousness-type double patenting
in the absence of a terminal disclaimer filed in the application.38" '
The Federal Circuit has also required, in certain circumstances, an
additional inquiry to support an obviousness-type double patenting
rejection. In such circumstances, e.g., where a later-filed improve-
374. See id. at 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (stating that foreign patent application
must meet requirements of§ 112 in order to gain entitlement to priority date under § 119).
375. Id. (explaining that satisfaction of this test requires specification by written description
of invention, manner and process of its manufacture and use in "full, clear, concise, and exact
terms").
376. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (providing that only new inventions or new improvements to
existing inventions can be patented).
377. SeeIn reGoodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052-53,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010,2015-16 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (citing Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894); In reStanley, 214 F.2d 151, 153,
102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 234, 236 (C.C.P.A. 1954)).
378. See id. at 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015 (citing In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 621-22 (C.C.P. 1970)).
379. Id. at 1046, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2010.
380. Id. at 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015 (citing In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
381. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015-16 (citing In re Eckel, 393 F.2d 848, 157 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 415 (C.C.P.A 1968)).
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ment patent issues before an earlier-filed basic patent,382 the rejec-
tion, to be sustained, requires not only that the application claims be
patentably indistinct from the prior patent claims, but also that the
prior patent claims be patentably indistinct from the application
claims.8 The court considered whether the case of Goodman
required such a two-way analysis.384
The broadest of Goodman's application claims,, which Goodman
grouped together on appeal and which thus stood (or fell) togeth-
er,"8 defined a genus of nucleic-acid constructs.386 The court
determined that the claimed genus encompassed the species covered
by a claim of the prior patent, and that the application claims
therefore were not patentably distinct from the prior patent
claims. 387 The court also determined that the circumstances of the
case did not require application of the two-way inalysis."'
The court noted that Goodman, not the PTO, dictated the rate of
prosecution of the generic claims vis-a-vis the narrower claims of the
prior patent.389 Goodman chose to obtain early issuance of its
narrower claims and file a continuation for the broader claims rather
than appeal the rejection of the broader claims to the court.3 90
Accordingly, the lack of patentable distinctness of the application
claims compared to the patent claims was sufficient to sustain the
obviousness-type double patenting rejection.391
Of course, as in Goodman, the PTO, rather than the applicant, may
dictate the rate of prosecution of different claims by imposing a
restriction requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 121,392 as reflected by
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commis-
382. See In re Stanley, 214 F.2d 151, 158, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 234, 240 (C.C.P.A. 1954)
(recounting fact that application for improvements on "Methods and Apparatus for the Fluid
Treatment of Filamentary Materials" was filed prior to application for "Method for Treatment
[o]f Filaments").
383. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1053, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
384. Id.
385. Id. (citing, inter alia, In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
386. Id. at 1049, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
387. Id. at 1053 n.4, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016 n.4 (citing, e.g., In re Van Ornum, 686
F.2d 937, 944, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 761, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).




392. SeeTexas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1168,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Commission issued limited
exclusion order and cease and desist orders to each of five respondents).
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sion. 11 If the PTO requires restriction between two groups of claims
representing independent and distinct inventions and, in response, an
applicant elects one group of claims that ultimately issue in a patent
and files a divisional application to the non-elected group of claims,
then consonance (i.e., the demarcation between the two inventions
that prompted the restriction requirement) must be maintained.'94
Otherwise, the non-consonant claims of the divisional application may
be rejected as obvious in view of the patent claims under the doctrine
of obviousness-type double patenting.
395
3. 35 U.S. C. § 102
An application claim is unpatentable and a patent claim is invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if it is not novel-i.e., "anticipated."'3 96 For
example, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), an inventor will lose any right to
a patent for an invention if it was "on sale" for more than one year
before the filing of the U.S. patent application.3 97
a. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
Section 102(b) of the patent statute operates as an absolute bar to
patentability and precludes the patenting of any invention that was
patented or described in a printed publication in the United States or
a foreign country, or that was publicly used or on sale in the United
States, for more than one year before the filing of the U.S. patent
application. 98 This bar is known as the "on-sale bar" to patentabili-
ty.39
9
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Atlantic Thermoplastics
393. See id. at 1179, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (upholding ITC's determination that
claims were not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting because consonance was
maintained and claims of patent in question were not obvious in view of claims of earlier
patent).
394. See id. (discussing rule that requires that "patentee may not remove a patent from
consideration as a prior art reference pursuant to [§ 112] where the principle of consonance
is violated").
395. See id. (noting that principle of consonance protects patentee's ability to remove patent
from consideration as prior art reference).
396. SeeAkzo N. v. United States ITC, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding proper
application of§ 102 novelty uses standard of anticipation that requires "each and every element"
of claimed invention be disclosed in prior art reference, along with showing that prior art
reference is enabling); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 773, 781 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that § 102 is "usual basis for rejection for lack of novelty or anticipation").
397. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
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Co. v. Faytex Corp.,' commentators have noted that Federal Circuit
decisions relating to the on-sale bar have not provided any sense of
predictability41 on this issue because these Federal Circuit decisions
have set forth several tests for the on-sale bar of § 102(b).42 Under
the test identified in the Atlantic Thermoplastics dissent, "the on-sale bar
requires that: (1) the claimed invention be embodied in or obvious
over the subject matter sold; (2) the operability of the invention must
have been verified by sufficient testing; and (3) the sale must have
been plurality for profit rather than experimental purposes."
403
Another test applied by the Federal Circuit requires: (1) more than
one year before the critical date, there must have been a sale or
definite offer to sell; (2) evidence that the claimed invention is
anticipated by or obvious over the subject matter sold; and (3) an
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the sale in view of the
underlying policies.4°" Finally, in some cases the test simply requires
a consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" in light of the
policies underlying the on-sale bar.4'5 In the following case, the
court apparently applied this last test.
In Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock, Inc.,406 Keystone
asserted that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
for patent invalidity. 7 Keystone argued that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether an embodiment of the
claimed invention was on sale before the critical date required under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 408 The claimed invention related to a retaining
wall made from interlocked blocks and soil-stabilizing fabric
(geo-grid) connected to the wall via pins interconnecting and aligning
the blocks.4' The alleged infringer asserted that the patent was
invalid under § 102(b) because Keystone had offered to sell to a city
a wall system having a pin-connected geo-grid more than one year
400. 5 F.3d 1477, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
401. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1483 n.1, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1343, 1348 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Rader, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 1483, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
403. Id. at 1482, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853, 859-60, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986)).
404. Id. at 1483, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (citing UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816
F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1471-72 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied; 484 U.S. 1025
(1988)).
405. Id. (citing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549-50, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1591-92 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
406. 997 F.2d 1444, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
407. Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1446,27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1297, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (challenging summaryjudgment).
408. Id.
409. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298-99.
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before Keystone filed its U.S. patent application.410  Keystone
conceded that it had offered to sell the city a wall system, but
disputed that this wall system embodied the claimed invention.41 1
As explained by the Federal Circuit, for an on-sale bar to be
triggered, a device, either anticipating or rendering obvious the
claimed invention, must have been on sale or offered for sale
primarily for profit more than one year prior to the critical date, and
the device must have been operable at that time.41 '2 But the claimed
invention need not be reduced to practice to trigger the on-sale
bar.411 "The entirety of the circumstances surrounding the sale, or
offer to sell, including the stage of development and the nature of the
invention, must be balanced against the policies underlying the on-
sale bar of section 102(b)."414
The court noted that the claimed invention required that the
geo-grid be attached to the retaining wall blocks by using the same
aligning pins and by interconnecting the blocks.415  The district
court had found that one of the proposals submitted to the city,
before the critical date, alluded to connection of the geo-grid; the
district court also found that there was no evidence that any means
other than pins had been contemplated or proposed by Keystone.416
The Federal Circuit pointed out, however, that the proposals
submitted by Keystone did not expressly specify that pins aligning and
interconnecting the blocks would anchor the geo-grid. 417  Thus,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found that a
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether an embodi-
ment of the claimed invention was offered for sale before the critical
date.418 The court reversed the district court's granting of summary
judgment on the issue of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).419
In Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 420 a
district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) was also challenged. 421 Here, however, the patent
holder, Paragon, did not claim that a device embodying the patented
410. Id. at 1447, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
411. Id. at 1452, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
412. Id. at 1451, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
413. Id. at 1452, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
414. Id.
415. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1453, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
419. Id.
420. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
421. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1184, 25 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1561, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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invention had been sold before the critical date.422 Paragon only
challenged the district court's decision on summaryjudgment that the
sales were not for experimental purposes and, therefore, did not fall
within the so-called experimental-use exception to the on-sale bar.4
The district court found that Paragon had published price lists and
letters offering for sale the orthotic device claimed in the patent
before the critical date.424 The district court also held that none of
the price lists and letters referred to experimental testing, and that,
as admitted by Paragon, about three hundred of the devices had been
sold prior to the critical date without Paragon maintaining any control
over the devices or placing any restriction on their use.42 In
response to the motion for summary judgment, Paragon had
submitted: an affidavit of the inventor averring that he considered
the sales as being for experimental, rather than commercial, purposes;
a declaration by a patent attorney averring that he was informed
during pendency of the patent application that the sales were for
testing purposes; and a declaration of a Paragon officer averring that
the sales were limited and that he called on podiatrists to monitor
results and check complaints. 426 Nonetheless, the district court
concluded that Paragon's sales activities were not for legitimate
experimental purposes.427
On appeal, Paragon argued that the evidence it had submitted in
response to the motion for summary judgment was sufficient to raise
a genuine issue of fact, material to the experimental use issue, and
that the grant of summary judgment was therefore improper.
4 21
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the facts and surrounding
circumstances, when considered in combination, pointed to only one
possible conclusion-that the sales were commercial in nature and fell
within the statutory bar.'
Regarding the inventor's affidavit and the patent attorney's
declaration, the court explained that intent to experiment is merely
422. Id. at 1185-86, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
423. Id. at 1186, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. The term "exception" is somewhat of a
misnomer in this context. The issue is whether a claimed invention was "on sale" within the
meaning of the statute, and not the dual issue of whether the invention was "on sale" and, if so,
whether the sale was primarily for experimental purposes. Id. at 1185 n.3, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1563 n.3.
424. Id. at 1185, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563.
425. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
426. Id. at 1186, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
427. See id. at 1185, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (granting summary judgment).
428. Id. at 1186, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
429. See id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564-66 (concluding that no dispute as to any material
fact regarding commercial nature of sales existed).
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a fact to be taken into account in resolving the ultimate legal question
and that the expression by an inventor of his subjective intent to
experiment, particularly after institution of litigation, is generally of
minimal value.4 3' Although the court observed that the patent
attorney's declaration, at best, showed that the inventor's statements
were not litigation-driven, therefore providing some credence to the
inventor's averments, the court noted that the inventor's expressed
intent of experimentation was assumed for purposes of deciding the
motion.431
But an inventor's subjective intent to experiment, standing alone,
does not establish experimental use. Given sales made in an ordinary
commercial environment, in which the goods are placed outside the
control of the inventor, the inventor's secretly held subjective intent,
even if true, is unavailing unless supported by objective evidence.4 2
The court found there to be a lack of objective evidence of experi-
mental use.4 3
To assert experimental use, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the inventor must clearly have kept control over his invention in the
course of its testing.' Moreover, the assertion of sales for experi-
mentation, at a minimum, requires that the customers be made aware
of the experimentation.435 Here, Paragon sold the devices as fully
tested, without any control being retained by the inventor over the
devices, and without any disclosure to either the doctors or their
patients about their involvement in experimental testing.
436
The declaration of Paragon's officer did not alter the non-
experimental nature of the sales from the viewpoint of the purchasing
doctors or the public. 7 The court noted that the declaration did
not state any activity not normally associated with a regular commer-
cial sale.4' The receipt and processing of commercial customer
complaints did not transform unrestricted sales made outside the
one-year grace period of § 102(b) into permissible sales activity.439
430. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (citing TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,
724 F.2d 965, 972, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984)).
431. Id. at 1187, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
432. Id. (quoting LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
1072, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
433. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
434. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (quoting In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1580, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1890, 1893 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877))).
435. Id. at 1188, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
436. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
437. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
438. Id. at 1187, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
439. Id. at 1187-88, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
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The court rejected Paragon's argument that the limitation of the
sales to low-volume purchases objectively showed that the sales were
intended to be for testing purposes." ° The court said that this fact
may be relevant to determining whether the scope of the inventor's
testing was appropriate, but only where other evidence indicates that
the sales were restricted and controlled as appropriate for experimen-
tal use. 41 Because the evidence did not show that the sales were
appropriately restricted and controlled and, in any event, even a
single sale outside the grace period may be sufficient to invoke
§ 102(b), Paragon's evidence was insufficient to negate the bar."2
Thus, none of the objective evidence proffered by Paragon
indicated that the sales of the devices were for anything other than a
primarily commercial purpose.43  There being no material factual
dispute regarding the commercial nature of the sales, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.4"
b. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)
Like 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) is an absolute bar to
patentability.445 Section 102(d) applies where a U.S. patent applica-
tion is filed more than one year after a corresponding foreign
application has been filed and the foreign application issues as a
patent before the U.S. filing date.446 In re Kathawala" concerned
questions regarding the interpretation of § 102(d) and resulted in a
noteworthy interpretation of the term "invention" as used in the
statute.44
The invention claimed in the U.S. application in question related
to a group of compounds capable of inhibiting a key enzyme in the
biosynthesis of cholesterol." 9 Kathawala had initially filed a U.S.
application on November 22, 1982, claiming most of the compounds
440. Id. at 1188, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
441. Id.
442. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
443. Id.
444. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
445. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (1988) (prohibiting grant of patent where patent was issued in
foreign country more than 12 months prior to application for patent being filed in United
States).
446. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) precludes issuance ofavalid patentwhen "the invention
was first patented or caused to be patented ... by the applicant or his legal representatives or
assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application for patent ... filed more than 12 months before the filing of the application in the
United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(d).
447. 9 F.3d 942, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
448. See generally In relKathawala 9 F.3d 942,944-47,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785,1785-89 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (discussing §102(d) claim interpreting term "invention").
449. Id. at 944, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
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of the U.S. application.45 On November 21, 1983, Kathawalw filed
counterpart applications in Greece and. Spain, which contained
expanded claims covering the compounds claimed in the U.S.
application as well as certain derivatives of those compounds.451
Kathawala then filed the U.S. application in question on April 11,
1985, as a continuation-in part (CIP) of the earlier U.S. applica-
tion.45 2 The CIP claimed the compounds claimed in the Greek and
Spanish applications. 453
The Greek patent issued on October 2, 1984, and the Spanish
patent issued on January 21, 1985.4 5" The specifications of the
Greek and Spanish patents were substantially the same as the
specification of the CIP. 45 5  The Greek patent contained claims
directed to the compounds, compositions, methods of use, and
processes for making the compounds, while the Spanish patent
contained claims to a process for making the compounds. 55
Because Kathawala filed his CIP more than one year after he filed
his corresponding foreign applications and after the foreign applica-
tions issued as patents, the examiner rejected the CIP claims under
§ 102(d)."' The Board affirmed the examiner's rejection.458
On appeal, Kathawala argued that the Greek and Spanish patents
were not prior art under § 102(d).459 With respect to the Greek
patent, Kathawala did not dispute that the Greek patent contained
claims directed to the same invention as that claimed in his CIP.4
Kathawala argued that his invention was not "patented" in Greece.461
He argued that the compound, composition, and method-of-use
claims that were in the Greek patent were invalid under Greek patent
law because they were directed to non-statutory subject matter.6 2
The Federal Circuit did not agree that the validity of the Greek claims
under Greek patent law determined whether the invention was
"patented" in Greece within the meaning of § 102(d).'









459. I& at 945, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87.
460. I&, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
461. Id.
462. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87.
463. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
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The court explained that the controlling fact for purposes of
§ 102(d) was that the Greek patent contained claims directed to the
same invention as that of the CIP. The court reasoned that the
PTO should be able to accept at face value the granting of a foreign
patent claiming subject matter corresponding to that claimed in a
U.S. application without having to consider the fine points of foreign
law. 6 Refusing to allow Kathawala to escape the consequences of
his own actions in prosecuting the foreign applications, the court held
that the validity of the foreign claims was not relevant to the § 102(d)
inquiry.
466
Regarding the Spanish patent, which the court considered in
rejecting the compound claims of the CIP, Kathawala argued that
although the Spanish patent was granted and enforceable prior to the
CIP filing date, the Spanish patent was not published, and therefore
not "patented" until after that date.467 The court rejected this
argument, citing precedent holding that an invention is "patented" on
the date that it becomes enforceable, not on the date it becomes
publicly available.4' Thus, the public availability of the foreign
patent before the U.S. filing date was also held to be irrelevant to the
§ 102(d) inquiry.469 Kathawala further argued that the "invention"
patented in Spain was not the same "invention" recited in the CIP
claims at issue, because the former was directed to a process of
making the compounds while the latter was directed to the com-
pounds themselves.47 The court rejected this argument as well.47'
The court noted that the word "invention" may have many
meanings and, in the present context, must have a meaning consis-
tent with the policy and purpose behind § 102(d)-to encourage the
filing of applications in the United States within a year of the foreign
filing of a counterpart application.472 The court noted that
Kathawala had asserted that he claimed only the process in Spain





468. See id. at 945-46, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787 (citing In re Monks, 588 F.2d 308, 310,
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129, 131 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating that "patented" means "formal bestowal
of patent rights"); In re Talbott, 443 F.2d 1397, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(holding that "foreign patent need not be publicly available" to be "patented")).
469. Id. at 946, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787-88.
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patentable under Spanish patent law during the relevant time. '473
The court did not permit him to evade the statutory bar by arguing
that the Spanish Patent Office would not have allowed claims to other
aspects of the invention..4' The court found that "it would be
contrary to the policy of the statute to permit an applicant to file a
foreign application on an invention that may be claimed by four
related types of claims, obtain a grant of whatever patent rights were
available in the foreign country, and then file an application in the
United States, after the foreign patent has issued and more than one
year after the foreign filing date on the same invention, with claims
directed to those aspects of the invention which were unpatentable in
the foreign country.
" 41
The court, therefore, held that when an applicant files a foreign
application fully disclosing his invention and having the potential to
claim his invention in a number of different ways, the reference in
§ 102(d) to "invention... patented" necessarily includes all disclosed
aspects of the invention.7" Accordingly, the court affirmed the
Board's rejection of the CIP claims under § 102(d) based on the
Greek and Spanish patents.477
c. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
Section 102 (e) provides, inter alia, that an applicant is not entitled
to a patent if the invention was described in a patent granted on a
U.S. application by another filed before the applicant's invention."'
In In re Ziegler, 9 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision
that Ziegler's patent application claims were unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e).' 8
On appeal, Ziegler did not challenge the Board's finding that the
disclosure of a patent reference, which issued from an application
filed before Ziegler's U.S. filing date, anticipated Ziegler's claimed
invention."' Ziegler, however, challenged the Board's finding that
the cited patent qualified as prior art under § 102(e),' 82 arguing
473. Id. at 947, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788-89.
477. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
478. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988) (prohibiting grant of patents in these circumstances).
479. 992 F.2d 1197, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
480. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1203, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
481. Id. at 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
482. Section 102(e) provides that an applicant shall be entitled to a patent unless "the
invention was described in a patent granted on an application .. by another filed in the United
States before the invention thereof by the applicant...." 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988).
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that he had established entitlement to the priority date of his
earlier-filed German application under 35 U.S.C. § 119,483 and that
the priority date was before the filing date of the cited patent.
484
The claims of the application, which was a continuation of a patent
application, were directed to polypropylene having specified charac-
teristics.' 5 The Board had found that Ziegler's German application
did not enable one skilled in the art to use the claimed polypropylene
pursuant to the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.486 A foreign
application must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, for a later-filed U.S. application, to be entitled to the
benefit of the foreign filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 119.48' There-
fore, the Board held that Ziegler failed to show entitlement to the
German priority date and thus failed to overcome the rejection for
anticipation.'
Assuming that the Board's determination was based on the
how-to-use prong of the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, the court stated that resolving the issue entailed
answering two questions: "(1) What utility is disclosed by the German
application? and (2) Does the stated utility satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 101?"
489
Ziegler's German application asserted that the claimed
polypropylene was "plastic-like."49 Regarding this assertion, the
court noted that its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.), had squarely held in Anderson v. Natta,491 that
the disclosure in Ziegler's German application that a polymer, such
as polypropylene, is "plastic-like," was an insufficient assertion of
utility.
492
The remaining disclosure in the German application relied on by
Ziegler-that the polypropylene was solid and could be pressed into
a flexible film with a characteristic infrared spectrum-was also found
483. See Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (citing Wagoner v. Barger,
463 F.2d 1377,1380,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85,87 (C.C.PA. 1972), and noting that applicant bears
burden of establishing entitlement to priority date).
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1199, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
486. Id. at 1201, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
487. SeeYasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 885-89, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 162-65
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (providing standard for establishment of later filed U.S. application to benefit
of foreign filing date).
488. Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1200-01, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
489. Id. at 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
490. I& at 1201, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603-04.
491. 480 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458 (C.C.PA. 1973). This case arose from an
interference involving Ziegler's patent application.
492. ZiegLer, 992 F.2d at 1201, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05.
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insufficient to establish utility.4 93 The court followed the reasoning
of two cases, Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson494 and Anderson v. Natta,495
where statements that a polymer formed a film were found insuffi-
cient to establish practical utility.496 The court, therefore, conclud-
ed that the Board's determination that Ziegler's German application
failed to set forth a practical utility for the claimed polypropylene was
not clearly erroneous497 Consequently, the court held that Ziegler
was not entitled to the German priority date.498 Because Ziegler
failed to antedate the patent reference, the anticipation rejection
under § 102(e) was affirmed.4
d. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
Section 102 (f) provides that a person is not entitled to a patent if
"he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patent-
ed."5"' Thus, if one patent applicant derived the invention from
another, the former is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) from
obtaining a valid patent."0 As evident from the case summaries in
Part III below, derivation is an issue that may come up in an
interference between two parties claiming the same invention.0 2
493. Id. at 1201-03, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
494. 247 F.2d 800, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (stating that word "film" by itself
does not connote particular use).
495. 480 F.2d 1392, 1395-97, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458, 460-61 (C.C.PA. 1973) (rejecting
Anderson's assertion of actual reduction to practice of polymer and holding that polymer lacked
utility). In Anderson, the only utility asserted for the alleged reduction to practice was as a film,
but the court found a discernible difference between a small quantity of polymer pressed into
a film for infrared scanning, a procedure that must have been standard practice, and a film
practically useful in applications for which thermoplastic film is suitable. Id. The Federal
Circuit in Ziegerrejected Ziegler's argument that Anderson was inapposite because Ziegler relied
on a constructive, rather than an actual, reduction to practice. Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1202 n.10,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604 n.10. The court explained that the principle that the product
must be stated to have a practical utility is the same in both cases. Id.
496. Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1202-03, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. The court also distinguished
Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.P.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676 (D. Del.
1980), afftd, 664 F.2d 356, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 327 (3d Cir. 1981), where a disclosure that a
polymer had use in applications where any solid plastic is used was found to meet the utility
requirement. The court based its finding on an expert's testimony that, from this disclosure,
there was no question that one could mold various useful articles. Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1202-03,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
497. Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1203, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
498. Id.
499. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
500. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988).
501. Id.
502. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.625 (1993) (stating that proving derivation requires preliminary
statement that includes name of opponent, date of first drawing, date offirstwritten description,
date of first disclosure, date of conception, and date of communication to opponent).
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e. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
As observed in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International
Trade Commission,03 a patent claim may be invalid as anticipated
under § 102(g) due to prior conception and reduction to practice by
another claimed invention. 0 4  If such a prior conception and
reduction to practice by another is embodied in a claim of an
application or patent, an "interference" proceeding may be initiated
to determine priority of inventorship under § 102(g), i.e. to deter-
mine which party is entitled to a patent claiming the common
invention. 505
In determining priority of invention in an interference proceeding
under § 102(g), "there shall be considered not only the respective
dates of invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other."0 6 Decisions dealing with interference
issues are summarized herein at Part IV.
4. 35 U.S. C. § 103
In addition to establishing the novelty requirement, the provisions
of § 102 are also used to define "prior art" for purposes of determin-
ing whether the nonobviousness requirement of § 103 has been satis-
fied. To be applicable under § 103, such prior art must be
503. 988 F.2d 1165, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
504. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1177,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding Commission's finding that there
was no anticipation because other party's invention was not reduced to practice until after
reduction to practice of Texas Instrument's patented invention). 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) provides
that an applicant is not entitled to a patent if, before the applicant's invention, "the invention
was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it." 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
, 505. Priority of invention under § 102 (g) is akin to derivation in that both concepts focus
on inventorship and may be resolved in an interference, but they are distinct concepts. SeePrice
v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
506. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
507. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Section 103 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States, or (c) he has abandoned the
invention, or (d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the
subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or
assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this
country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve
months before the filing of the application in the United States, or (e) the invention
was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the
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"analogous" to the claimed invention, as shown in the next case.
a. Scope of the art
Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.08 arose from a patent
infringement suit, which involved two patents having claims regarding
single in-line memory modules (SIMMs), and was brought by Wang
against Toshiba and NEC." The jury awarded damages to Wang,
finding that both Toshiba and NEC infringed the patents, but that
only NEC's infringement was willful."1 Both defendants filed post-
trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and
the plaintiff moved to amend the judgment as to damages.511  The
district court denied the motions." 2 Toshiba and NEC appealed
the district court's denial of JNOV on the issues of validity and
infringement, while Wang cross- appealed the district court's refusal
to amend the judgment as to damages.5 3
After discussing the standard of review used for a denial of JNOV
on infringement and validity issues,51 4 the court turned to the issue
of whether the patent claims in suit were invalid for obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.15 The court affirmed the holding of
nonobviousness, concluding that the prior art relied on by appellants
was not analogous to the claimed invention.
516
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an
international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs
(1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent, or (f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented, or (g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In
determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time
prior to conception by the other.
Id. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 5.03[3] (1993) (discussing nonobviousness with
respect to "content of the prior art" and "sources of prior art").
508. 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
509. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 860-61, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1769-70 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
510. Id. at 860, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 860-61, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
514. Id. at 863, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (noting that fact findings reviewed under
substantial evidence standard require affirmance unless appellants show that: (i) reasonable
persons could not, in light of evidence before them, have found fact necessary to supportjury's
verdict; or (ii) facts properly found cannot in law support jury's verdict). The court further
noted that in reviewing the evidence from a denial ofJNOV, the court must consider all of the
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmover, without determining or substituting the
court's choice for that of the jury between conflicting elements in evidence. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73.
1993 AREA SuMMARY: PATENTS
The Federal Circuit noted that nonobviousness is a legal conclusion
that has factual underpinnings, including the scope and content of
the prior art, which, having been genuinely disputed, must be
presumed to have been resolved by the jury in favor of Wang.517
The court, determining that the jury instructions concerning analo-
gous art were adequate, presumed that the jury found that the prior
art primarily relied on by appellants, which also related to SIMMs,
518
was not analogous to the claimed subject matter, i.e., not relevant to
a consideration of obviousness under § 103.519
The court therefore presumed that the jury answered in the
negative both of the following questions, one of which must be
answered in the affirmative for prior art to be considered analogous:
(1) Is the art from the "same field of endeavor as the claimed
invention, regardless of the problem addressed" by the invention?
(2) If the art is "not within the same field of endeavor," is it "still
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem" being solved?
21
The jury's negative answers to the questions in the test were reviewed
to determine whether the finding of nonanalogous art was supported
by substantial evidence.
2'
Concerning the first question, the court observed that the prior art
related to memory circuits in which modules of varying sizes could be
added or replaced, while the patents at issue pertained to compact
522modular memories. The court stated that the prior art was not
in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention simply because
both related to memories and, without further explanation, conclud-
ed that the jury could reasonably have found that the prior art was
not in the same field of endeavor.
5 23
Turning to the second question, the test for analogous art, the
court pointed out that Wang's technical expert testified that the prior
art was "not pertinent to the field of personal computers for which
Wang's SIMMs were designed. '524 Although Wang's patents did not
refer specifically to the term "personal computer," the expert testified
that the intended use of the claimed SIMMs was apparent from the
517. Id. at 863-64, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (citing Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)).
518. Id. at 864, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
519. Id.
520. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59,23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1058, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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entire context of the patents."- In comparison, the prior art SIMMs
were developed for use in a larger, programmable controller of
industrial machinery and could not be used in a personal comput-
er.526 Wang's expert also testified that the prior art taught the use
of Static Random-Access-Memories (SRAMs), whereas the Wang
patents taught the use of Dynamic Random-Access-Memories
(DRAMs), which were primarily used in personal computers. 52
After noting such differences between the intended uses and
objectives of the claimed SIMMs modules and those of the prior art
SIMMs modules, the court concluded that substantial evidence
supported the jury's finding that the prior art was not reasonably
pertinent to the problem solved.528
Thus, the court found that the jury's finding of nonanalogous art
was supported by substantial evidence.2 9 Because the prior art
primarily relied on by Toshiba and NEC was nonanalogous, the court
affirmed the jury's verdict that the Wang patents were not invalid for
obviousness.5 °
b. Content of the art
For a claim to be rendered prima facie obvious based on two or
more prior art references, the references not only have to be
analogous to the claimed invention, but there must be some
motivation or incentive contained in the prior art references for
combining their teachings.51 Moreover, even if there is motivation
or incentive to selectively combine certain teachings of the prior art,
a prima facie case of obviousness will not be established unless the




528. Id. at 865, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
529. Id.
530. See id. at 865 n.9, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 n.9 (noting further that even if prior
artwere analogous, there was substantial evidence supportingjury's presumed findings that prior
art lacked suggestion to combine teachings thereof as urged by Toshiba and NEC, and that
claimed invention was commercially successful).
531. See, e.g., ACS Hospital Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Obviousness cannot be established by combining the
teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion
supporting the combination. Under section 103, the teachings of the references can be
combined only if there is some suggestion or incentive.").
532. See, e.g., In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (stating that examiner's failure to establish primaface case based on teachings that suggest
claimed invention, should not result in rejection); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783, 26 U.S.P..2d
(BNA) 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the
teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed [invention) to
a person of ordinary skill in the art.") (emphasis added).
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PTO must identify where the suggestion appears in the prior art.33
Thus, the PTO's rejection of a claim for obviousness will not be
upheld where, as in In re Rijckaert,5 4 the PTO asserts that a claim
limitation is inherent in a prior art reference but fails to show that the




In re Raynes 36 illustrates that the suggestion does not have to be
explicit in the prior art.137  Raynes claimed an interactive automo-
bile servicing system comprising, inter alia, fuel pumps, "means for
displaying video programming and price/quantity information
regarding the amount of fuel dispensed," and "means for providing
the video programming to the pumps." 3' The Board had affirmed
the examiner's obviousness rejection of the claimed system based on
a combination of a primary reference-a patent disclosing a system
having a light emitting diode (LED) or liquid crystal display (LCD)
rather than the claimed video display means coupled to the video
programming means-and a secondary reference-a technical
encyclopedia mentioning that LED and LCD displays may eventually
replace the relatively bulky cathode-ray tubes (CRT) displays. 3 9 The
Federal Circuit agreed that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have obviously replaced the displays of the systems disclosed in the
primary reference with a video display, such as a CRT, "for the use of
Only ifa pimafacie case of obviousness is established does the burden of coming forward with
evidence or argument, e.g., evidence relating to objective indicia of nonobviousness, such as
unexpected results or commercial success having a nexus to the claimed invention, shift to an
applicant. See Rijckaert 9 F.3d at 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957. While such evidence
weighs in favor of nonobviousness, however, the lack of it does not weigh in favor of
obviousness. SeeMiles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870,878,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123,
1129 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v.Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955,
960, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
533. See Rijckaer, 9 F.3d at 1533, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957; see also In reYates, 663 F.2d
1054, 1057, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1149, 1151 (C.C.P-.A 1981) (finding need for PTO to produce
supporting references of suggestion).
534. 9 F.3d 1531, 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
535. See Rijckaer4 9 F.3d at 1533-34, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957 (discussing basis for
reversal of obviousness rejection where PTO failed to show necessary relation between limitation
and prior art). Moreover, that which is inherent is not necessarily known; obviousness cannot
be predicated on what is unknown. Id. at 1534, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957 (citing In re
Spormann, 363 F.2d 444, 448, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4,9, 452 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
536. 7 F.3d 1037, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
537. See In re Raynes, 7 F.3d 1037, 1038-40, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630, 1630-32 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (affirming PTO's rejection for obviousness); see also Ex parte Clapp, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
972,973 (PTO Bd. App. 1985) (explaining that to support conclusion that claimed combination
is directed to obvious subject matter, either references must expressly or impliedly suggest
claimed combination or examiner must present convincing line of reasoning as to why artisan
would have found claimed invention obvious in light of teachings of references).
538. Raynes, 7 F.3d at 1038-39, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
539. Id. at 1039, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.
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video to display programming and other information is so ubiquitous
to warrant judicial notice. "540
In In re Bel4, 41 the Federal Circuit reviewed de novoP42 the
Board's affirmance of an examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
of claims directed to nucleic-acid molecules (DNA and RNA)
containing sequences that code for human insulin-like growth factors
(IGF) I and IL The Board had affirmed the examiner's rejection
of the claims as being obvious based on a pair of primary publications
disclosing the amino-acid sequences of IGF-I and IGF-II, combined
with a secondary patent disclosing a general method for isolating a
gene for which at least a short amino-acid sequence of the encoded
protein was known. 44 The Board reasoned that, even though a
protein and the corresponding DNA are not structurally similar, they
are nevertheless linked through genetic code, and therefore the gene
is rendered obvious when the amino-acid sequence is known.545 In
view of the secondary patent reference teaching the cloning method,
the Board concluded that there was no reason to believe that the
ordinary artisan, having the amino-acid sequences of the target
proteins, would have been unable to predictably clone, without undue
experimentation, the target DNA sequences.56
The Federal Circuit refused to accept the Board's conclusion that
the established relationship in the genetic code between a nucleic
acid and the protein it encodes makes a gene primafacie obvious over
its correspondent protein."4 The court noted that this proposition,
in effect, amounted to a rejection based on the primary publications
alone.5 4  The court also noted that- the PTO had not contradicted
540. Id. at 1040, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631-32. The dissent, however, took the position
that a video display was not an obvious substitute for an LED or LCD display, apparently
considering that the artisan would not have, as a matter of common sense, weighed factors such
as size, expense, and display capabilities in selecting a suitable means for displaying the desired
information. Id. at 1040-41, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132-33 (LourieJ., dissenting). Because
the prior art did not mention substituting a CRT for an LED or LCD display, but indicated a
general preference for LED or LCD displays compared to CRT displays, the dissent would have
reversed the Board's decision. Ia at 1041, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632-33.
541. 991 F.2d 781, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
542. The court reviews an obviousness determination by the Board denovo. In reVaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 493, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
543. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 782, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
544. Id. at 783, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530-31. Because the claims were directed to
compositions, the court ignored the PTO's emphasis on the similarities between Bell's method
for making the claimed sequences, which was disclosed in the specification, and the method
disclosed in the secondary reference. Id. at 785, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
545. Id. at 783, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
546. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530-31 (citing Board's decision).
547. Id. at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
548. Id. (concluding that possibility of hypothesis does not mean that hypothesis was
obvious).
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Bell's argument that, in the case of IGF, the amino-acid sequences of
the primary publications could be coded for by more than ten1
6
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which corresponded to the
claimed human sequences. 49 Considering the vast number of
possibilities suggested by the publications and their failure to suggest
which of those possibilities was the human sequence, the court
concluded that the primary publications failed to render the claimed
sequence prima facie obvious.550
The court further concluded that the secondary reference failed to
cure the deficiencies of the primary publications.5" In fact, the
court determined that the secondary reference tended to teach away
from the claimed invention. 52  Bell's probe had twenty-three
nucleotides based on a sequence of eight amino acids, none of which
was unique; in contrast, the secondary reference taught that it was
counterproductive to use a primer having more than fourteen to
sixteen nucleotides unless the known amino-acid sequence had four
to five amino acids coded for by unique codons. The secondary
reference suggested that it was advantageous to design a probe based
on an amino-acid sequence specified by unique codons)5 3 Because
the primary publications showed that IGF-I only had one amino acid
with a unique codon and IGF-II had none, the secondary reference
was considered to teach away from the claimed sequences. 54
The court rejected the PTO's argument that the secondary
reference suggested that the cloning method disclosed therein could
be easily applied to isolate genes for an array of proteins.555 The
court found that there was no suggestion in the secondary reference
of how to apply its teachings to amino-acid sequences without unique
codons.556 Finding that the prior art lacked the requisite teaching
or suggestion to combine the teachings to produce the claimed
sequences, the court reversed the Board's decision affirming the
examiner's rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.5
549. Id.
550. Compare id. (relying on assertions of Rinderknecht regarding number of possible nucleic
acid sequences) with In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (stating that "'obvious to try' is not a legitimate test of patentability").
551. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531-32.
552. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 785, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
556. Id.
557. Id. (citing In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (stating that obviousness "'cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior
art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the
combination'" (quoting ACS Hosp. Sys. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q.
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The Rayne and Bell cases, which involved utility patent applications,
addressed issues of patentability under § 108.558 The remaining
cases in this subsection involve design patents or applications for
design patents.5 9 As these cases show, § 103 applies to the determina-
tion of obviousness of a claimed design."W "For a rejection of a
claim of a design patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the
references must suggest the overall appearance of the particular
design claimed."
5 61
As the court explained in In re Harvey,56 if the combination of
the references suggests only the components of a claimed design, but
not the overall appearance of the design, a rejection for obviousness
is improper. 6 32 Harvey had appealed from the Board's decision
affirming the final rejections of the claims of Harvey's two design
applications under § 103."6 Each claimed design was directed to a
vase formed by the intersection of two geometric solids.565 The
claimed designs had been rejected based on a combination of prior
art designs, including a prior art Harvey vase as the primary reference,
which the Board analyzed as a basic design concept of the intersection
of two solids. 66
The Federal Circuit found, contrary to the Board's conclusion, that
the prior art Harvey vase was not a proper primary reference (i.e.,
basic design) because the disclosed vase was not basically the same as
the claimed designs.6 7 The court held that the Board, in relying on
the prior art Harvey vase as a design concept rather than for its
(BNA) 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
558. See supra notes 536-57 and accompanying text (discussing application of § 103).
559. See infra notes 562-600 and accompanying text.
560. In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569, 1570, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1440, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 108
(Fed. Cir. 1984), for proposition that tests for determining validity of design patent issued under
35 U.S.C. § 171 are same as those for determining validity of utility patent issued under 35
U.S.C. § 101).
561. Klein, 987 F.2d at 1574, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (citing In reChu, 813 F.2d 378,
382, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
562. 12 F.3d 1061, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
563. In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1063, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing In reCarlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In
re Sung Nam Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
564. I& at 1062, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. See id. at 1063-64, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208-09 (finding that major modifications
would be needed to make prior art vase same as claimed designs); see also In re Rosen, 673 F.2d
388, 391, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 349 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (stating that basic design has design
characteristics that are "basically the same" as those of claimed design).
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design characteristics, improperly mixed principles of obviousness for
utility patents with those for design patents."i
The court addressed the sufficiency of the teachings of the prior art
cited in an obviousness rejection of a claimed design in In re
Klein.- 9 The claim570 was directed to a shingle design having
notched top and lower layers, the notches forming tabs with the lower
layer, the shingle design was mounted so that its notches were offset
to the right of the notches of the top layer. 7 1 The claim encom-
passed plural alternative embodiments; thus, if any one embodiment
within the scope of the claim was rendered obvious, then the § 103
rejection would be upheld.7 2
The Board had determined that a combination of two utility patents
rendered the claimed design obvious. 3  With respect to the first
prior art reference, the Board had concluded that one of the
reference's drawing figures, which showed a shingle with darker lines
on the bottom and right side of the tabs as compared with the left
side, disclosed a shingle having an offset appearance as in one of the
embodiments depicted in Klein's application, 4 Yet, the Board
based its rejection not on this reference alone, but in combination
with another reference, "apparently because of a felt need to do
SO.
"5 75
With the Board's reliance on a combination of two references
belying its statements regarding the first one, the court sharply
568. Harvey, 12 F.3d at 1064-65, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209 (stating that rule in In re
Glavas, 230 F.2d 447,450, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50,52 (C.C.P.A. 1956), and In reMann, 861 F.2d
1581, 1582, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030, 2031 (Fed. Cir. 1988)-that focus in considering prior
art for purposes of determining patentability of designs is on appearances, not uses--was being
extended one step further to require focus on actual appearances, not design concepts).
The court further held that even if the Board correctly applied the standard of obviousness,
its conclusion "would still be erroneous because the Board misconstrued the combined teachings
and combinability of the prior art, and improperly compared the visual impressions of selected
features, rather than the visual impression of the work as a whole." Harvey, 12 F.3d at 1064, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209. The court also determined that even if there was a suggestion in the
prior art to combine certain characteristics, the Board's decision could not stand because its
factual findings, that the visual differences between the prior art and the claimed designs are
minor, were clearly erroneous. Id. at 1065-66, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210; see In re Carter, 673
F.2d 1378, 1380, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 625, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting that if prior-art designs
are to be modified in more than one respect to render claimed design obvious, then those
modifications must be de minimis in nature and unrelated to design's overall aesthetic
appearance).
569. 987 F.2d 1569, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
570. Only one claim is permitted in a design patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (1993) ("[M]ore
than one claim is neither required nor permitted.").
571. In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569, 1571, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
572. Id. at 1570, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134 (supporting Board's interpretation of rule).
573. Id.
574. Id. at 1572, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
575. Id. at 1573, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
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criticized the Board's characterization of this reference as "wholly
unjustified" and "in a class with wishful thinking."57 6 The court was
unable to perceive any offset appearance or blackened left sides of
the tabs or notches. 77 Rather, the court recognized the darker
lines used in the reference's drawing as a conventional drafting
578practice.
In using the first reference as prior art, said the court, the Board
had impermissibly used hindsight to take a drafting practice, required
in patent drawings, found in a utility patent and construed this
practice as a suggestion for an ornamental design. 79  The court
determined that the first reference simply disclosed a shingle having
an outline similar to the claimed top layer, which was but one
element of the claimed design 580
Moving on to the second reference, the court noted that the Board
failed to make clear how it was relying on this reference. 58' The
court, therefore, turned to the examiner's detailed rejection for
guidance, but found that the examiner's reliance on the second
reference was misplaced: the examiner had admitted that even the
hypothetical shingle strip resulting from his postulated combination
of the references was "not identical to the claimed design in all
details"; the examiner had applied an erroneous "distinctiveness"
standard of patentability; and the examiner had looked to the second
reference using impermissible hindsight. 8'
The court then culled the second reference, particularly Figure 3,
which the Board had alluded to in its decision, for suggestions of the
claimed design.583 Instead of finding any such suggestion, the court
found that it had no resemblance to the claimed design. 84 Perceiv-
ing no suggestion of the claimed design in the cited references, the
court reversed the Board's decision affirming the examiner's rejection
for obviousness under § 103.585
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. See iU., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36 (citing patent office practice rules). The rule,
which has been in effect for over 100 years, is now embodied in the patent regulations. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.84(d) (2) (1993) ("Heavy lines on the shade side of objects should preferably be used
.... The light should come from the upper left-hand comer at an angle of 45.").
579. Klein, 987 F.2d at 1573, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 1574, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 1575, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
585. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136-37.
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In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co.,5"' the Federal Circuit
similarly considered the sufficiency of the prior art in determining the
validity of a claimed design under § 103.587 The district court had
found Melville liable for infringement of L.A. Gear's claimed shoe
design, and had rejected Melville's affirmative defense of invalidity of
the claimed design under 35 U.S.C. § 103.5"'
Specifically, Melville had asserted twenty-two prior art references as
showing or suggesting the various features that made up the claimed
design and had argued that the claimed design was readily recon-
structed from the elements of these references.589 The district court
found that all of the isolated elements of the claimed design were
disclosed, but concluded that there was no teaching or suggestion of
the claimed design as a visual whole in the prior art.59°
The Federal Circuit agreed, pointing out that § 103 mandates that
not only the individual elements, but also the ornamental quality of
the combination, be suggested in the prior art.591 The court noted
that the district court had found that the combination of the particular
elements of the claimed design was not known in the prior art, and
emphasized that "a reconstruction of known elements does not
invalidate a design patent, absent some basis whereby a designer of
ordinary skill would be led to create this particular design."592 The
court found no error in the district court's determination that no
such basis could be discerned in the prior art.5 93 Furthermore, the
commercial success of L.A. Gear's patented design and Melville's
copying of the claimed design were cited as secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.594 The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the
district court's holding that the design patent was not invalid under
§ 103.595
Finally, in In re Carlson,59 the court affirmed the Board's decision
that a claimed bottle design was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
586. 988 F.2d 1117, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
587. SeeL.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1917-18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (addressing obviousness under § 103).
588. Id.
589. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
590. Id.
591. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917-18.




596. 983 F.2d 1032, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1992), as revised on petition for
rehearing, Feb. 1, 1993.
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§ 103."' Carlson argued that none of the cited references showed
the symmetrical design depicted in his design patent application.9 8
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the
designer of ordinary skill could understand the potential use of a
symmetrical design.599 The court held that, in an area where designs
are intentionally asymmetric, a symmetrical design is obvious as the
"expected" design and, accordingly, affirmed the decision of the
Board.'
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1[1
a. Written description requirement
In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., ' the Federal Circuit
also addressed the issue of whether the Wang patents satisfied the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
which issue was raised on appeal by NEC, but not Toshiba.60 2 The
court noted that the test for determining if this requirement has been
met asks whether the disclosure reasonably conveys to the skilled
worker that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter
as of the filing date of the application.' ° Noting that this question
is one of fact, the court determined whether there was substantial
evidence that supported the jury's verdict that the written description
requirement was met.
60 4
NEC had argued that the recitation of "support means for
supporting the memory module at an angle with respect to the
printed circuit motherboard," which was added to the claims by
amendment, was not supported by the original disclosure of the Wang
patents. 5 The court first pointed out that a patent specification is
directed to those of ordinary skill in the art.6°6 After further noting
597. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
as revised on petition for rehearing, Feb. 1, 1993.
598. See id. at 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (noting that Carlson argued that
Bundesanzeiger entry did not specifically refer to dual-compartment containers).
599. Id.
600. Id. at 1038-39, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
601. 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
602. SeeWang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 865-66, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (considering written description issue under § 112).
603. Id. at 865, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
604. Id.
605. Id. at 865-66, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
606. Id. at 866, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (citing In reHayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc.
Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1533, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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that drawings alone may provide the required written description, 07
the court observed that Wang's expert and the inventor had testified
that terminal leads, illustrated in the drawings, function as the recited
support means.6°8 These witnesses had further testified that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would know that leadless SIMMs
include a row of terminals, not shown in the drawings, that would
function as the recited support means.609 The court, therefore, held
that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that NEC failed
to show that the district court's denial ofJNOV on the issue regarding
the written description requirement was incorrect.61
b. Enablement requirement
In In re Ziegler61 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision
that Ziegler's U.S. patent application was not entitled to the benefit
of the filing date of Ziegler's prior German application because the
priority application failed to enable one "skilled in the art" to use the
claimed invention 612 as required by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.61' The court upheld the Board's determination that Ziegler's
German patent application failed to disclose a practical utility for the
claimed polypropylene and, hence, failed to satisfy the how-to-use
prong of the enablement requirement.
61 4
In In re Wright,615 the Federal Circuit considered another question
of enablement. Wright sought to overturn a § 112 rejection determin-
ing that the scope of the enabling disclosure failed to support the full
scope of the appealed claims, a type of rejection that is frequently
characterized as being for "undue breadth."616
Wright's claimed invention was directed to processes for creating
live, nonpathogenic vaccines for use against pathogenic RNA viruses,
the vaccines produced by these processes, and methods for protecting




611. 992 F.2d 1197, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
612. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 2000-03, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1603-06 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
613. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1988). To satisfy the enablement requirement, sufficient
information must be disclosed by the applicant to "allow someone skilled in the art to make and
use" the claimed invention. Id.
614. See Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1200-03, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605-06 (concluding that
Ziegler's German application failed to satisfy requirement for asserting characteristics or
practical use of invention with sufficient specificity to qualify for patent, thus precluding use of
foreign patent application potentially providing patentee additional year of determining practical
utility before required to file in United States under § 119).
615. 999 F.2d 1557, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
616. In reWright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1560, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510, 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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living organisms against RNA viruses by using some of these claimed
vaccines. 617 Wright's specification provided a general description of
these processes, vaccines, and methods of their use, but only gave a
single working example. This example described the production of
a recombinant vaccine that conferred immunity against an RNA
tumor virus in chickens known as Prague Avian Sarcoma Virus.
618
The examiner had allowed claims directed to processes for producing
a vaccine against this specific virus, but Wright sought allowance of
the broader claims on appeal.6 t9 Concerning the claims on appeal,
the Board, affirming the examiner's rejection under § 112, had held
that these broader claims reading on vaccines against all pathogenic
RNA viruses were "not supported by an enabling disclosure because,
given the breadth of the claims, the unpredictability in the art, and
the limited guidance provided by Wright's specification, one of
ordinary skill" had to unduly experiment in order to practice the
claimed invention.62°
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that, when rejecting a
claim under the enablement provision of § 112, the PTO bears the
initial burden of presenting a reasonable explanation for why the full
scope of the claims is not adequately enabled. 62' After the PTO
meets its burden, the burden shifts to the applicant to provide
suitable proofs that the specification is enabling.
22
The court found that the PTO had, in fact, met its initial burden
by setting forth a reasonable basis as to why the claims were not
enabled by the general description and the specification's single
working example.623 The court noted that the examiner and Board
were correct in their observation that: (1) the appealed claims were
directed to vaccines, methods of making them, and methods of their
use, and by definition these vaccines must trigger an immuno-
protective response, not just an antigenic response; (2) many of the
claims attempted to cover any and all nonpathogenic vaccines and
processes for creating such vaccines eliciting immunoprotective
activity in any animal toward any RNA virus; and (3) many of the
617. Id. at 1559, 27 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1511.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. See id. at 1560-61, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511-12 (agreeing with examiner's view that
Wright's broad claims for vaccines against all pathogenic RNA viruses were not supported by
limited guidance provided in application).
621. See id. at 1561-62, 27 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1513 (noting Board found that description of
invention in application was nothing more "than an invitation to experiment").
622. Id. at 1562, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513 (citing In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24,
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367, 369-70 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
623. Id.
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claims embraced vaccines against AIDS viruses, whereas no successful
AIDS virus vaccine had been developed.624
The court further found that Wright failed to rebut the PTO's
primafacie case of enablement with sufficient proof that the specifica-
tion was enabling as of the filing date of his application, for both the
broadest and narrowest claims on appeal. 25 The court cited an
article published about five years after Wright's effective filing
date6 26 which supported the PTO's position that an artisan, at the
time of Wright's invention, would have reasonably doubted "that all
living organisms could be immunized against infection by any
pathogenic RNA virus by" inoculation with Wright's claimed vac-
cines.
627
Wright pointed to a few AIDS virus vaccines carrying SIV and HIV
envelope genes that he had developed since the filing of his applica-
tion that successfully conferred protective immunity to the tested
animals.6 2 The court, however, found this evidence insufficient to
rebut the PTO's assertions regarding undue experimentation, and
indicated that even a decade later, the art was not as predictable as
Wright argued it was at the time of his filing.
6 29
Affidavits submitted on Wright's behalf, in his attempted rebuttal,
were also of no avail.6"' The affidavits were found to fail in their
purpose because they merely contained unsupported conclusory
statements as to the ultimate legal conclusion.3
Nor was the court persuaded by the fact that the claims limited to
avian tumor viruses were adequately supported by an enabling disclo-
sure.3 2 The court found that Wright had failed to establish that, as
of his filing date, an artisan would have reasonably believed that
Wright's success with a particular strain of avian RNA virus "could be
extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success" to other avian
RNA viruses within the scope of the narrower claims.6 3 3 Wright also
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. See iU. (supporting examiner's and Board's use of 1988 article indicating that AIDS
retroviruses, representing only subset of all RNA viruses, were known to have'divergent virus
envelopes and show great genetic diversity).
627. Id.
628. Id. at 1562-63, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
629. Id. at 1563, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
630. Id. (declining to address presented arguments because no specific arguments were
originally set forth regarding affidavits in brief to Board).
631. Id.
632. Id. at 1564, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
633. Id.
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failed to point out with particularity any scientific literature that
existed as of his filing date to support his position.634
Thus, with respect to all of the appealed claims, the court affirmed
the PTO's position and rejected Wright's arguments. 35 Conse-
quently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that the
claims were unpatentable under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.636
In Morton International, Inc. v. Cardinal Chemical Co.,6 7 the Federal
Circuit reviewed, on remand,638 the district court's holding that
Morton's patent claims were invalid under § 112.639 The claims in
question were directed to organotin mercaptoalkyl carboxylic-acid
ester sulfide compounds having a specific bonding, referred to as
"partial connectivity," and containing ten to forty-two weight percent
tin and eight to forty-two percent sulfur by weight.6" The patent
specification provided over fifty examples for preparinOg the claimed
compounds having partial connectivity.6" But the district court
found that the examples in the patent specification produced a
mixture of alkyltin mercaptides and alkyltin sulfides, rather than the
claimed compounds.6 2 Moreover, the district court found that even
using sophisticated analytical instruments and model systems, there
was no evidence that compounds within the scope of the claims
existed.
643
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court's findings
were supported by the record.6' The court held that the defen-
dant, Cardinal, had met its burden of establishing lack of enablement
by clear and convincing evidence, and that Morton had failed to rebut
this evidence, which it could have done, for example, by showing that
the exemplified procedures would indeed produce the claimed
connectivity in the resulting compounds.6 5  Consequently, the
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. For another case similarly upholding the Board's
affirmance of an enablement rejection of a claimed method for producing a mammalian
peptide, see In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
637. 5 F.3d 1464, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
638. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721
(1993) (remanding for consideration of validity issue previously held moot by Federal Circuit
due to initial finding of noninfringement).
639. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing previous court of appeals decision vacating district court's decision).
640. Id. at 1467, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
641. Id. at 1469, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
642. Id.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 1469-70, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
645. Id. at 1470, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
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Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that the claims
were not supported by an enabling disclosure.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ff2
In Morton Internationa4 the Federal Circuit also affirmed the district
court's finding that Morton's patent claims were invalid for failing to
meet the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.' 7 The court
found that the record supported the district court's conclusion that
because the claimed compounds could not be identified by known
analytical methods, skilled workers would be unable to determine if
a particular compound fell within the scope of the claim.6
48
In North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 49 the
Federal Circuit, after affirming the district court's holding of
noninfringement, 650 considered whether the claims at issue in
National Research Council of Canada's (NRC's) patent, which was
licensed to North American Vaccine, were properly held to be invalid
for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112.51 The appealed claims
were both dependent on the same claim, which was directed to
antigenic-polysaccharide-protein conjugates, each conjugate having
the protein covalently linked to the terminal portion of the polysac-
charide without significant crosslinking' 2  The district court
concluded that the claims were indefinite.5 3 The court based its
decision on the parties' stipulation that a few categories of the specific
polysaccharides recited in the dependent claims, when treated
according to the patent's teachings, would yield molecules having
linkages along their backbones; these molecules were outside the




647. See id. (observing that second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires specifications to
particularly point out and distinctly claim subject matter applicant regards as her invention in
order to ensure that claims will not be found invalid for indefiniteness).
648. See id. (citing Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and noting that to find claim invalid for
indefiniteness requires determination of whether skilled artisans would understand what is
claimed when claim is read with knowledge of specification).
649. 7 F.3d 1571, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
650. North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1578, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The noninfringement decision is discussed in Part IVA
below.
651. See id. at 1578-80, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-40. The court, citing Cardinal Chem.
Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1967, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1721 (1993),
indicated that it was desirable to also review the decision of invalidity. Id.
652. Id. at 1573-74, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
653. Id. at 1576, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
654. Id.
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On appeal, NRC argued that the parties' stipulation of the possible
inoperativeness of some species was an insufficient basis for holding
the claims invalid and that Cyanamid had failed to meet its burden of
proving indefiniteness.65 The Federal Circuit agreed, concluding
that the stipulation was not equivalent to an admission that skilled
artisans would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the
claims.656 The specification clearly indicated that the claimed
invention was directed to conjugates having a protein linkage at a
single terminal portion of the polysaccharide.657 The court pointed
out that the mere failure of certain species to meet the objects of the
invention did not show that those skilled in the art could not
determine the scope of the claims.65 The court suggested that
skilled artisans would recognize that "if a species within a dependent
claim" did not meet the limitations of the independent claim, it
would not be within the scope of the dependent claim. 59 Conse-
quently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's holding of
invalidity under the second paragraph of § 112.66'
B. Special Patentability Requirements
Certain types of patents, such as design, reissue, and plant patents,
must fulfill special requirements in addition to patentability under
§§ 102 and 103 and other standard requirements noted above.661
The cases below illustrate some of the requirements peculiar to design
patents and reissue patents.
1. Design patents
Under 35 U.S.C. § 171, "[w]hoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title,"
and "[t]he provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
655. Id. at 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
656. See id. (finding that defendant failed to meet its burden under clear and convincing
evidence standard by disputing meaning of claims that were not so unclear as to be held invalid
under § 112).
657. Id.
658. See id. (establishing that this fact would be relevant to possible invalidity for
inoperativeness under § 101 or nonenablement under § 112, first paragraph, issues that were
not before court).
659. Id.
660. Id. at 1580, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340; see also Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997
F.2d 870,875,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (indicating argument that claim
does not describe workable invention is not relevant to definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
because "[t]he invention's operability may say nothing about a skilled artisan's understanding
of the bounds of a claim").
661. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988); see supra Part II.A.3-4.
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shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise noted."1
2
Thus, as reflected by In re Klein663 discussed above,664 a claimed
design must not only be new, but also must be unobvious.665 The
next case illustrates another requirement imposed by § 171-that the
claimed design be ornamental, rather than functional.6
In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 667 the court considered
the question of invalidity of a design patent for an athletic shoe on
the basis of functionality of the design.6 s Melville Corporation, one
of the defendants that L.A. Gear had charged with infringing the
design patent at issue, presented the affirmative defense of invalidity,
arguing that the claimed design was functional. 69  Noting that "a
design patent is directed to the appearance of an article of manufac-
tare" and that a claimed design cannot be "essential to the use of the
article," the court rejected Melville's assertion that the patent was
invalid for claiming a functional design.670
The court agreed with Melville that each of the elements making
up the claimed design had a utilitarian purpose, but pointed out that
this is not the relevant inquiry in determining the functionality of the
design-the relevant inquiry being an evaluation of the functionality
of the design as a whole.67' The court emphasized that a question of
particular importance in determining whether a combination of
utilitarian elements constitutes an ornamental design is whether the
function of the elements can be performed in any way other than by
the claimed design.6 2 Finding that the district court had correctly
determined that numerous alternative constructions were available to
provide the same functional result as that in the claimed design, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the claimed
design was primarily ornamental and that the design patent, there-
fore, was not invalid for functionality.673
662. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
663. 987 F.2d 1569, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
664. See supra text accompanying notes 560-61 and 569-85.
665. In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569, 1570, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
666. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
667. 988 F.2d 1117, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
668. LA. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123-24,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
669. Id. at 1123, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id. (agreeing with Melville that elements of disputed design serve utilitarian purpose,
but disagreeing that utility overshadows combination of elements thus allowing consideration
of ornamental design of combined elements).
673. I& at 1123-24, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
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2. Reissue patents
While 35 U.S.C. § 171 governs design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 251
governs reissue patents. Under § 251, if an "error" that arose without
any deceptive intent is discovered in a patent, whether it be a design
or utility patent, the patentee may file a reissue application to correct
the error.674 If the requirements for a reissue application are met,
§ 251 provides that the patentee will be granted a reissue patent "for
the unexpired term of the original patent."675
Thus, as noted in In re Morgan,676 § 251 authorizes the Commis-
sioner to reissue a patent only for the unexpired part of the term of
the original patent.677 Morgan had applied four times for reissue
of its patent; the present appeal involved the fourth reissue applica-
tion . 8 The original patent, however, had expired on August 19,
1992, while the present appeal was pending.679 On October 7, 1992,
"after briefing and a few days before the scheduled oral hearing, the
Commissioner moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that there was no
'unexpired' term for which he had authority to reissue the patent"
and, therefore, the case was moot.8 The Federal Circuit agreed
and granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss.
U l
The court noted that, according to the unambiguous language of
§ 251, "the Commissioner has authority to reissue a patent only 'for
the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.' ' 6 2 Morgan
argued that § 251 should not be strictly construed and should be
applied in light of the reissue provision's general remedial nature.
According to Morgan, the underlying intent of § 251 "was to prohibit
the initiation of the reissue proceeding after expiration of the original
patent," and the phrase "for the unexpired term of the original
patent" was not meant to terminate a reissue proceeding that had
been properly initiated during the term of the original patent.
684
Morgan noted that under 37 C.ER. § 1.510(a), reexamination
proceedings, which are remedial in nature, may proceed "during the
period of enforceability of a patent," and argued that the reissue
674. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988); see also 37 C.F.L §§ 1.171-1.179 (1993).
675. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
676. 990 F.2d 1230, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
677. In re Morgan, 990 F.2d 1230, 1231, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392, 1393 (Fed. Cir 1993).
678. Id. at 1230-31, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392-93.





684. Id. at 1231-32, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393 (emphasis added).
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provision should be interpreted to permit similar treatment.6
Morgan further argued that a strict reading of § 251 would be
"inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. § 286, which permits a patentee to bring




The court rejected a construction of § 251 to implicitly include the
term "enforceable," a construction that would authorize the Commis-
sioner to reissue the patent for the enforceable, unexpired part of the
term of the original patent.687 Because the original patent in this
case had expired, however, there was no "unexpired part," regardless
of whether such part would have been enforceable.'
The court found Morgan's interpretation of § 251, that it authorizes
reissue where the proceedings were initiated during the unexpired
term of the patent, to be "contrary to the explicit language of that
section." 9 The court noted that while the reissue statute does not
expressly require termination proceedings when a patent expires, it
is the inevitable consequence of that provision that the patent can no
longer be reissued.69°
With respect to Morgan's argument that a strict interpretation of
§ 251 is inconsistent with § 286, the court stated that this argument
was "not without some force because a patent does have value beyond
its expiration date."69' Noting, however, that the issue was if the
Commissioner had the authority to reissue a patent once the original
patent had expired, and not if a patentee could file a complaint for
infringement after the reissue patent expired, the court found that it
was compelled by the plain and unambiguous language of § 251 to
hold that a patent may no longer be reissued after it expires. 92
The court, therefore, declined to force the Commissioner to involve
his equitable powers and process the reissue application for three
reasons: because the Commissioner could not possibly abuse his
discretion; because the process could not, as a matter of law, result in
a reissued patent; and because there was no evidence that the PTO
685. Id. at 1232, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393 (arguing that because both reissue and
reexamination are remedial and because PTO proceeds with reexamination proceedings after







692. Id. (holding that after expiration, patents may be sued on, but not reissued).
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had unduly prolonged the processing of Morgan's reissue applica-
tion.
6 93
Thus, one requirement of a reissue patent under 35 U.S.C. § 251
is that it must be granted before the term of the original patent
expires. The next case illustrates another requirement imposed by §
251-the oft-litigated requirement of reissue "error."694
In Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc.,69 the court considered on appeal
the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law that claims six
through nine, added during patent reissue, were invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 251. Following ajury verdict, the district court had entered
judgment against Coloplast, Inc., holding, inter alia, that Mentor's
reissue patent was not invalid and that all original and reissue claims
of the patent were willfully infringed.696
Coloplast argued on appeal, as in its Rule 50 (b) motion, that claims
six through nine of the reissue patent were valid because they were
"not based on 'error' within the meaning of section 251. "697
Whether the statutory requirement of "error" has been met is an issue
of law that the court reviews de novo.69 The underlying factual
inquiries, in contrast, are reviewed for substantial evidence.699
Although the error requirement generally is liberally construed, the
reissue statute does not give a patentee a second opportunity to
prosecute anew his original application.7 °0 "The recapture rule bars
a patentee from acquiring, by reissue, claims that are of the same or
broader scope than claims cancelled from the original application. "701
The originally claimed invention related to a condom catheter used
on male patients suffering from incontinence. 7 2  Claims one
693. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393-94. Morgan spent 15 years prosecuting the four
reissue applications. In the first application, the claims were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
with the C.C.P.A. affirming that rejection. Id. at 1230-31, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. The
second application, a continuation reissue application, was abandoned. Id. at 1231, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1392. In the third application, the Board affirmed a rejection under § 103 over
the same references relied on in the first application. Id. Finally, in the fourth application, the
present one, the Board affirmed, inter alia, a rejection under § 103 based on the same references
relied on in the previous applications. Id.
694. Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
695. 998 F.2d 992, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
696. Mentor, 998 F.2d at 993, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
697. Id. at 994, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
698. Id.
699. Id. (citing Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1439, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289,
297 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
700. Id. at 995, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524 (citing In reWeiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1582, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 369, 371 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985)).
701. Id. (citing Ball Corp., 729 F.2d at 1436, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 295).
702. Id. at 993, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
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through four of the reissue patent, which corresponded to the claims
of the original patent, were directed to "a catheter having a pressure
sensitive adhesive on a nonstick (release) layer located on the outer
surface of a condom sheath prior to it being rolled up, such that on
rolling the sheath outwardly, the adhesive on the outer surface" would
come into contact with and stick to the inner surface. 703  When
unrolled, the adhesive on the release layer on the outer surface would
be transferred to the inner surface.7 °4
Within two years of issuance of the original patent, Mentor filed a
broadening reissue application with an attorney declaration
705
stating that the original patent claimed less than Mentor had a right
to claim.70 ' The original claims did not read literally on catheters
manufactured "using a process in which the adhesive is applied to the
inner latex surface of the sheath at the time of manufacture, before
the device was rolled."70 7 The declaration averred that the error
arose because the prosecuting attorney assumed that manufacturing
catheters by applying the adhesive to the inner surface was "too
impractical to be commercially feasible."708 Mentor therefore added
new claims six through nine, which lacked "the requirement of
transfer of adhesive from the outer layer to the inner layer." °7 9 The
patent was ultimately reissued with original claims one through four
and new claims six through nine.
7 10
Coloplast argued that its motion for judgment of invalidity as a
matter of law had been improperly denied because reissue claims six
through nine, which did "not include the adhesive transfer limitation,
impermissibly" recaptured "what Mentor deliberately surrendered" in
prosecuting the original patent and, therefore, Mentor's error was not
correctable under § 251.711 Thus, Coloplast contended that
Mentor's reissue claims violated the recapture rule.
71 2
The court agreed with Coloplast, explaining that "[ e] rror under the
reissue statute does not include a deliberate decision to surrender
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1993) (identifying requirements necessary to reissue oath or
declaration).
706. Mentor, 998 F.2d at 996, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
707. See id. (explaining that broadening reissue patent application was filed within two-year
statutory period of§ 251, which provides that "[n]o reissued patent shall be granted enlarging
the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant




711. Id. at 996-97, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525-26.
712. Id.
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specific subject matter" to overcome prior art because, as a result of
this decision, the public is entitled to practice the surrendered subject
matter.713 The court noted that although " [t] he recapture rule does
not apply in situations in which there is no evidence that the
amendment of the original claims was in any regard an admission"
that the original scope of the claims was not in fact patentable, that
was not the situation here.
714
Claim one of Mentor's original patent application did not require
"transfer" of adhesive from the outer layer to an inner layer.715
During prosecution of the original patent application, Mentor
responded to an examiner's rejection of the claims over prior art by
replacing claim one with a new independent claim seven requiring
transfer from the outer layer to the inner layer.71 '6 After another
prior art rejection was made, Mentor responded by amending claim
seven to further require that this transfer occur as the sheath was
rolled up and then unrolled and argued that this feature patentably
distinguished the claims over the prior art.717 The original patent
was subsequently issued with claim one of the patent corresponding
to claim seven of the application.
718
As noted above, Mentor's reissue application added claims six
through nine, all of which lacked the limitation of adhesive transfer
from the outer to inner layer.79 The examiner rejected the reissue
claims based on prior art, and Mentor responded by submitting
detailed information on commercial success.720 The patent was then
reissued with original claims one through four and new claims six
through nine.721
The Federal Circuit concluded that reissue claim six, which did "not
include the adhesive transfer limitation, impermissibly" recaptured
"what was deliberately surrendered in the prosecution of the original
application."722 To obtain allowance, Mentor narrowed its claims
originally filed in the patent application by adding the adhesive
transfer limitation and was therefore precluded from recapturing what
713. Id. at 996, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
714. Id. at 995, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (citing Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating &
Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
715. M, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
716. Id. at 995-96, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524-25.
717. Id.




722. See id. (observing that reissue claims did not contain rolling and unrolling adhesive
transfer limitation that was deliberately surrendered to overcome rejection of prior claim due
to prior art issue).
1334
19941 1993 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS 1335
it deliberately surrendered.723 Mentor argued that the recapture
rule was avoided because reissue claims six through nine, although
broader than the original claims in some respects, were materially
narrower in other respects. 24 The court noted that "reissue claims
that are broader in certain respects and narrower in others may,"
indeed, avoid the recapture rule if they are broader in a way that does
not try to reclaim that which was surrendered during an earlier
application.7" Because the reissue claims were broader "in a man-
ner directly pertinent" to the surrendered subject matter and the
added limitations did not narrow the reissue claims materially
compared to their broadening, the court held that the recapture rule
applied.7 2  Because reissue claims six through nine did not meet
the legal requirement for reissue error, the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of invalidity on
claims six through nine.727
III. INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE
In general, an interference is a proceeding where priority between
two or more parties claiming the same patentable invention is deter-
mined.728 In other words, an interference is a proceeding where





727. Id. at 997, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
728. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1988) (laying out conditions of patentability entitlement where
priority is in question and giving list of factors to consider, including respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice, and also requiring consideration of reasonable diligence
of inventor first to conceive but last to reduce to practice).
729. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). In Beech, the Federal Circuit held that the district court, apparently confusing the
concepts of inventorship and ownership, erred in vacating a Board decision resolving an
interference between the parties. Id. at 1248-49, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582-83. The case at
bar presented a question concerning ownership of patent rights. Id. at 1239, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1574. The district court, in a previous litigation between the parties, had ruled on a
question of ownership. Id. at 1241-42, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. Additionally, a previous
interference in the PTO had resulted in a determination by the Board regarding priority of
invention. Id. at 1239, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. In the present case, the district court
vacated the PTO's interference decision, explaining that it was "restating" its previous ruling
from the prior litigation regarding the contractual rights of the parties. Id. at 1244, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. In reversing the district court's order vacating the PTO's
interference decision, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court had engaged in "faulty
legal analysis" when it concluded that any determination of who had title in the subject matter
involved in the interference "could serve as a basis for vacating the PTO's interference decision"
regarding who was the first to invent the subject matter. Id. at 1248, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1582.
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instituted in a district court action or in a PTO proceeding.73 0
A. Priority and Derivation Issues
In Price v. Symsek,731 the Federal Circuit distinguished the concept
of priority of invention from the concept of derivation.73 2 "Priority
goes to the first party to reduce an invention to practice, unless the
other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention
and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that
invention to practice." 733  In contrast, a party asserting derivation
"must establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter and
communication of that conception to the adverse claimant." 7"
Price arose from an interference provoked by Price's filing of a
patent application containing claims copied from Symsek's patent
almost a year after its issuance. 35 Price sought to prove that Symsek
had derived the subject matter of the count from him or, alternative-
ly, that Price was the prior inventor because he had conceived the
subject matter of the count before Symsek and had been reasonably
diligent in reducing it to practice. 73 6  The Board held that Symsek
was entitled to its patent claims corresponding to the interference
count because Price had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
his conception prior to Symsek's conception. 37 In so holding, the
Board ruled that a witness' declaration did not corroborate a drawing
because the witness did not attribute the drawing to Price or indicate
that she had any understanding of its content or significance.73
Thus, Price's testimony that a drawing illustrating the subject matter
of the count was not corroborated.? Price appealed, arguing that
the Board had erred in requiring Price to prove the elements of
730. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (providing that "[t]he owner of an interfering patent
may have relief against the owner of another by civil action"); id. § 135(a) (providing that
"[wihenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may
be declared"); 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (1993) (noting that interference proceedings in PTO arc
governed by 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601-1.690).
731. 988 F.2d 1187, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
732. Price v. Symsek, 998 F.2d 1187,1190,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031,1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
733. Id.; seealso35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988) (regarding conditions of patentability entitlement
when priority is at issue).
734. Pyice 998 F.2d at 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
(providing limit to patentability where applicant did not invent subject matter for which she is
seeking patent).
735. P ice 998 F.2d at 1189, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
736. Id. at 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
737. Id.
738. Id. at 1195, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
739. Id.
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priority or derivation beyond a reasonable doubt74 and in refusing
to consider documentary evidence whose existence was corroborated
as of the relevant date.741
Noting that the issue regarding the quantum of proof required for
an applicant to establish priority or derivation in an interference with
an issued patent was one of first impression in the Federal Cir-
cuit,742 the court held that the correct standard of proof is "clear
and convincing," and not "beyond a reasonable doubt."743 The
court found no reasonable justification for extending the criminal
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" into the field of patent law,
and found that the societal interests derived from the statutory
presumption of patent validity require a higher standard than the civil
standard of "a preponderance of the evidence."7' Thus, although
the Board correctly placed the burden of proving conception on
Price, the junior party,745 the court held that the Board had erred
in requiring Price to satisfy this burden beyond a reasonable
doubt.746 The court found that this error was not harmless and
that it apparently had led the Board to impose an unreasonable
requirement of corroboration.747
The court noted that proof of conception requires corroboration
of an inventor's testimony,7 48 and that, in this situation, a "rule of
reason" analysis is applied, where all pertinent evidence is evaluated
to determine whether the requirement of corroboration has been
met. 49 The court found that the Board had extended the corrobo-
ration requirement beyond reasonable bounds."0
The court explained that, although evidence regarding what the
drawing would mean to a person of ordinary skill in the art may help
the Board to evaluate a drawing, the content of a drawing does not
740. Id. at 1190-91, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033-34.
741. Id. at 1195, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
742. Id. at 1191, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
743. Id. at 1194, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036.
744. Id. at 1193, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035; cf. Lamont v. Berguer, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1580, 1582 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988); Okadav. Hitotsumachi, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1789,1790
(Comm'r Pat. & Tm. 1990) (positing that statutory presumption of validity does not apply in
interference proceeding).
745. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.657 (1993) (stating that rebuttable presumption exists in favor of party
with earliest filing date or effective filing date and that burden of proof is on party contending
otherwise).
746. P ice 988 F.2d at 1194, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036.
747. Id.
748. See id. (articulating unequivocal case law holding that inventor's testimony regarding
priority or derivation can not, standing alone, reach level of clear and convincing evidence).
749. Id. at 1195, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
750. Id.
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require corroboration. 5 ' Only an inventor's testimony must be
corroborated before it can be considered.75 2 Thus, the court held
that the Board had erred in requiring the content of the drawing, a
physical exhibit, to be corroborated, 753 and determined that the
witness' declaration, if believed, corroborated the preparation of the
drawing before Symsek's date of conception.7 54 The court, there-
fore, vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for the
Board to determine whether Price had established conception and the
other elements of priority or derivation "under the clear and
convincing evidence standard."755
The court visited the issue of whether the burden of proving the
conception element of a party's case for priority had been met in Fiers
v. ReveLv56 This case, which arose from a three-way interference
among three patent applicants (Fiers, Sugano, and Revel), also
addressed the issue of entitlement to the benefit of an earlier-filed
application for the purpose of establishing priority of invention. 757
Sugano, having filed a U.S. patent application on October 27, 1980,
claimed the benefit of, inter alia, a March 19, 1980, Japanese filing
date; Fiers, having filed a U.S. patent application on April 3, 1981,
sought to establish priority based on a prior conception coupled with
diligence to a British filing date of April 3, 1980; and Revel, having
filed a U.S. patent application on September 28, 1982, claimed the
benefit of a November 21, 1979, Israeli filing date.75 The'count in
controversy covered DNA consisting essentially of a DNA that codes
for human fibroblast beta-interferon polypepide.759
The Board decided that Sugano was entitled to a judgment of
priority, holding that: (1) Sugano was entitled to the benefit of the
Japanese filing date; "(2) although Fiers was entitled to the benefit of
the British filing date, he had not proved conception" of the subject
matter prior to that date; and (3) Revel was not entitled to the benefit
of the Israeli filing date. 760 In general, these holdings hinged on
whether there had been a disclosure or recognition of the complete
nucleotide sequence of a DNA coding for beta-interferon.76'
751. Id.
752. Id.
753. Id. at 1195-96, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
754. Id. at 1196, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
755. Id.
756. 984 F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
757. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,1164-65,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601,1603 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
758. Id. at 1167, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
759. Id. at 1166, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
760. Id. at 1167-68, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
761. Id. at 1168, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
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The Federal Circuit first addressed Fiers' case for priority.762 The
court rejected Fiers' argument that proof of an enabling method for
preparing the DNA of the count was sufficient to establish conception
of the DNA, and noted that conception of a DNA, like conception of
any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other
than by its functional utility.763 The court therefore affirmed the
Board's holding that Fiers' proof of conception of a method that
enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to make the DNA of the count




Turning to Revel's case for priority, the court noted that Revel had
the burden of proving entitlement to the filing date of the
earlier-filed Israeli application by establishing that this application met
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. 76 5 The Board
held that the Israeli application satisfied neither the
written-description requirement nor the enablement requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112.766 The court held that Revel failed to prove that
its Israeli application met the written-description requirement because
the application did not demonstrate that the disclosed method for
isolating the DNA in question actually worked and, therefore, the
application failed to establish that Revel had possession of the inven-
tion.71 7 The court did not address the issue of whether the applica-
tion satisfied the enablement requirement.
768
Finally, the court addressed Sugano's case for priority based on its
Japanese filing date.769  The court stated that once the sufficiency
of Sugano's specification had been accepted by the Examiner, Sugano
had no additional burden to prove by extrinsic evidence that his
application was enabling. Consequently, the burden was on Fiers to
demonstrate that Sugano's application was not enabling.770  The
762. Id.
763. Id. at 1168-69, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceuti-
cal Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ruling that
chemical structure or defining method of preparation by physical, chemical, or other
distinguishing characteristic must be present in order to establish conception)).
764. Id. at 1169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605 (rejecting Fiers' argument that controlling
issue was whether his method was enabling).
765. Id.
766. Id. at 1170, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
767. Id. at 1170-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605-06 (dismissing Revel's claim and declining
to accept his argument that written description requirement was satisfied via correspondence
between language of count and language of specification).
768. Id. at 1171 n.12, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 n.12.
769. Id. at 1171, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
770. Id. at 1172, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (citing Weil v. Fritz, 601 F.2d 551, 555, 202
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 450 (C.C.P. 1979)). The court in Weil explained that "any party making
the assertion that a U.S. patent specification ... fails... to comply with § 112 bears the burden
of persuasion." 601 F.2d at 555,202 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 450 (emphasis added) (indicating that
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court concluded that Sugano's disclosure was enabling because it
detailed a method for obtaining a DNA coding for beta-interferon,
and held that the Board was correct in finding that Fiers showed no
persuasive evidence to question the veracity of the statements
contained in the specification.77 After indicating that Sugano's
Japanese application, in setting forth a thorough and complete
nucleotide sequence of a DNA coding for beta-interferon, satisfied the
written description requirement, the court held that Sugano was
entitled to theJapanese filing date and therefore affirmed the Board's
decision on priority.
772
B. Other Patentability Issues
In addition to priority and derivation issues, other patentability
issues may also be determined in an interference action before the
Board.773  These other issues of patentability may be raised by a
party,774  or, as in the following case, sua sponte by an
examiner-in-chief (EIC). '
In In re Van Geuns,776 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
decision that the claims of Van Geuns' application designated as
corresponding to the count 777 were unpatentable for obviousness
once Sugano's sufficiency of specifications is determined, burden shifts to opposing party to
challenge entitlement to Japanese application date and finding that was not done in this case).
Revel had the burden of proving entitlement to the benefit of his earlier-filed Israeli application
date. F ers, 984 F.2d at 1169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. To meet this burden, Revel was
required to prove that his application met the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id.; see also 37
C.F.R. § 1.633(f)-(g) (1993) (outliningpreliminarymotions that partymayfile, including motion
to be accorded benefit of filing date of earlier application filed in United States or abroad and
motion to attack benefit accorded opponent in notice declaring interference of filing date of
earlier applications filed in United States or abroad). Compare Kubota v. Shibuya, 999 F.2d 517,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1993), which is discussed in Part III.C below.
771. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1172, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (noting that apparently
statements in Sugano's specification represented, in effect, that disclosed method produced
described DNA and that DNA coded for beta-interferon).
772. Id.
773. See37 C.F.R. § 1.633(a) (1993) (establishing that party may file preliminary motion for
judgment on ground that opponent's claim corresponding to count is not patentable to
opponent, except motion cannot be based on priority of invention by moving party as against
any opponent or derivation by opponent from moving party).
774. See generally id. § 1.633 (outlining acceptable preliminary motions).
775. Id. § 1.610(e) (giving examiner-in-chief suaspontediscretion to determine proper course
of conduct in interference for any situation not specifically assigned in 37 C.F.R. § 1.610); id.
§ 1.641 (noting that examiner-in-chief may take action if unpatentability discovered). In a
decision dated October 15, 1993, Commissioner Lehman authorized Board members (EICs) to
use the new title "Administrative PatentJudge" (APJ). 1156 O.G. 32 (Nov. 9, 1993).
776. 988 F.2d 1181, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
777. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (f) (1993) (defining "count" as interfering subject matter between
applications or between applications and patents, and adding that any claim that corresponds
to count is claim involved in interference within meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)).
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under 35 U.S.C. § 103.7"8 The EIC had moved sua sponte under 37
C.FR. §§ 1.610(e) and 1.633(a) forjudgment on the ground that the
subject matter of the count was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.77' After the parties responded to the show-cause notice
under 37 C.FR. § 1.640(d), took testimony, filed briefs, and appeared
in a hearing before the Board, the Board determined that the subject
matter of the count was unpatentable for obviousness. 8 0  The
Board, therefore, held all of the claims of the parties designated as
corresponding to the count, including claims 2147 of Van Geuns, to
be unpatentable for obviousness because they stood or fell with the
count.781 Van Geuns appealed. 82
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the Board should
determine patentability with reference to a specific claim or claims,
rather than the count.783 As pointed out by the Federal Circuit, an
interference count is merely a "vehicle for contesting priority of
invention and determining what evidence is relevant to priority."
7s4
Because claim 42 of the Van Geuns application, however, correspond-
ed exactly to the count, the Federal Circuit viewed the Board's
decision as finding that claim to be unpatentable for obviousness.
78
Reviewing the legal conclusion of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 de novo and the underlying factual findings under the clearly
erroneous standard,786 the court determined that the Board did not
err in concluding that claim 42 would have been obvious.
78 7
Turning to the issue of unpatentability of claims 21-41 and 43-47,
the Federal Circuit stated that, as a general proposition, the PTO's
position is:
that claims designated as corresponding to a count stand or fall
with the patentability of the subject matter of the count is
overbroad. The rules for determining patentability in an interfer-
ence proceeding and the scope of a party's admission when claims
778. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1185, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
779. Id. at 1183, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 1184, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
782. Id. at 1183, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
783. Id. at 1184, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
784. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59 (citing Case v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 749,
221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ruling that "count" and "claim" are not
interchangeable words to use when claiming invention); Squires v. Corbett, 560 F.2d 424, 433,
194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513, 519 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
785. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
786. See d. (citing In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1935
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
787. Id. at 1186, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
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are designated as corresponding to the count must be consid-
ered.78s
The court noted that when an interference is declared between an
application and a patent the PTO must, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.606,
designate the claims that define the same patentable invention as the
count as corresponding to the count. 9 Thus, based on the defini-
tion of "the same patentable invention" given at 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n),
the PTO must designate as corresponding to the count those claims
that are the same as the count or obvious in view of the count, assum-
ing the count is prior art with respect to such claims.
790
As noted by the court, a party may contest the PTO's "designation
of particular claims as corresponding to a count" by filing a prelimi-
nary motion under 37 C.F.R § 1.633(c) (4).91 The court indicated
that if a party does not timely contest the designation of claims, then
the party has effectively conceded that all of the designated claims
would be anticipated, at least rendered or obvious, if the count was
actually prior art to the claims.792 In dictum, the Federal Circuit
stated that if prior art actually were to anticipate the subject matter
defined by a count, then it follows from 37 C.FR. § 1.601 (n) that all
claims designated as corresponding to a count would be unpatentable
for anticipation or obviousness. 79  The court, however, was not
persuaded that this logic should be extended another step. 9"
The court explained that, where prior art does not anticipate, but
only renders obvious, the subject matter of a count, the prior art does
not disclose every limitation of the count.795  In such a case, al-
though the claims designated as corresponding to the count have
been conceded to be the same patentable invention as the count, they
788. Id. at 1185, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
789. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
790. Id. The rules do not require the PTO, in the first instance, to identify the legal and
factual bases for designating claims as corresponding to a count. For example, if a claim of a
party is designated as corresponding to the count on the basis of obviousness, assuming the
count to be prior art, the rules do not require the PTO to provide the factual basis for the
designation using the test for obviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
791. Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1185, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060; see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.637(c)(4)(ii) (1993) (stating that preliminary motion to designate that claim does not
correspond to count must show that claim does not define same patentable invention declared
in interference corresponding to count); cf. id. §§ 1.601 (n), 1.606 (1993) (elaborating instance
where invention is construed to be "same patentable invention" or is obvious with respect to
another invention which is prior art).
792. Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1185, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
793. Id. at 1185-86, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
794. Id. at 1186, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
795. Id.
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are not necessarily the same patentable invention as the prior art.
796
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that:
a party to an interference, who has failed to timely contest the
designation of claims corresponding to a count, has not conceded
that claims corresponding to a count are anticipated or made
obvious by the prior art when the subject matter of the count is
determined to be unpatentable for obviousness.
797
Van Geuns had failed to contest in time the designation of claims
22-41 and 43-47 as corresponding to the count.798 He had, however,
argued these claims separately, although the rules did not specify
whether a party may argue the patentability of claims separately to the
EIC and the Board.7 99 Because the inter partes interference proce-
dures for determining patentability essentially paralleled the usual ex
parte procedures, the court concluded that a party to an interference
could argue separately the "patentability of claims designated as
corresponding to a count," but if the party did not so argue its claims
separately, they stood or fell together.00
Applying these principles, the court held that Van Geuns' claims
22-41 and 43-47, which were designated as corresponding to the count
and whose patentability was argued apart from that of the count, were
not unpatentable simply because the subject matter of the count was
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103."01 Rather, the claims were
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because, as found by the Board,
the limitation argued by Van Geuns as distinguishing over the prior
art would have been obvious in view of the prior art.
802
Another case dealing with unpatentability issues under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103 in an interference context is Davis v. Loesch.83 Davis
arose from an interference declared April 4, 1985,804 which is after
796. Id.
797. Id.
798. Id. at 1185, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
799. Id. at 1185 n.2, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 n.2.
800. Id. at 1186, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (citing 37 C.F1L § 1.192(c)(5) (1993)
(outlining situations for grouping of claims to stand or fall together unless statement that
rejected claims do not stand or fall together is included in presentation of reasons why they are
separately patentable); In reKing, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 137 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
801. Id.
802. Id. at 1185-86, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61.
803. 998 F.2d 963, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
804. Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 963, 965, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(declaring interference between defendant's pending continuation application and patent issued
to plaintiff).
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the February 11, 1985 date on which the new interferences rules went
into effect.8°5
The interfering subject matter related to a flameless apparatus that
converts liquid nitrogen into gaseous nitrogen making it possible to
pump nitrogen into an oil well.80 6 The interference involved
Loesch's continuation application, which claimed priority based on a
patent application filed March 31, 1980, and Davis' U.S. Patent No.
4,420,942 (the '942 patent), which issued from an application filed
July 16, 1982, and Davis' application for reissue of the '942 patent on
December 18, 1985.807 Loesch provoked the interference by pre-
senting claims in the continuation claim copied from the '942 patent
and the reissue application.8s 8 Each party relied solely upon its
respective filing date for proof of priority."° Loesch was accorded
the benefit of its March 31, 1980, filing date, and was, therefore,
designated the senior party.
810
The Board concluded that: (1) the disclosure in Loesch's patent
application, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 4,438,729 (the '729
patent), "supported all the material limitations" of the count;81 1 (2)
"Davis' reissue claims 44-55 were not patentably distinct from the
count";8 12 and (3) "Loesch was entitled to judgment on the ground
that all of Davis' claims at issue, claims 1-5 and 41-43 of the '942
patent and claims 44-55 of the reissue application, were unpatentable
to Davis under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and/or 35 U.S.C. § 103 [in view of]
the disclosure of" Loesch's '729 patent.8 13  Davis appealed and the
Federal Circuit affirmed.814
805. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601 to 1.690 (1993) (outlining governing rules on interferences
procedures in FrO that are to be construed to insure just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of each interference). Although the Davis interference was under the new rules, some of
the issues raised by the parties--e.g., whether an opponent's disclosure supports the material
limitations of the count, Davis, 998 F.2d at 965, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443-hark back to
practice under the old interference rules (37 C.F.R. § 1.201 et seq.). This is not surprising
because the interference was declared shortly after the new rules went into effect.





811. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.633 (g) (1993) (noting situation where party can move to attack
benefit accorded opponent for filing earlier application).
812. SeeDavis, 998 F.2d at 965, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (concluding that claims are not
obviously patentably distinct in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.633(c)(4),
1.637(c) (4) (providing regulations under which party may move to redefine interference by
designating claim as not corresponding to count).
813. SeeDavis, 998 F.2d at 965,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (basing unpatentability on prior
art reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.633(a) (outlining grounds under
which party can move for judgment that opponent's claim is not patentable to opponent).
814. Davis, 998 F.2d at 964-66, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
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The court agreed that the disclosure of the '729 patent supported
the material limitations of the count.8 15 Because the '729 patent
therefore anticipated the count, the court agreed that the '729 patent
anticipated claims 1, 4, 5, 41, and 42 of the '942 patent and claims 1,
4, 5, 41, 42, 50, 53, and 54 of the reissue application. 16
Concerning reissue claims 2, 3, 43-49, 51, 52, and 55, Davis argued
that these claims were separately patentable because they recited a
shell-and-tube heat exchanger in place of the commingling chamber
of the embodiment of the apparatus disclosed in the '729 patent.
17
The court disagreed with Davis, noting that the '729 patent taught
substituting a shell-and-tube heat exchanger for the commingling
chamber, and that there was evidence that it would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make the suggested
substitution."1 The court, therefore, affirmed the Board's determi-
nation of obviousness. 9
In Davis, the court also addressed a jurisdictional issue, which is
discussed above in Part I. Other issues not relating to patentability
raised in cases dealing with interferences are discussed in the
following subsection.
C. Issues Relating to Procedure and Practice
General Instrument Corp. v. Scientific-Atlantd 2 arose from an inter-
ference proceeding in the PTO wherein the Board decided
Scientific-Atlanta (SA) was entitled to priority. 21 General Instru-
ment (GI) appealed by filing an action under 35 U.S.C. § 146.22
815. Id. at 969, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
816. Id. at 968,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. Although the court cited Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
853 (1989), for the proposition that a claimed invention is anticipated if every element is shown
in a single prior art reference, Davis, 998 F.2d at 969, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445, the court
did not mention whether the Board's decision addressed how the disclosure of the '729 patent
showed all elements of the Davis claims in question. Rather, the unpatentability of these claims
apparently was premised on their designation as corresponding to the count. Cf In re Van
Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (ruling that claims whose
patentability were argued apart from count, but were designated as corresponding to count,
were not unpatentable due to subjective matter of count but, rather, due to prior art limitation
argued by plaintiff and court holding that limitation could not be distinguished due to
obviousness).
817. Davis, 998 F.2d at 968-69, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445-46.
818. Id. at 969-70, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
819. Id. at 970, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
820. 995 F.2d 209, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
821. General Instrument Corp. v. Scientific-Atlanta, 995 F.2d 209, 210, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1145, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
822. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1988) (providing that "[a]ny party to an interference dissatisfied
with the decision of the Board... may have remedy by civil action.., unless he has appealed
to ... the Federal Circuit").
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GI's appeal under § 146 was directed to the issue of patentability of
SA's claims based on an alleged public use more than one year before
the filing of SA's patent application. 23 The basis for the alleged
public use was a public demonstration of a product by the inventor
named in SA's application that occurred over a year prior to its filing,
which demonstration was disclosed by SA in its preliminary statement
filed during the PTO proceedings.2 4 SA moved in limine to
preclude all testimony regarding the alleged public use on the ground
that the issue had not been raised before the Board and, therefore,
could not be raised in the district court proceeding. 2 The district
court granted SA's motion and entered judgment in favor of SA.126
The questions the Federal Circuit addressed on appeal were (1)
"whether the public use issue was raised before the Board for
purposes of a subsequent appeal pursuant to [35 U.S.C. §] 146" and,
if not, (2) "whether the district court properly excluded the testimony
proffered" by GL.827 The Federal Circuit answered the first question
in the negative and the second question in the affirmative.
The court noted that GI could not have made a preliminary motion
for judgment under 37 C.F.R § 1.633(a) based on the alleged prior
use because SA's preliminary statement was not served on GI until
after the deadline for filing preliminary motions had passed. 2 The
court found, however, that GI could have filed a belated preliminary
motion for judgment, which likely would have met the good-cause
requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 1.645(b).129 Not only did GI fail to file
such a belated preliminary motion for judgment of unpatentability
based on the alleged prior use, GI expressed disinterest in pursuing
the matter, thereby waiving any interest in a decision by the Board on
the issue.8 30  Because the EIC did not exercise his discretionary
authority to take up the issue, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court correctly decided that the issue of the alleged public use
823. General Instrument, 995 F.2d at 210, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.46.
824. See id. at 212-13,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (noting that if demonstrated product had
been SA's claimed invention, public demonstration would have made SA's claims covering
invention unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
825. Id. at 210-11, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
826. Id. at 211, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 213, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.646(a) (1) (1993)
(noting that preliminary statements are not served on opponent until ordered by EIC); id.
§ 1.631(a) (recognizing that service is typically ordered concurrent with EIC's decision on
preliminary motions).
829. General Instrument 995 F.2d at 213, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (basing statement on
fact that information underlying motion was not available any earlier in proceeding).
830. Id. at 214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49.
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was not raised before the Board for purposes of the § 146 proceed-
ing.
831
The court next turned to whether the district court erred in
precluding evidence on the public use issue when that issue was not
"raised before the Board."8 2 The court initially noted that review
of an interference proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 146 is an equitable
remedy 3 and, accordingly, the district court may, when appropri-
ate, exercise its discretion, and allow testimony on issues that were not
raised before the Board.8 34  The Federal Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by granting SA's motion in
limine, thus upholding denial of the admission of testimony on the
issue of public use.33
Kubota v. Shibuyad36 is another case that involved an issue relating
to the allocation of the burden of proof under the new interference
rules.37 In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether the
moving party attacking the opponent's priority benefit accorded in
the declaration of the interference under 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 3(g) bears
the burden of proving that the opponent's earlier-filed application
does not comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first para-
graph.
8 38
Although Shibuya had been accorded the benefit of an earlier
Japanese filing date and was designated the senior party when the
interference was officially declared, the EIC granted Kubota's
preliminary motion under 37 C.F.R. § 1.633(g), reversed the order of
the parties making Shibuya the junior party, and required Shibuya to
show cause as to why summary judgment should not be entered
against him.83 9 After Shibuya responded to the show-cause order,
the matter came before the Board, which reversed the EIC's decision
and reinstated the benefit originally accorded to Shibuya on the
831. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. In reaching its decision, the court provided guidance
for determining whether an issue has been raised for § 146 purposes, stating that, "[s]hort of
[such] compliance with the regulations, issues may only be deemed raised for section 146
purposes if the record clearly demonstrates that the issue was undeniably placed before the
[EIC], and one or more parties insisted that the issue be resolved in the process of deciding
which of the parties was entitled to priority." Id.
832. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
833. See id. (citing Standard Oil Go. v. Montedison S.p., 540 F.2d 611,616-17, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 657, 660-61 (3d Cir. 1976) (reviewing circumstances such as fraud where district court
exercises its discretion by admitting testimony not raised before board).
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. 999 F.2d 517, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
837. Kubota v. Shibuya, 999 F.2d 517,520,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
838. Id. at 519, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
839. Id.
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ground that Kubota "failed to satisfy his burden of proving that
Shibuya's Japanese application did not" meet the enablement and
written-description requirements of § 112. 4  Although Kubota
previously asserted that Shibuya's Japanese application improperly
incorporated essential material by reference to the disclosure of
another foreign application,841 the Board found that Kubota failed
to present to the EIC any credible evidence that a person of ordinary
skill in the art, upon reading the Japanese application, would be
unable to make and use the invention of the count without resorting
to the referenced disclosure. 42
Affording deference to the Board's and Commissioner's8 43 inter-
pretation that the new interference rules clearly place the burden of
proof on a party filing a preliminary motion under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.633(g), the court agreed that 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.637 (g) and 1.639
supported placing such a burden,8 " and that the old-rule "'right to
make' the claim" cases did not apply."5 The Federal Circuit there-
fore affirmed the Board's decision that Kubota, as the moving party,
bore the burden of proof.
46
IV. INFRINGEMENT
In a typical patent infringement suit brought by a patent holder
against an accused infringer, the court will be faced with two major
issues: (1) whether the patent claims asserted by the patent owner
are valid; and (2) whether these claims are infringed. Under 35
U.S.C. § 282, a patent is presumed valid, and therefore the burden is
on the accused infringer to prove invalidity by clear and convincing




843. An amicus curiae brief was filed by the Commissioner, urging the court to affirm the
Board's decision.
844. Id. at 521, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
845. Id, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422 (noting that old interference rules required that party
who copied claims for purposes of provoking interference bore burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that it had "right to make" claim).
846. Id. at 522, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. The PTO subsequently amended 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.637(a) to make explicit that a party filing a preliminary motion in an interference has the
burden of proving that it is entitled to the relief sought in the motion. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,432
(1993).
847. See Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745-46, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming that plaintiff accused of infringement did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that patent was invalid with respect to asserted
anticipation and obviousness claims, but finding clear error in district court ruling willful
infringement).
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In contrast, the burden is on the patent owner to prove infringe-
ment by a preponderance of the evidence.' To prove infringe-
ment, the patent owner must show that every limitation of an asserted
patent claim is found in the accused device, either literally or by an
equivalent.
8 49
Determining a question of patent infringement entails a two-step
analysis: (1) construing the claims to determine their scope; and (2)
comparing the properly construed claims with the accused structure
to determine whether the claims encompass the accused struc-
ture.850
A. The First Step of the Analysis
The claims of the patent, which measure the invention at issue, are
given the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringe-
ment analyses. 1 Interpretation aids for determining the meaning
of a claim include not only the claim language, but also the patent
specification, prosecution history,12 prior art, and other claims.8
3
The Federal Circuit applies a de novo standard in reviewing questions
of claim interpretation, which are questions of law. 4
848. See Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that
patent owner has burden to prove infringement by "preponderance of the evidence" and
concluding, under doctrine of equivalents, that accused devices not shown to infringe by
preponderance of evidence)).
849. See id. (stating that claim limitations cannot be ignored under doctrine of equivalents
when determining infringement) (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,
935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961
(1988)). But a finding that a patent claim literally reads on an accused device does not
necessarily end the infringement inquiry-an accused infringer may establish noninfringement
under the reverse doctrine of equivalents by showing that its device "has been so far changed
in principle that it performs the same or similar function in a substantially different way." SRI
Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123-24, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 587
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 608-09 (1950) (describing that doctrine of equivalents not always applied to benefit of
patentee and that disputed device from combination of forms may restrict original claim and
defeat patentee's infringement action).
850. SeeUniroyal, Inc.v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,1054,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434,
1441 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (using formula to determine whether literal infringement occurred and
what scope of claims were in relation to disputed invention).
851. SRI IntZ4 775 F.2d at 1121, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 585.
852. See Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284,
1288 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing importance of examining language specification and
prosecution history of disputed claim, especially where disagreement exists as to language of
claim and how interpreted).
853. Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d at 1577,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839-40 (looking to specification
to assist claim construction, noting prosecution history, and rejecting patentee's attempt to
distinguish claim limitation as to construction).
854. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1839; see also Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992,
994, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.855 involved a
question of claim interpretation. 6 National Research Council of
Canada and its exclusive licensee, North American Vaccine (collective-
ly NRC), filed suit against American Cyanamid Co., alleging patent
infringement. 7 The patent claims in question were directed to a
vaccine component-an antigenic polysaccharide-protein conju-
gate-with the protein linked to a terminal portion of the polysac-
charide without significant crosslinking." 8 The district court found
that Cyanamid's "HibTITER," a vaccine against Haemophilus influenza
(H. flu) type b (Hib) bacteria, did not literally infringe the claims of
NRC's patent based on its interpretation of the claimed "linkage to a
terminal portion of the polysaccharide without significant
crosslinking."" 9
Cyanamid's vaccine consisted of Hib polysaccharides linked to one
or more proteins.86 Half of these molecules were monofunctional
monomers, which each had a protein bound to a polysaccharide (no
crosslinking), and the remaining molecules were difunctional dimers
and trimers, which had two and three proteins, respectively, linked
together by a polysaccharide (end-to-end crosslinking).861 The
district court, interpreting "conjugate" as embracing all the molecules
in the mixture, had rejected NRC's argument that infringement was
established on the basis of the monomers alone.8 2 The district
court had also construed "linkage to a terminal portion of the
polysaccharide without significant crosslinking" to mean linkage at
only one terminal portion of the polysaccharide, excluding all
crosslinking, even end-to-end crosslinking.86 Because Cyanamid's
HibTITER contained dimers and trimers having end-to-end
crosslinking, the district court had held that these vaccines did not
infringe NRC's patent.
8 4
At oral argument, NRC indicated that it was not challenging the
interpretation of the claim term "conjugate."865 NRC did argue,
however, that the claim language in question was not limited to
855. 7 F.3d 1571, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
856. North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1573, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1333, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id. at 1573-74, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35.
860. Id. at 1574, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
861. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35.
862. Id. at 1574 n.1, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 n.1.
863. Id. at 1575, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
864. Id.
865. Id. at 1574-75 n.2, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 n.2.
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linkage at only a single terminal (monofunctionality), but included
end-to-end crosslinking, with the phrase "without significant
crosslinking" referring to crosslinking across the backbone of the
polysaccharide, rather than at the ends. 6 The Federal Circuit
disagreed.86 7
Acknowledging that the term "a" in a claim may mean one or more,
the court found that there was no indication in the specification that
the inventors had intended "a" in the recited "a terminal portion" to
have other than its ordinary singular meaning.8 The court reject-
ed NRC's argument that the recitation of H. flu supported its
proposed construction.6 9 The court determined that the evidence
supported the district court's finding that H. flu did not necessarily
yield difunctional molecules, and concluded that the specification
supported the district court's interpretation that the claims were
limited to linkages at only one terminal portion of the polysaccha-
ride.7 °
Noting that neither the word "backbone" nor the concept of
avoiding linking other than at multiple terminal portions appeared in
the specification, the court also found no support for NRC's
contention that "significant crosslinking" referred to crosslinking
866. Id. at 1575, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
867. Id.
868. Id. at 1575-76, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336; see also ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator,
844 F.2d 1576, 1579, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (providing that words of
claim will be given their ordinary meaning, unless it appears that inventor used them
differently).
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation that the article "a" was used to
denote one terminal portion. North American Vaccine, 7 F.3d at 1581, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1341-42 (Rader, J., dissenting). Although the majority's opinion analyzed statements in the
specification in interpreting the article "a," the dissent argued that the majority improperly
relied on the inventors' earlier scientific writings that used the term "monofunctionaity" even
though the majority specifically rejected the district court's reliance on the earlier writings and
stated that "[a] patent is to be interpreted by what it states rather than by what the inventor
wrote in a scientific publication." Id. at 1578,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. Because the patent
specification did not refer to monofunctionality, the dissent argued, the scientific writings
actually showed that the inventors intended to claim polyfunctional molecules. Id. at 1581, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. The dissent suggested that the article "a" in the specification was
used for grammatical correctness, not to denote the singular, and that the claim would have
recited "a singular terminal portion" to denote the singular. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340-
41. Nothing in the specification, however, was cited in the dissent as showing that "a" was used
in the plural sense. Cf Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1936, 1938-39 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (interpreting claimed "straw-shaped" element as requiring
elements to be hollow in accordance with ordinary meaning of "straw," and stating that if
patentee, "Hoganas, who was responsible for drafting and prosecuting the patent, intended
something different, it could have prevented this result through clearer drafting").
869. North American Vaccine, 7 F.3d at 1577, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
870. Id.
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across the backbone of the polysaccharide. 71 Emphasizing the
requirement that applicants disclose their inventions adequately and
completely, the court concluded that "significant crosslinking" was
intended to mean linking at more than one terminal. 72 The
district court's holding of noninfringement was affirmed because it
turned on the district court's claim interpretation, which was
upheld. 73
Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc. 4 also involved a
question of claim interpretation, specifically, the meaning of a
limitation in a means-plus-function clause.'7 5 Carroll Touch had
filed a complaint alleging that Electro (EMS) infringed its pat-
ent.8 76 EMS answered by denying infringement and alleging patent
invalidity, and counterclaimed for a declaration to that effect.
77
The patent claims involved a photoelectric "touch input panel" for
use over computer video display devices, such as a cathode-ray tube,
that enable "a user to communicate with the computer by touching
a location on the display screen that corresponds to a desired
operation. "a1 a  A scanning infrared system consisting of a frame
containing circuitry generates a grid of infrared light beams, the
beams falling along a horizontal X-axis and a vertical Y-axis.879 To
command a computer equipped with the claimed invention to
perform a function, the user touches a display on the screen.88 0
The location of the touch is identified in terms of the grid coordi-
nates defined by the X-axis and Y-axis beams that are interrupted by
the touch."1 "Information pertaining to the location of the object
is then inputted to the computer, which subsequently executes an
action responsive to the selected function or command."8 2
871. Id. at 1577-78, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. According to the dissent, "without
significant crosslinking" referred to "'many randomly activated functional groups', and not to
crosslinking at a terminal portion of the polysaccharide." Id. at 1583, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1342 (RaderJ., dissenting).
872. Id. at 1578, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (giving little weight to inventor's testimony
that he intended invention to include difunctional molecules, explaining that such after-the-fact
testimony is entitled to "little weight compared to the clear import of the patent disclosure").
873. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
874. 15 F.3d 1573, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
875. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1988).
876. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys. Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1575, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
877. Id. EMS also filed counterclaims alleging that Carroll Touch, in bringing its
infringement suit, engaged in an anti-competitive scheme to restrain trade and committed acts





882. Id. at 1575-76.
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The district court concluded that EMS did not infringe Carroll
Touch's patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
Such a conclusion turned on the court's interpretation of the term
"spaced apart" found in a means-plus-function limitation in claim
1.883 At trial, the district court heard "expert testimony presented
by both parties regarding whether the accused devices met that
limitation."" The district court rejected EMS' witnesses' testimony
"that although the light beams of the accused devices intersected, they
were nevertheless 'spaced apart' within the meaning of' the
claim.
88 5
In reviewing the district court's interpretation of the claim
limitation as requiring that the beam surfaces be totally spaced apart,
i.e., non-intersecting, the Federal Circuit first noted that Carroll
Touch disputed neither that all of the accused EMS devices had beam
surfaces intersecting at varying degrees nor that one of the EMS
devices using coplanar beam surfaces having total surface intersection
did not infringe the patent at issue."8 ' Carroll Touch did contend,
however, that the EMS devices using curved beam arrays were "within
the claim limitation because such devices have beam surfaces that are
spaced apart for most of their respective surface areas.
" 887
More particularly, referring to the patent specification, Carroll
Touch maintained that the claimed invention encompassed the use
of curved beam surfaces positioned as closely "as possible to the
display surface to eliminate" parallax and that some intersection of
the beam surfaces necessarily would occur when so positioned.88
Thus, according to Carroll Touch's interpretation, the claim term
"spaced apart" allowed for some intersection of the beam surfac-
es.8
89
The court first looked to the specification for assistance in
construing the claim.89 The court stated that although the specifi-
883. Id. at 1576, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. The claim limitation read that:
means for mounting said light sources and said photosensitive device on said housing
to produce said sets of beams in two surfaces, spaced apart along the direction normal to
the plane of said opening counting means for each of said sets for counting a number
of interrupted beams in each set, and means for producing output signals indicating
the number counted by each counter.
Id. at 1577, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1839. (emphasis added).




888. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
889. Id.
890. See id. (noting that words are generally given their ordinary meaning, unless it appears
from specification or prosecution history that they were used differently by inventor).
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cation of the patent disclosed "the use of curved beam surfaces, it
[did] not teach that the space between the beam surfaces should be
minimized in order to diminish parallax."89' Nor did "the specifica-
tion indicate that use of curved beam surfaces necessarily results in
intersection of the beam surfaces."
892
Rather, the court found that the specification confirmed that the
term "spaced apart" did not include devices having intersecting beam
surfaces, the specification expressly disclosing that "the separation of
the X and Y beam planes permits the apparatus to discriminate
against small insects, and to calculate the difference in the time
between interruption of the beam in the two...planes., 89" Thus, the
specification did not support an interpretation that the beam surfaces
of the claimed invention intersect.
Next, the court determined that the prosecution history also under-
mined Carroll Touch's interpretation of the disputed "spaced apart"
term.8 94 The examiner had rejected claim 1 as originally filed based
on prior art describing X-Y array sensors and X-Y-Z array sensors, and
Carroll Touch had responded by arguing that the prior art defined
"merely one single plane of beams" as distinguished from the claimed
invention, "which has two separate surfaces."8 95 The court found
that in attempting to distinguish the claim requirement of "two
separate surfaces, spaced apart" from the prior art, "Carroll Touch
necessarily was arguing that the beam planes of the claimed invention
do not intersect."89  The court therefore agreed with the district
court's interpretation of the claim limitation in question.897
Rawplug Co. v. illinois Tool Works, Inc.898 presented, inter alia, a
question of claim interpretation in the context of the district court's
judgment of noninfringement. 899 One patent in suit claimed a
single-piece, preshaped anchor having a shank with a "non-abrading
surface" for securing fixtures to masonry.9" The district court
891. Id.
892. Id. at 1577-78





898. 11 F.Sd 1036, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 19P8 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
899. Rawplug Co. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 11 F.3d 1036, 1038,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
900. 11 F.3d at 1036, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
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interpreted the term "non-abrading" as excluding a slightly-abrading
shank surface.90
The Federal Circuit came to a different interpretation of the term
"non-abrading" after considering it in light of other claim language,
the patent specification, and the prosecution history.902 The court
observed that the specification stated that the shank was resilient and
had a non-abrading bearing surface so that when it was driven into a
tightly-fitting masonry hole it would not "score, chisel or otherwise
mutilate the hole," but would "frictionally secure" the anchor in place,
and that the claim contained similar language.0 The court found
that this language, consistent with specified objects and advantages of
the invention, suggested that at least some minimal abrasion was
contemplated, with the friction or abrasion being such that it would
not score, chisel, or mutilate the hole.9 The court further noted
that its interpretation-that the "non-abrading" language did not
preclude the surface exerting some friction on the hole's walls after
the installed anchor regained its shape-was not inconsistent with the
prosecution history.95 Thus, the court concluded that the district
court's claim interpretation was erroneous.
90 6
B. The Second Step of the Analysis
The second step of the infringement analysis involves comparing an
accused device with the claim language as interpreted to ascertain
whether the device falls within the claim's scope.907 Infringement
cannot be established unless every limitation of a claim is met either
literally or by an equivalent in the accused device. 0
901. Id. at 1038, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (reporting district court's conclusion that
Illinois Tool Works' (ITW's) devices did not literally meet claim limitations because ITW's
devices had serrations for enhancing frictional engagement, and therefore did not possess
claimed "non-abrading" surfaces).
902. Id. at 1042-45, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916-18 (focusing on fact that claims are
"specifically crafted" for claiming innovative device after installatims and, therefore, shape before
installation is not as important as installed product detailed in claim language).
903. Id. at 1039, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
904. Id.
905. Id. at 1044, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916 (noting that "non-abrading" limitation term
was added to application claims to distinguish them over prior art, which disclosed anchors
having metal teeth and acknowledging that term must be interpreted consistently with other
claim language).
906. Id. at 1044-45, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917-18 (determining that ITW's shanks were
slightly serrated for frictionally engaging wall of masonry hole, which did not score, chisel, or
mutilate hole, and therefore holding that district court erred in concluding that no literal
infringement existed).
907. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
908. Id. (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1432
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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1. Literal infringement
Literal infringement results when an accused device contains all the
limitations specified in the claims.9" In International Visual Corp. v.
Crown Metal Manufacturing Co.,91 the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court's granting of summary judgment that Crown's GRIPPER
device did not literally infringe IVC's patented device.9  IVC
argued that the district court made several errors in interpreting the
literal scope of the claims, and the Federal Circuit agreed.912
The court held that the district court misconstrued the claims in
question by reading into them unrecited limitations.913 For exam-
ple, the district court erroneously interpreted claims to require one
recited element to be "'separate and apart'" from another where
there was no such limitation and, to the contrary, the claims required
"integral[] connect[ion]."914 The district court further erred by
reading into the claims another limitation found in IVC's commercial
embodiment of the invention, a plastic housing, which limitation was
not recited in the claims, but instead was disclosed in the patent
specification as being a preferred embodiment.915 Because the
district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement was
based on an erroneous claim construction, the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
916
In Morton International, Inc. v. Cardinal Chemical Co.,917 the court
revisited on remand the district court's holding of
noninfringement. 918  The Federal Circuit determined that the
district court had properly required Morton to identify the com-
pounds in Cardinal's mixtures allegedly within the scope of Morton's
909. Id.
910. 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
911. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 770, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1588, 1589-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
912. Id. at 771-72, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591-92.
913. Id.
914. Id. at 771, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
915. Id. at 771-72, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591 ("Infringement is determined on the basis
of the claims, not on the basis of a comparison with the patentee's commercial embodiment of
the claimed invention.") (quoting ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572,1578,
221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
916. Id. at 772, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591-92. The district court's application of the
doctrine of equivalents was also found to be erroneous because it was based on the erroneous
claim interpretation, and therefore, remand was deemed appropriate. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1592.
917. 5 F.3d 1464, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
918. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1466,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190,
1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court had previously affirmed the lower court's judgment of
noninfringement and therefore vacated its judgment of invalidity as moot, which vacatur was
overturned by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 1-21 and accompanying text.
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patent claims, to confirm their existence.919 The court pointed out
that every limitation in the claims had to be met. Of these limita-
tions, the existence of the claimed compounds having partial
connectivity was the essence of the dispute.92 The court found that
this existence was never established.92'
The court upheld the district court's rejection of Morton's evidence
pertaining to its "building-block" theory. 22 According to this theory,
the existence of the claimed compounds in Cardinal's mixtures was
established by NMR results showing the presence of chemical moieties
or compound fragments combining to form certain compounds, some
of which were assumed to be compounds having the claimed partial
connectivity.923 The court determined that the district court consid-
ered the conflicting testimony of the parties' experts on the NMR
results, and specifically considered and rejected Morton's theory.924
The court found that Morton's theory was merely speculative because
a number of compounds could not be identified using the NMR
results.925 The court held that Morton had not met its burden of
showing that every claim limitation, in particular the recited partial
connectivity, was found in Cardinal's accused compounds, either
literally or by an equivalent.
26
In Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 927 the court found error
in the district court's finding that Shandon's accused apparatus
literally infringed the light-microscopy processing apparatus claimed
in Miles' patent.928 The district court construed the claimed "cabi-
net" to mean a single enclosure for components of the apparatus. 29
The district court determined that the accused apparatus had three
modules together forming a single cabinet.930 The district court,
919. Morton, 5 F.3d at 1468-69, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193-94.
920. Id.
921. Id. at 1468,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. Morton relied on In reBreslow, 616 F.2d 516,
205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 221 (C.C.P.A. 1980), which held that compounds that were conceded to
exist need not be isolated to be claimed. Morton, 5 F.3d at 1468, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
The Federal Circuit distinguished this case on the basis that the existence of this compound was
at issue. Id.





927. 997 F.2d 870, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943
(1994).
928. Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127
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therefore, concluded that the claimed "cabinet" limitation, as every
other claim limitation, was found in the accused apparatus.93'
On appeal, Shandon argued that the district court had miscon-
strued the cabinet limitation as defining an enclosure for the various
components of the apparatus.932 Looking to the patent claims,
specification, and drawings, and further referring to a dictionary
definition of "cabinet," the Federal Circuit determined that the
district court properly construed the claim term.933 The court
concluded, however, that the district court erred in finding that the
accused apparatus had one, not three, cabinets. 94 Because the
accused apparatus had more than a single enclosure for the various
components, the court held that the district court erred in finding
literal infringement.9 35
2. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
Even when an accused device does not literally infringe a patent
claim, a court may nonetheless find infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.
9136
a. The tripartite function-way-result test
In deciding whether an accused device infringes under the doctrine
of equivalents, the familiar three-prong test is applied to determine
equivalence-whether the accused device performs substantially the
same overall function, in substantially the same way, to obtain
substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention.937
The cases below illustrate the application of various prongs of this
tripartite test.
In Miles Laboratories,938 the Federal Circuit upheld the district
court's finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 39
931. Id.
932. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
933. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127 (citing WEBrTER'S NEw WoRLD DICTIONARY 193 (3d
college ed. 1988)).
934. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DicrIONARY 872 (defining "module" as "any set of
units, as cabinets, designed to be arranged or joined in a variety of ways")).
935. Id.
936. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-43, 25 U.S.P.Qt2d
(BNA) 1451, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
937. Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland
Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961 (1988)).
938. 997 F.2d 870, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943
(1994).
939. Miles Lab. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870,876,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127-28 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
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Shandon argued that the district court had not determined that its
accused apparatus achieved "substantially the same result" as the
claimed apparatus and contended that the intended result of the
patented apparatus was the unification of the various compo-
nents. 4' Shandon alleged that by separating the components into
three cabinets, instead of one cabinet as claimed, its apparatus
achieved safety and operational advantages over the claimed appara-
tus.
9 4 1
The court countered that Shandon's apparatus, like that claimed,
attained enclosure of the components-a result that did not change
merely because Shandon had separated components into three
discrete cabinets.9 42 Because the limitations and functions of a
claimed apparatus, not an accused apparatus, constitute the proper
frame of reference for the doctrine of equivalents, Shandon could not
escape infringement simply because its apparatus performed functions
or achieved results in addition to those of the claimed apparatus.943
After observing that the patent did not require the cabinet to contain
all components and finding that Shandon's apparatus achieved
substantially the same result as that claimed-an entirely closed
system-the court concluded that there was no error in the finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.94
b. Limitations on the doctrine
Satisfaction of the tripartite function-way-result test under the
doctrine of equivalents will not necessarily result in a finding of
infringement. Other factors, such as the proximity of the prior art
and arguments made prosecuting the application in an attempt to
persuade the examiner of patentability, may limit application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Manufacturing Co.
945
illustrates how the prior art may impact the infringement analysis.
9 46
940. Id. at 876-77, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
941. Id. at 877, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. The claim had a "single cabinet" limitation.
Id. at 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
942. Id.
943. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1128 (citing Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys.,
Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 702, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).,
944. Id.
945. 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
946. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 772, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1588, 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Prior art, one limitation on the doctrine of equivalents,
refers to "whether an asserted range of equivalents would cover what is already in the public
domain." Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). If such a range is
already in the public domain, the claim cannot be infringed because a "patentee [cannot] ...
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In this case, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's granting
of summaryjudgment that Crown's GRIPPER device did not infringe
IVC's patented device.947 The district court erroneously read a
limitation into the claims,94 causing it to incorrectly draft the
hypothetical claim of the Wilson Sporting Good test.950 Thus, the
district court erred in applying the hypothetical claim analysis, which
the Federal Circuit explained is an optional way of evaluating whether
prior art limits the application of the doctrine of equivalents.951
A patent's prosecution history may also limit application of the
doctrine of equivalents. 52  Prosecution history estoppel is a
policy-oriented limitation to the range of equivalents available to a
patentee, preventing the patentee from extending the range of a
claimed invention to cover subject matter relinquished during
prosecution.53 As a general proposition, the estoppel is based on a
showing that a patent applicant made an amendment to the claim in
question to distinguish over cited prior art.954 Such an amendment,
however, "is not the sine qua non to establish prosecution history
estoppel.... [U]nmistakable assertions made... to the [PTO] in
support of patentability, whether or not required to secure allowance
of the claim, "955 may also operate as an estoppel.956
preempt a product that was in the public domain prior to the invention." Id. at 684, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948; see also, Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 866-67, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing fact that prosecution history estoppel
is another limitation on doctrine of equivalents).
947. International Visua 991 F.2d at 770, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590; see supra notes 909-16
and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's reversal of district court's summary judg-
ment).
948. International Vriual 991 F.2d at 771, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
949. 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
950. International Visua 991 F.2d at 772, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(reversing summary judgement and remanding for further proceedings consistent with court's
claim interpretation).
951. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591 (relating that approach requires visualization of claim
that is hypothetically larger than scope of issued claim and determination as to whether such
larger claim would have been patentable over prior art).
952. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
953. Id. (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861,870,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 96
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
954. Id. at 1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
955. Id.
956. Id. at 1774-75, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (holding that assertions in prosecution
history emphasizing criticality of claim limitation for both patentability and operability, which
included statements in invention disclosure form filed in patent application, estopped Texas
Instruments from asserting that device not having claimed limitation infringed under doctrine
of equivalents).
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In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,951 7 the Federal Circuit
determined whether prosecution history estoppel barred application
of the doctrine of equivalents. 8  The two patents in suit, U.S.
Patent Nos. 4,656,605 and 4,727,513 (the '605 and '513 patents),
which were assigned to Wang, each had a claim 1 directed to a
memory module for installation on a printed circuit motherboard
comprising, inter alia, the following elements: eight data memory
chips for storing digital data; a ninth memory chip for storing error
detection and correction information associated with the eight data
memory chips; and an epoxy-glass printed circuit board substrate
having a length and width adequate for mounting thereon the nine
memory chips only in a single row.959 Claim 1 of the '605 patent,
which was the only claim of this patent, further required that the
ninth memory chip be interconnected with the other eight, while
dependent claim 2 of the '513 patent contained a similar limita-
don.9"0 The accused devices of Toshiba and NEC included: (1)
classic nine-chip memory modules having eight data chips and one
error detection chip arranged in a single row on a printed circuit
board substrate; (2) three-pack modules having three chips arranged
in a single row, two half-bytes, each of which would read and store
four bits of information, and a parity chip, which detects error; and
(3) lateral modules having nine chips arranged in more than a single
row.
96 1
The jury had found that: (1) the classic modules infringed claim
1 of the '513 patent literally and claim 1 of the '605 and claim 2 of
the '513 patent under the doctrine of equivalents; (2) the three-pack
modules infringed claim 1 of both patents under the doctrine of
equivalents; and (3) the lateral modules also infringed claim 1 of
both patents under the doctrine of equivalents.6 2 Toshiba and
NEC appealed the part of the judgment finding that the sale of the
lateral and three-pack memory modules infringed claim 1 of both
patents under the doctrine of equivalents.9
63
Specifically, Toshiba argued that because Wang had added the
claim limitations that the modules comprise nine memory chips and
that the nine chips are mounted only in a single row to overcome
957. 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
958. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 866-68, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1775-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
959. Id. at 860-61, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
960. Id. at 861-62, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71.
961. Id. at 862, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
962. Id.
963. Id. at 866, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
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prior art rejections, prosecution history estoppel barred expanding
the claims' scope under the doctrine of equivalents such that they
would cover either the three-pack modules, which had only three
memory chips, or the lateral modules, which did not have the
memory chips mounted only in a single row.9" NEC had raised the
defense of such prosecution history estoppel only with respect to its
three-pack modules." After noting that an issue not raised by an
appellant in its initial brief is normally waived, the Federal Circuit
indicated that it would be unfair to give one appellant the benefit of
an estoppel without giving it to another.96 6 Because no prejudice
would result to Wang, the court exercised its discretionary authority
and considered the defense of prosecution history estoppel for both
the lateral and three-pack modules applicable to both NEC and
Toshiba.967
The court first discussed the law regarding prosecution history
estoppel, which is an equitable doctrine that bars a patentee from
enforcing its claims against otherwise equivalent structures if those
structures were excluded by claim limitations added to avoid prior
art." In contrast, when determining whether prosecution history
estoppel applies, a question of law,969 the court must consider not
only the claim language that was changed, but also the reason for the
change. 97 The court noted that unmistakable assertions made by
an applicant to the PTO in support of patentability, whether or not
required to obtain allowance, also may operate to preclude the
patentee from asserting equivalency, and that the prosecution history
is examined as a whole in determining whether estoppel applies.
9 71
Because Wang argued that the '513 patent claims were patentable
for the same reasons the '605 patent claim was allowed, the court
examined the prosecution history of the parent application to
determine whether prosecution history estoppel applied to both
patents.972 In a first Office Action, the PTO rejected the claims of




968. Id. (citing Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279,
1284, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
969. Id. at 867, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (citing LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
970. Id. at 866-67, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.p.A., 944 F,2d 870, 882, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
971. Id. at 867,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
972. Id. at 867 n.11, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 n.11.
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Wang's parent application under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on a prior art
reference disclosing a memory module with multiple rows of nine
chips.9 73 Wang responded to this rejection with an amendment
adding a claim limitation requiring the memory chips to be mounted
in a single row, accompanied by remarks noting this new claim
limitation and pointing out that the reference did not have memory
chips mounted in a single row.974 The court emphasized that after
a second Office Action, Wang filed a preliminary amendment in a file-
wrapper-continuation application cancelling the previous claims and
adding a new claim, which recited "'an epoxy-glass printed circuit
board substrate having a length and width adequate for mounting
thereon only in a single row said nine memory chips."'9 75 The court
concluded that the "single row" claim limitation and the "only" claim
language were added to overcome the prior art rejection.
9 76
To no avail, Wang contended that the prosecution history did not
exclude substrates having memory chips mounted in two rows, but
rather the prior art restricted the size of the substrate to not larger
than that upon which nine chips could be mounted.977 The court
concluded that while a two-row construction may not read on the
prior art, Wang was nonetheless estopped from asserting that the
claims read on structures not having nine chips in a single row.
978
The court explained that Wang chose to limit the scope of its claims
to require that the memory chips be mounted "'only in a single row'
and twice relied on this limitation before the PTO to distinguish the
claims over the prior art structure.9 79 The court, therefore, held
that the district court erred in denying JNOV on the issue of
infringement by the lateral modules under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. 980
For similar reasons, the court held that Wang was also estopped
from asserting that the three-pack memory modules having less than
nine chips infringed its claims.981  Examining the prosecution
973. Id. at 867, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
974. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775-76.
975. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
976. Id.
977. Id.
978. Id. at 867-68, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
979. Id.
980. Id. at 868, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728
F.2d 1423, 1439, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 107 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("A patent attorney is often faced
with choices during a patent prosecution .... A patent attorney should not be able, however,
to choose one course of action within the PTO with the anticipation that, if later checked, he
or she can always choose an alternate course of prosecution in a trial ... ")).
981. Id.
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history, the court found that Wang limited the scope of its claims to
require nine chips and relied on this limitation before the PTO to
distinguish the claims over the prior art, including a reference to EDI
teaching the use of eight chips.82 Accordingly, the court reversed
the part of the district court's judgment finding infringement of both
patents under the doctrine of equivalents as applied to the lateral and
three-pack modules. 3
In Haynes International, Inc. v. Jessap Steel Co.,9 4 the court consid-
ered the district court's granting of summary judgment of
noninfringement both literally and under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.9" Haynes' patent in suit was directed to a corrosion-resistant
nickle-based alloy containing chromium, molybdenum, and tung-
sten.986 Jessop had conceded that its accused alloy met all of the
limitations of the claim at issue, except that it did not contain "about
22 [percent by weight] chromium."987 The district court deter-
mined that prosecution history estoppel precluded a range of
equivalents covering Jessop's alloy, which contained 20.74 to 20.81
weight percent chromium.9 s
The application as originally filed had three claims specifying a
chromium content the independent claim recited a chromium
weight content of "20 to 24" percent; a dependent claim recited a
chromium content of "about 21 to 23" percent; and another
dependent claim recited a chromium weight content of "about 22"
percent.98 9 The examiner rejected these claims in view of prior art,
the principal difference between the claimed subject matter and the
cited prior art being that the claims recited a different but overlap-
ping range of chromium content.990 In response, the applicant
submitted an affidavit providing test results for an alloy containing
21.96 weight percent chromium, which were asserted to show
unexpected results, but the examiner again rejected the claims.99'
The applicant appealed to the Board, which ruled that the examiner
properly rejected the first two of the three claim limitations, but that
the affidavit rebutted the prima fade case of obviousness of the claim
982. Id.
983. Id.
984. 8 F.3d 1573, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
985. Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1575, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652,
1653 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
986. Id.
987. Id. at 1576, 28 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) at 1654.
988. Id.
989. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55.
990. Id. at 1576-77, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55.
991. Id. at 1577, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
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requiring about 22 weight percent chromium.992 After the applicant
rewrote the third claim in independent form and cancelled the two
broader claims, the application was allowed.9
In light of this prosecution history, the Federal Circuit found that
a reasonable competitor could have concluded that the applicant, by
cancelling the first two claims, retaining only the narrower third
claim, and failing to submit additional test data to attempt to procure
the issuance of broader claims in a continuation or reissue applica-
tion, gave up coverage that would have included Jessop's alloy.94
Thus, the court held that the prosecution history estopped Haynes
from asserting that its patent claim covered Jessop's alloy under the
doctrine of equivalents.995
In Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,996 the court considered the
effect of subject matter relinquished during prosecution and the prior
art.997 Hoganas' patent was directed to a composition used to form
refractory linings for industrial furnaces. 8  To minimize the
downtime required for drying refractory linings when installed, the
claimed composition employed "'straw-shaped, channel-forming
elements"' for releasing built-up steam used in the drying process."
The district court had granted Dresser's motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement, finding, inter alia, that prosecution
history estoppel precluded Hoganas from urging that Dresser's
composition, which employed "'capillary-sized"' elements, infringed
Hoganas' patent.' °0
In particular, during prosecution the examiner issued an Office
Action finally rejecting Hoganas' application claims for obviousness
based on a reference disclosing "a composition for making porous,
lightweight refractory bricks, which included 1-50% 'shredded or
992. Id.
993. Id.
994. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655-56.
995. Id. at 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. The concurringjudge, attempting to avoid
misinterpretation of the majority's "dicta" as expanding the scope of prosecution history
estoppel, wrote that this was a case of"classical prosecution history"- i.e., broader claims were
cancelled after a rejection based on prior art. Id. at 1580, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658-59
(Newman,J., concurring). According to the concurrence, the failure to continue prosecution
beyond full examination neither is, nor should be, a ground of estoppel, and the creation of
such a ground would create important policy questions. Id. at 1581, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1659.
996. 9 F.3d 948, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
997. Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948; 951-55, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936,
1939.42 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
998. Id. at 949, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
999. Id.
1000. Id. at 950, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
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comminuted paper.' " ' °  The reference disclosed two purposes for
the paper: (1) the promotion, through capillary action, "of uniform
drying of newly formed bricks prior to firing," and (2) the formation
of channels for releasing "steam caused during firing by the burn-out
of other materials added to the composition used to make
bricks."' ° 2  The examiner allowed the claims after Hoganas re-
sponded to the final rejection by pointing out two distinctions: (1)
contrasted to the one percent or more by volume of paper in the
prior-art composition, "the claimed composition [required] only a
small amount of channel-forming elements 0.05 to 0.35% by
weight-in order to avoid unnecessary porosity which could impair
the strength of the resultant lining";l'0 and (2) unlike the commi-
nuted paper of the prior-art composition, "the function of the
claimed channel-forming elements was not to achieve capillary
action"; and therefore "the thickness of the channel-forming elements
would generally be [one hundred] or more times the thickness" of
the prior-art elements.1" 4 The district court focused solely on the
second ground in concluding that Hoganas surrendered coverage of
capillary-sized elements."'
On appeal, Hoganas argued that the district court failed to apply
the rule that any estoppel "encompasses all of [the] combined distinc-
tions" over the cited prior art. °0 6  Hoganas argued that if the
district court had properly applied this rule, it would have concluded
that Hoganas gave up at most compositions incorporating both
distinctions, i.e. compositions (1) containing capillary-sized fibers (2)
in percentages by weight of more than one percent.'007 The Feder-
al Circuit did not agree; reasoning that a reasonable competitor was
entitled to conclude from the prosecution history that Hoganas'
characterization of the reference was correct.00 8
The court noted that Hoganas had characterized the reference as
disclosing compositions having at least one percent by volume paper
and that the claimed percentages could therefore have overlapped the
disclosed percentages.'00 9  The court indicated that because a
reasonable competitor consequently would not have concluded that
1001. Id. at 952, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
1002. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939-40.
1003. Id.
1004. Id.
1005. Id. at 953, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
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the examiner relied on the first distinction in allowing the claims, the
rule cited by Hoganas did not apply.'010 Accordingly, no error was
found in the district court's finding that prosecution history estoppel
precluded expanding the claims to cover the accused compositions,
which lacked the second distinction. 01'
In addition to looking to the prosecution history to determine the
proper range of equivalents, if any, to be afforded a claimed
invention, a court may also look to whether the invention represents
a significant or a minor advance over the prior art. For example, in
Hoganas AB, the Federal Circuit, in further support of its determina-
tion of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, indicated
that because the claimed invention represented only a "modest,"
rather than a "pioneering," advance over the prior art, it was not
entitled to "the broad range of equivalents" normally afforded a
pioneering invention.""
C. Special Infringement Analyses
1. Means-plus-function claims
In Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing. Co.'0' 3 the court
detailed the differences between an equivalency analysis under 35
U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, for determining literal infringement of
claims having means-plus-function limitations, and an equivalency
analysis for determining infringement of such claims under the
doctrine of equivalents.'0 1 4 The patent in suit, asserted by Valmont
against Reinke, claimed a "self-propelled irrigation apparatus for
watering non-circular areas. "1°  The claimed apparatus included
a main arm for irrigating a circular area of a field, and an extension
arm for irrigating portions of the field outside the circular area.
101 6
The apparatus further included an angle encoder at a center pivot for
measuring the angle between the main arm and a predefined axis in
the field, and another angle encoder at the end of a main arm for
measuring the angle between the extension arm and the main
arm.0 1 7 An angle comparator was also included for comparing the
1010. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41.
1011. Id. at 954, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
1012. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
1013. 983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1014. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1041-44, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1451, 1453-55 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1015. Id. at 1040, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1016. Id.
1017. Id. at 1040-41, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
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signals from the two angle encoders and controlling the motion of
the extension arm to ensure that it followed a uniform path.'0 8
Reinke's comer irrigation apparatus, like that claimed by Valmont,
included an extension arm. 01 9 The extension arm in the Reinke
apparatus, however, followed a buried electrical conductor, not
electrical signals generated by angle comparators. 120
The district court had found that Reinke's comer irrigation
apparatus infringed seven Valmont patent claims, each containing
means-plus-function language, under "some form of equivalency
analysis." 2' The primary infringement issue involved the "control
means"1 22 element of claim 1-"'control means for operating the
moving means to move the extension arm relative to the main arm
)"1023
The district court had concluded that both Valmont's claimed
control means and Reinke's accused control means performed
substantially the same function (operation of the moving means), in
substantially the same way (by imparting an electric signal to steering
motors, causing steering wheels to pivot), to achieve substantially the
same result (movement of the extension arm in an angle relative to
the main arm so that the extension arm could reach and irrigate the
comers of a field).0 24 The Federal Circuit was only able to deter-
mine from this conclusion that the district court "applied some type
of equivalency determination to find infringement, either equivalency
under of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) or the doctrine of equivalents."
10 25
Before reviewing the district court's finding of infringement on its
merits, the Federal Circuit explained the differences between the
origins and purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1988), and those of the
doctrine of equivalents. 1 21 It also distinguished an equivalency
analysis mandated by the patent statute from an equivalency analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents. 10 27 The court emphasized that,
unlike the doctrine of equivalents, the sixth paragraph of § 112
operates to limit the literal scope of a claim.0 2' The only question
1018. Id.







1026. Id. at 1041-44, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453-55.
1027. Id.
1028. Id. at 1042,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (citingJohnston v. PAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,
1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
1368
1993 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS
in applying the claimed means-plus-function language to an accused
device in determining literal infringement is whether the single means
in the accused device, which performs the function stated in the
claim, is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding structure
described in the patentee's specification as performing that func-
tion.1
029
On the other hand, determining infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents involves the familiar tripartite test for determining
equivalency-whether the accused device performs substantially the
same overall function, in substantially the same way, to obtain
substantially the same overall result as the claimed device.0°0 The
court held that:
the word 'equivalent' in section 112 suggests the familiar doctrine
of equivalents concept of insubstantial change which adds nothing
of significance to the claimed invention, a section 112 equivalent,
however, comes about from insubstantial change which adds
nothing of significance to the particular structure, material, or acts
disclosed in the specification.
0 31
Thus, the tripartite function-way-result test applied in determining
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents does not apply in
analyzing equivalency in determining literal infringement under §
112, sixth paragraph.
1 3 2
The court applied these principles to the facts of this case.
Analyzing equivalency under § 112, the Federal Circuit found that the
district court erred in failing to examine the patent specification to
identify the structures corresponding to the claimed control means,
and in failing to determine whether the accused product used a
control means that is an equivalent of any disclosed structure as
required by the statute."0s  The court found that the structures
generating the signals for control in the respective devices were
strikingly different: where Reinke's structure sensed electromagnetic
signals from the buried cable, Valmont's disclosed structure sensed
angular relations between the main arm and the extension arm.
1035
Thus, to the extent the district court conducted an infringement
1029. Id. at 1043,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (citing Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc.,
843 F.2d 1349, 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1030. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)).
1031. Id.
1032. Id.
1033. Id. at 1044-45, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56.
1034. Id. at 1044, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
1035. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56.
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analysis under § 112 and found literal infringement, it erred because
the control means of Reinke's apparatus was not an equivalent of the
structures disclosed in Valmont's patent.
10 36
The Federal Circuit further held that, to the extent the district
court applied the doctrine of equivalents, it also erred in finding
infringement 0 37 Applying the tripartite test, the court found that
"[a] 1though Reinke's buried cable perform [ed] substantially the same
control function and achieved substantially the same result as the
[claimed] control means, it [did] so in a very different way."
138
Thus, Reinke's apparatus did not infringe Valmont's patent under the
doctrine of equivalents because it did not meet the tripartite
test.
1039
In Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc.,10 40 the
court again considered the question of whether a means-plus-function
limitation was satisfied by the accused devices, either literally or under
the doctrine of equivalents. 4' Regarding the issue of literal
infringement, the court stressed that to literally meet a
means-plus-function limitation, an accused device must perform the
identical function recited in the claim using the particular structure
disclosed in the specification or an equivalent thereof.
10 42
As discussed above, the means-plus-function limitation in question
was interpreted to require the beam surfaces as being totally spaced
apart, without any intersection.'0 43  The court noted that "produc-
tion of two separate beam surfaces ... spaced apart along a direction
normal to the plane of the display" was an essential function of the
means-plus-function limitation in question.'0 44 The court conclud-
ed that EMS' devices, which had intersecting beam surfaces, did not
perform the identical function recited in the limitation and did not
use any structure disclosed in the specification or an equivalent
1036. Id.
1037. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
1038. Id. The court noted that Valmont had argued during prosecution of reissue
applications, in which Valmont had sought patent protection for a buried cable system, "that
buried-cable steering is completely different from the control means" claimed in the patent in
suit. Id. at 1045, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
1039. Id.
1040. 15 F.3d 1573, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1041. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576-81, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1839-45 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1042. Id. at 1578, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (citing Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg.
Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1043. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1044. Id.
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thereof. 45 Accordingly, the court found no literal infringe-
ment.
1 046
Nor did the court find infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.10 47  The court reemphasized that one cannot ignore claim
limitations in determining whether there is infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 1" The court deemed its holding concern-
ing the "'spaced apart"' requirement of claim 1 to be controlling in
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 1 49
"The claimed invention could not operate as intended if its beam
surfaces were not spaced apart for the entirety of their surface
areas,"'050 because it would be unable to measure the time interval
between beam surface breaks or to differentiate between a valid input
by the user and an accidental input caused by a small object.
10 51
Thus, the court held that the accused devices, which had intersecting
beam surfaces, "[did] not perform substantially the same overall
function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same
result as the claimed invention."0 52
2. Product-by-process claims
Claims of a utility patent may be drafted using various techniques,
including the means-plus-function format discussed above. Another
format for drafting claims is the product-by-process format, wherein
a claimed product is defined by reciting the process steps used to
make the product.10 3 One reason for using a product-by-process
format is to define a product otherwise difficult to define.
A product of the court's processing of cases involving this type of
claim has been a debate regarding how these claims should be
interpreted for purposes of patentability or validity and for purposes
of infringement.0 54 In Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc.,'.55 the court
1045. Id.
1046. Id.
1047. Id. at 1579, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1841.
1048. Id. (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)).
1049. Id.
1050. Id.
1051. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1052. Id.
1053. See Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 997, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1526
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
1054. SeeAtlantic Thermoplastics Co. Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1055. 998 F.2d 992, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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avoided revisiting the issue, deciding that the claims in question were
not, in fact, product-by-process claims.'056
Mentor argued that claims 1-4 of its patent were product-by- process
claims and that these claims were infringed by Coloplast's product
under the court's holding in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc.057 that process limitations do not prevent such
claims from encompassing an identical product made by a different
process. 05 8  Scripps, however, was not on point because the claims
at bar were not, in fact, product-by-process claims. 10 59 The court
explained that "product-by-process claims recite how a product is
made, not how it is used."' °w Here, the only process aspect of the
claims related to use of the product, which was a central aspect of the
claims. 1061
Specifically, claims 1-4 defined a catheter for male patients suffering
from incontinence in which adhesive is "transferred from the outside
of the catheter to the inside upon rolling and unrolling."' 62
Because neither party disputed that Coloplast's catheter product
excluded the transfer of adhesive from the outer to the inner surface,
it was found not to infringe the claims."' Determining that no
reasonable juror could have found otherwise, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court erred in denying Mentor's motion forjudgment
of noninfringement as a matter of law."'0
3. Design patent claims
Design patent claims are, like means-plus-function and
product-by-process claims, written in a special format.1065 Design
patent claims entail not only special requirements relevant to validi-
ty,10 66 but also special infringement standards.0 67 There must be
substantial or overall similarity between the accused and claimed
1056. Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 997, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1526
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
1057. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).







1065. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (1993) (discussing requirements for title, description, and claim).
1066. See supra notes 663-73 and accompanying text.
1067. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1988) (defining infringement as unauthorized manufacture or sale
of "the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof").
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designs.' ° Additionally, "the accused design must appropriate the
particular novelty of the patented design that distinguishes it from the
prior art." 10 69 The cases below deal with questions of design patent
infringement.
In Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok International Ltd., 0 70 the court
determined a question of design patent infringement in the context
of a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Reebok.
°71
Payless filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Reebok
seeking a declaration that its footwear did not infringe, inter alia,
Reebok's design patents.1 7  Reebok counterclaimed, alleging, inter
alia, patent infringement by five shoe models sold by Payless, and also
filed the motion for a preliminary injunction. 7 3 After denial of its
motion, Reebok appealed, arguing that the district court erred in
finding that Reebok did not show a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits of its claims of design patent infringement.10 74
In particular, Reebok maintained that the district court misapplied
the Gorham test for design patent infringement-10 75 Reebok claimed
that the district court compared the accused shoes with commercial
versions of the patents, instead of properly comparing them with the
claimed designs. 10 76 It also argued that the district court improper-
ly distinguished the accused shoes from the patented designs based
on features not in the claims. 1 77 The Federal Circuit agreed,
finding that the record clearly showed that the district court's decision
improperly turned on features, such as logos, that were not a part of
claimed design.' 78 Regarding a comparison of one of the accused
designs with the claimed design, the court noted that the sole
1068. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) ("[I]f, in the eye of an
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially
the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase
one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.").
1069. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 990, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Calif., Inc., 853 F.2d
1557, 1565, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)); see Keystone
Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444,1450,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (looking to similarity of design to determine infringement).
1070. 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1071. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1072. Id.
1073. Id. at 986-87, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1074. Id. at 987, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18.
1075. Id. at 990, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1076. Id.
1077. Id.
1078. Id. (citing Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026,1028, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 933,
934 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (requiring that, for proper application of Gorham test, accused design must
be compared to that claimed, not commercialized)).
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distinction observed by the district court between the two 'admittedly
similar' designs was a difference in heel pieces. °79 Noting that
minor or insignificant differences between a patented design and an
accused design do not avoid a finding of infringement 80 and that
the ornamental aspects of a claimed design are to be considered as a
whole, 10 81 the court held that the district court erred in failing to
apply the proper legal analysis and, therefore, abused its discretion in
determining that Reebok was not reasonably likely to succeed on the
merits of its claims of patent infringement.0 82
In contrast, the court held in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe
Co.'""3 that the district court, in determining the question of sub-
stantial similarity, did not err in comparing the accused shoe design
of Melville with the design commercialized by the patentee, L.A.
Gear.' 84  Here, in contrast with Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok
International Ltd.,' the accused infringer did not argue that the
design of the shoe sold by the patentee differed from that claimed in
the patent.0 86 As the court in L.A. Gear explained, when a patent-
ed design and the design of an article sold by the patentee are
substantially identical, it is proper to directly compare the patentee's
article to the accused article.
0 87
Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock, Inc.16"' involved not
only a utility patent discussed above, 0 89 but also a design patent
directed to a retaining wall block.' 9° With respect to the latter
patent, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's granting of a
1079. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1080. Id. at 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (quoting Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 110 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1081. Id. (citing Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1082. Id.
1083. 988 F.2d 1117,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
1084. LA Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124-26,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1917-19 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
1085. 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1086. LA. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1125, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918. Melville contended that the
district court's infringement determination was erroneous because the court referred to its
findings on likelihood of confusion, relevant to a trade dress issue in the case, in the part of its
opinion concerning infringement. Id. The Federal Circuit found no methodological error,
however, pointing out that the district court analyzed likelihood of confusion in the context of
the Gorham test. Id. at 1125-26, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918-19. Indeed, Melville did not
dispute substantial similarity. Id.
1087. Id. at 1125,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (citing Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d
1186, 1189, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1625, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1088. 997 F.2d 1444, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1089. See supra notes 406-19 and accompanying text.
1090. Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1446,27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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summary judgment motion that Keystone's design patent was not
infringed.109'
The claimed block design was intended for use in a retaining wall
such that only one side of the block would be seen.' ° 2 While the
district court found the ornamental features of the accused and
claimed blocks to be distinguishable, the court noted that their
appearances were similar when the blocks were imbedded in a
wall1
093
Keystone argued on appeal that the district court misapplied the
law of design patent infringement and disregarded evidence of overall
similarity, contending that only the front face of the claimed design
was ornamental and it alone should have been considered because
the other features were all concealed when imbedded in a retaining
wall.' ° 4  The Federal Circuit disagreed, pointing out that design
patent infringement cannot be established "by showing similarity of
only one part of a patented design if the designs as a whole are
substantially dissimilar."'0 95
Because the test for infringement begins with an examination of
the overall similarity of the patented and accused designs, with the
patented design being defined by the drawings in the patent, not just
one claimed feature, 95 the proper frame of reference for the
patented design in question, which included no hidden portion, was
the entire block.0 97 Finding the district court to have properly
determined that the accused and claimed designs lacked overall
similarity,'98 the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not
err in finding noninfringement.'0 99
1091. Id. at 1449, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1092. Id. at 1450, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301-02.
1093. Id. at 1450-51, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1094. Id. at 1451, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1095. Id. at 1450, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1096. Id. (citing Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1028,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 933,
934 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1097. Id. at 1450-51, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. The court distinguished this test for
infringement from standards applicable to test patentability. Id. While "generally concealed
features are not proper bases for patentability because their appearance cannot be a 'matter of
concern,'" id. at 1451, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (citing In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015, 1016,
81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 362, 365-66 (C.C.PA. 1949)), a design that cannot be seen when it is being
used may be patentable because at some point in time, its appearance may be important, id.
(citing In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553, 1557, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1098. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying teyt (discussing evidence submitted by
Keystone in opposing motion).
1099. Keystone, 997 F.2d at 1451, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. Because the district court
properly found no overall similarity, the Federal Circuit held that the district court need not
have addressed the issue of-whether the accused block designs appropriated the claimed design's
point of novelty. Id.
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V. EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Even if an accused infringer's product falls within the scope of a
patentee's claims, a finding of infringement may be barred under an
equitable doctrine, such as assignor estoppel or laches.
A. Assignor Estoppel
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a party
assigning an invention, a patent application, or a patent from later
contending that the assigned property was valueless. 110° The doc-
trine also bars parties in privity with the assignor, such as a corpora-
tion founded by the assignor, from making similar claims.110'
Determining whether assignor estoppel applies in a particular case
involves a balancing of the equities."0 2  The determination is a
matter committed to the trial court's discretion, and this determina-
tion is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.110 3
In Q.G. Products, Inc. v. Shorty, Inc.," °4 the Federal Circuit decided
whether the district court correctly: (1) determined that the equities
mandated applying the doctrine to Shorty, the assignor; and (2) ascer-
tained that the scope of the assignment covered the patent claims in
question.1 °5 The district court had found that Shorty infringed
Q.G.'s patent, and that the doctrine of assignor estoppel barred
Shorty's invalidity defense under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)." 0 6
Before turning to the merits of the case, the Federal Circuit distin-
guished cases where a patent is assigned from cases where an
invention or application is assigned."0 7 The court noted that in
situations in which a patent is assigned, and consideration of the
equities requires application of an estoppel, the analysis is relatively
straightforward because the assignor implicitly attests to the assigned
patent's value and the assignor's representations cover no more or
less than the rights assigned. Accordingly, a defendant may present
1100. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224,6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2028
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (precluding patent assignor, accused of infringement, from defending on
grounds of invalidity), cat. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988).
1101. Id. at 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2031.
1102. Q.G. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211, 1212-13, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778,
1780 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 192 (1993); Diamond Sdentifw, 848 F.2d at 1225, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
1103. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1581, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1104. 992 F.2d 1211, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 192 (1993).
1105. Q.G. Prods., 992 F.2d at 1213, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780-81.
1106. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1107. Id. at 1212-13, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
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evidence concerning interpretation of the assigned patent's claims
while at the same time being estopped from challenging the validity
of these claims. 
°8
In situations, however, in which an "invention" or application is
assigned, and consideration of the equities requires application of an
estoppel, the analysis is somewhat more elaborate."n 9 When an
assignment is made before the patent issues, the claims are subject to
change by the PTO, either with the acquiescence or at the insistence
of the assignee, and so the scope of the allowed claims may actually
include more than the assignor intended."' 0 The Supreme Court
has said that this circumstance might justify a view that the scope of
relevant evidence used to establish the limits of any future estoppel
should be broader than in circumstances of assignment of a granted
patent."" That is, because the metes and bounds of the invention
are not as certain, the court recommended evaluation of sufficient
evidence to define the representations of the assignor.
111 2
The Federal Circuit considered such evidence, including the
following background of the assignment in question. After Guy
Lallier, Marc Lallier, and Rudolphe Simon discussed a design for
fastening metal comer strips to wall boards, Simon alone filed a
patent application for such a device.1" 3  Simon's application de-
scribed a device for holding a protective metal corner bead in place
while nailing it to the ends of two intersecting wall boards, with a
"shoe" on the device maintaining the alignment of the comer bead
during fastening." 4  The application depicted a comer strip and
a shoe, but made no mention of interchangeable shoe sizes." 5
At about the time Simon's application was filed, Simon and the
Lalliers agreed to form Shorty, Inc." 6 Simon assigned his rights
in the application to Shorty in exchange for a $20,000 loan and
stock."1 Due to a falling-out between Simon and the Lalliers,
Shorty assigned the application back to Simon in exchange for $3,000,
a promise to pay an additional $17,000, and return of the stock.118
1108. Id. at 1212, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (citing Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. v. Formica
Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 351 (1924)).
1109. Id. at 1213, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (citing WestinghouseElec., 266 U.S. at 351).
1110. Id. (quoting Westinghowue Ele., 266 U.S. at 352-53).
1111. Id. (quoting Westinghouse Elec., 266 U.S. at 352-53).
1112. Id.




1117. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779-80.
1118. Id.
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Under the assignment agreement, Shorty acknowledged that Simon
was the inventor and that it waived any claim to the invention."'
9
This assignment formed Q.G.'s basis for assignor estoppel.
20
Simon abandoned the application in favor of a continuation-in-part
(CIP) application, claiming the same type of device but adding an
interchangeable head feature, pneumatic power means, and a pistol
grip.'121  The CIP application matured into the patent at is-
sue.11 22 Simon then assigned his interest in the invention and the
CIP application to a third party, who in turn assigned to still another
party, who granted Q.G. an exclusive license."
23
The present infringement action was then filed by the assignee and
Q.G., its licensee.124 In defense, Shorty asserted that the patent
was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), arguing thaft Guy Lallier should
have been listed as a co-inventor"1' Q.G. moved for summary
judgment that Shorty's invalidity defense was precluded under the
doctrine of assignor estoppel, and this motion was granted.
26
In considering whether the district court correctly determined that
the equities weighed in favor of estopping Shorty from arguing that
the property assigned was of no value, the Federal Circuit first noted
that at the time of the reassignment to Simon, Shorty implicitly
represented that the invention in the first application had some value
because Shorty received $3,000, a promise for $17,000 more, and
stock.1127  Shorty's representation that the assigned property had
value thus weighed in favor of applying assignor estoppel.
The court found that Shorty's invalidity defense provided another
reason to apply assignor estoppel.Y28 At the time of'the assignment
of the application back to Simon, Shorty knew that the application
did not name Guy Lallier as a co-inventor.'129 Thus, Shorty acknowl-
edged the value of the first application while being aware of the
potential invalidity issue under § 102(f).13 The Federal Circuit,
1119. Id. at 1213, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1120. Id. at 1212-13, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780-81.






1127. Id. at 1213, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180-81.' The court noted that although the
application claims had been initially rejected by the PTO at the time of the assignment, such
rejections are typical. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
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therefore, upheld the district court's weighing of the equities and its
decision to apply the doctrine of assignor estoppel to Shorty.113
Observing that if the patent claims an invention within the
assignment agreement, the assignor estoppel doctrine operates to
prevent Shorty from contesting the validity of that patent, the Federal
Circuit considered whether the district court correctly determined the
limits of the assignment.13 2 Shorty argued that it did not assign
the patented invention, because it assigned the first application and
not the CIP application, and that the CIP application matured into
the patent in question." 3 According to Shorty, the differences
between the two applications, namely the interchangeable shoes and
the pneumatic power means added to the CIP application, precluded
applying assignor estoppel.
3 4
The court found that these differences were not material."
35
Simon testified that he demonstrated a prototype with interchange-
able shoes to the Lalliers before the assignment." 3 And the court
pointed to language in the original claims of the first application
showing that both the interchangeable shoes and pneumatic power
means were embraced by the application assigned for value."1
37
Moreover, the prosecution history revealed that the examiner
considered the feature of interchangeable shoes obvious in light of
the prior art and allowed the claims after they were amended to recite
a transversely mounted pistol grip."3" The pistol grip depicted in
the CIP application was virtually identical to that shown in the parent
application."3 9 Thus, Shorty's assignment of the invention and the
parent application were found to embrace the asserted patent, and
the district court's granting of summary judgment applying assignor
estoppel was affirmed."1"
In Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems Inc.," 41 after
affirming the district court's finding of noninfringement, the Federal
Circuit reviewed the district court's finding that EMS should not be
estopped under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from challenging
1131. Id.
1132. Id.
1133. Id. at 1214, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1134. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781-82.
1137. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
1138. Id.
1139. Id. at 1214-15, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
1140. Id. at 1215, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
1141. 15 F.3d 1573, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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the validity of the patent in suit." 42 The suit named Lazarevich,
who had previously been an employee of what became Carroll Touch
and went on to found EMS and become its president and principal
executive officer, as a co-inventor in the patent." 43  The district
court found that Lazarevich played only a minor role in developing
the claimed invention and received no compensation for either the
invention or its assignment." 4 The district court determined that
at the time he executed the assignment, Lazarevich did not realize he
was assigning his rights to the claimed invention in question, but
thought he was assigning his rights to another invention not at
issue.1 45 The district court, therefore, decided that the equities
weighed against applying assignor estoppel and in favor of allowing
EMS to contest the validity of the patent." 4
6
The Federal Circuit found that in so deciding, the district court
abused its discretion."47 Affording the district court's finding the
"great deference" due, 48 the court concluded that the finding
could not stand because the district court's account of the evidence
was implausible in light of the entire record for four reasons."49
First, the Federal Circuit found that if Lazarevich misunderstood
the subject of the assignment agreement, that misunderstanding was
attributable solely to his own imprudence."" EMS did not con-
tend that Lazarevich was unable to read or comprehend the agree-
ment, nor did EMS suggest that he was somehow incompetent to
execute the agreement." 5 EMS also did not identify any evidence
of record that demonstrated that Carroll Touch deceived Lazarevich
into assigning his rights as had been alleged.1
2
Second, the Federal Circuit stated that testimony Lazarevich gave
during previous litigation, in which Carroll Touch sued him for
breach of his employment contract, contradicted his assertion that he
had only minor involvement in developing the claimed inven-
1142. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1579, 27 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1836, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court indicated that it was "desirable" to decide this
issue "so that neither Carroll Touch nor the public [would be] left with unnecessary uncertainty
concerning the validity of the claims at issue." Id.
1143. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
1144. Id. at 1580, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1145. Id.
1146. Id. at 1581, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842-43.
1147. Id.
1148. Id. at 1580, 27 U.S.P.Q.d (BNA) at 1842.
1149. Id. at 1580-81, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842-43.
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tion."5 3 There, he testified that he was a "'principal inventor'" of
the device claimed in the patent in question."54
Third, the district court erred in finding that Lazarevich did not
receive any compensation for either the application or the assignment
of the claimed invention." 5 The court noted that Lazarevich was
compensated as an employee of Carroll Touch before he left, and
that employment, salary, and bonuses are all valid forms of consider-
ation.
1 1 56
Finally, the district court apparently failed to take into account that
Lazarevich made the declaration," 7 which was filed with the
application for the patent, while under oath and knowing that making
willful false statements is punishable and may jeopardize the validity
of the application or any patent subsequently issued.115 8  EMS
admitted that the matters sworn to by Lazarevich in the declaration
were believed by him at that time to be true. 1 59  Because
Lazarevich, the inventor-assignor, signed the declaration attesting to
his belief in the validity of the patent and assigned the patent rights
to another for valuable consideration, he was estopped from
defending against the claim of patent infringement by proving that
which he assigned was worthless.1 6°
B. Collateral Estoppel
Another type of estoppel that may operate as a defense to patent
infringement is collateral estoppel, i.e., issue preclusion. As the court
explained in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,n 61 collateral estoppel
precludes the relitigation of issues previously decided, "when those
issues arise in a later litigation on a claim that is not barred by res
judicata."1
62
The patent in Pfaff was directed to a housing for mounting and
testing leadless chip carriers."63 The claimed housing was com-




1156. Id. at 1580-81
1157. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (1993) (providing requirements for oath or declaration).
1158. Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d at 1581, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
1159. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
1160. Id. (citing Diamond Scientific v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220,1226, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2028, 2032 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1161. 5 F.3d 514, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1162. Pfhffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 517, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (citing 1B JAMES W. MOORE ET. AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE I D.401 (2d ed. 1992)).
1163. Id. at 515, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
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form a rectangular cavity the size of the leadless chip carrier.., and
an open lid or spreader on top of the pins.""" 4 The district court
granted summary judgment of noninfringement to Wells primarily
based on the holding in a prior litigation between the parties.
1165
Pfaff's previous patent-infringement suit against Wells in Indiana
resulted in the district court holding, inter alia, that Wells' devices did
not infringe claim I of Pfaff's patent because their pins were not
axially elongated and did not incline in a plane substantially parallel
to the first major face and their spreader coacted with a portion of
the pin ends that did not define the cavity, as required by claim 1,
and because prosecution history estoppel prevented Pfaff from
construing Wells' pins and spreader as equivalents."66 Pfaff later
filed the present suit against Wells in Texas to enforce the same
patent, alleging that Wells' subsequently developed devices infringed,
inter alia, claim 1 of the patent.1  The Texas district court granted
Wells' summary judgment motion for noninfringement." s Relying
on the Indiana district court's interpretation of the claims, the Texas
court found that the claim required that the spreader coact with the
inner edges of the pins, and that this requirement was not met by the
accused devices.' 69 Moreover, the Texas district court found that
prosecution history estoppel precluded Pfaff from contending that
Wells' devices, having spreaders coacting with the outer edges of the
pins, which did not mate with or define the cavity, were equiva-
lents.1170 Confusing res judicata with collateral estoppel, the Texas
district court indicated that, although there was a disparity in the
devices, the Indiana court's findings in relation to the prosecution
history of the patent and claim interpretation were res judicata.
1171
On appeal, Pfaff argued that the prior Indiana case did not
preclude the present assertion of infringement because the devices at
issue here differed significantly from those adjudged noninfringing in
the Indiana case.'1 72 After distinguishing res judicata and collateral
estoppel, the latter of which was at issue, the court cited its precedent
holding that a device not previously litigated and shown to differ from
the devices previously litigated requires an infringement determina-
1164. Id.
1165. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
1166. Id. at 515-16, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21.




1171. Id. at 517, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
1172. Id.
1382
1993 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS
tion on its own facts."" 3 The court noted, however, that where a
determination of the scope of patent claims was made in a prior case
and that determination was essential to the judgment there on the
issue of infringement, there is collateral estoppel in a later case on
the scope of such claims." 4
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claim
interpretation of the Indiana case-that the "claim required coaction
of the spreader with the inner edges which define the cavity"-had an
issue-preclusive effect insofar as it was necessary to the judgment of
noninfringement in the prior case."7' Furthermore, the court held
that collateral estoppel on the issue of prosecution history estoppel
precluded spreaders coacting with the outer edges of the pin ends
from infringing the claim under the doctrine of equivalents.
17 6
Nonetheless, the court reversed the Texas court's summary judgment
of noninfringement1
77
The court noted that the dispute was whether the accused devices
in the present case contained a spreader either coacting with inner
edges defining the cavity as claimed in the patent or coacting with
outer edges that do not define the cavity.178 The court determined
that the Texas court could not have properly resolved this disputed
issue based on the evidence before it, which consisted of rough
drawings of the accused devices." 7 9 The court therefore vacated the




Laches is an equitable defense barring a claim where there has
been both (1) an unreasonable and unexcused delay in bringing suit,
and (2) some material prejudice to the defendant arising from that
delay."18  An issue of the affirmative defense of laches pertaining
1173. Id. (citing Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1324, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1316, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1174. Id. at 518,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (citing Molinaro v. Fanon/Couerier Corp., 745
F.2d 651, 655, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 706, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1175. Id.
1176. Id. at 519, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1177. Id. at 520, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1178. Id. at 518, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
1179. Id. at 519, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
1180. Id. at 520, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1181. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1161, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321; 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
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to a cross-complainant's claim was addressed in Advanced Cardiovascu-
lar Systems, Inc. v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc."
8 2
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems (ACS) sued SciMed for infringing
ACS' patent to a balloon dilation catheter.183 During discovery,
SciMed became aware of and contacted Hess, an engineer, who
contended that he assisted the inventors named on the patent by
providing ideas and expertise on the structure and materials to be
used in making the claimed catheter.""s Hess stated that he did
not know that the patent existed or that he was not named as a
co-inventor until contacted by SciMed." 85 More than eight years
after ACS' patent issued, Hess filed a motion in the litigation to
intervene as a cross-complainant, seeking a declaration that he was a
joint inventor and a corresponding correction of the patent. 86
ACS filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6),
to dismiss Hess' cross-complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.1 7 The district court, considering
Hess' knowledge of the patent's issuance irrelevant, measured Hess'
delay from the date the patent issued to the date he sought to inter-
vene.' Drawing an analogy to the six-year limit under 35 U.S.C.
§ 286 for recovering damages for past infringement and the six-year
statute of limitations applying to conversion of personal property
under the state law, the district court held that Hess' delay for more
than eight years after patent issuance was unreasonable. 8 9 The
district court found that Hess' delay prejudiced ACS because Hess
intervened on the eve of trial and his intervention, if allowed, would
therefore delay resolution of the case. 90
In considering whether the district court correctly found that Hess
unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in bringing his claim, the
Federal Circuit first reviewed the lower court's determination of the
period of delay. The Federal Circuit held that, similar to a claim for
patent infringement where the period of delay is measured when the
patent owner knew or should have known of the infringement,"
91
the period of delay began when Hess "had actual notice of the claim
1182. Id. at 1161-64, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041-43.
1183. Id. at 1159, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1184. Id. at 1159-60, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1185. Id.
1186. Id. at 1160, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1187. Id.
1188. Id. at 1161, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
1189. Id. at 1160, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1190. Id.
1191. Id. at 1161, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041-42 (citingA.C. Aukerman Co. v. 1L L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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or would have reasonably been expected to inquire about the subject
matter." 92 Drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of
Hess, i.e., accepting his allegations of when he first had notice of the
patent and the omission of his name as an inventor, the court
concluded that Hess' pleading did not establish unreasonable delay
and that the district court therefore erred in granting the Rule
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
1193
Concerning the second laches element of prejudice, the court
pointed out that justice required that an issue of legitimate concern
"not be held forfeited merely because it would complicate other
pending litigation."11 94 Noting a lack of any suggestion that Hess
had attempted to manipulate the legal process in seeking or timing
his intervention, the court found error in the district court's finding




Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense to a patent infringe-
ment allegation,11 97 stemming from the requirement that applicants
for a patent conduct themselves with candor in their dealings with the
PTO." 98 If an applicant engages in inequitable conduct in prose-
cuting a patent application, a patent issued thereon is rendered
unenforceable.11 99
Inequitable conduct is established by proving its two ele-
ments-materiality and intent-by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 2 . To establish the first element, the accused infringer
1192. Id.
1193. Id. at 1163, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042-43. The court, however, agreed with the
district court that the six-year statutory limitation period analogously applies to determine laches
in challenges to inventorship, and that a delay of more than six years creates a rebuttable
presumption of laches. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043. As noted by the court, however, a
presumption does not supportjudgment on the pleading under Rule 12(b) (6). Id. at 1164, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1194. Id. at 1163, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1195. Id. at 1163-64, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1196. Id. at 1165, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044.
1197. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814-17 (1945) (barring plaintiff in infringement action from enforcing two patents under
equitable doctrine of unclean hands).
1198. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1993) (prescribing patent applicant's duty of candor to deal in
good faith with PTO, including duty to disclose all information known to be material to
patentability).
1199. See Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); see
also M.P.E.P. § 2010.
1200. SeeJ.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1089,
1094 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 747 U.S. 822 (1985). A finding of inequitable conduct is
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must show that the patent applicant withheld from the PTO material
information. 120  The second element is established by showing that
the applicant intended to deceive the PTO by failing to disclose this
material information to achieve allowance of the claims.120 2
In Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 1203 the
Federal Circuit considered whether the district court properly granted
KLM's motion for summary judgment that the patent at issue was
unenforceable because of the patent applicant's inequitable conduct
in obtaining the patent. 12° The district court had based its holding
on the applicant's failure to disclose to the PTO sales of the Omniflex
orthotic device before the critical date, and the applicant's submission
of deceptive affidavits under 37 C.FR. § 1.1321205 responding to the
PTO's request for affidavits from a "disinterested third party.' ' 206
Paragon's appeal focused on the intent element of inequitable
conduct.1 20 7  Paragon argued that the district court's holding of
inequitable conduct was in error because the district court did not
specifically find an intent to deceive the PTO, and because genuine
issues of material fact were raised respecting culpable intent, thus
precluding summary judgment.
20 8
Regarding the first argument, the court stated that Paragon's
argument boiled down to the fact that because the district court's
opinion did not contain the words "I find that the applicant had an
intent to deceive the PTO," there was no finding of intent.22 The
Federal Circuit rejected this as elevating form over substance. 210
The court observed that the district court specifically noted that intent
to deceive the PTO is a required element of inequitable conduct, and
committed to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Kingsdoun, 863 F.2d at 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
1201. SeeFMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112,1115
(Fed. Cir. 1987); J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1094.
1202. See Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241-42, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474,
1476 (Fed. Cir. 1990); FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1411,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115; see alsoM.P.E.P.
§ 2010.01.
1203. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1204. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1184, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1205. 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (1991). Under Rule 132, "[w]hen any claim of an application... is
rejected on reference to a domestic patent which substantially shows or describes but does not
claim the invention,. . . affidavits or declarations traversing these references or objections may
be received." Id.
1206. Paragon Podiaty, 984 F.2d at 1188, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1207. Id.
1208. Id. at 1188-89, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1209. Id. at 1189, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1210. Id. (citing Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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that to reach its conclusion of inequitable conduct the district court
necessarily had to have found the requisite intent.
211
The court turned to the remaining issue: the correctness of the
district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue regarding
the intent to deceive or mislead the PTO.2 1 2 The intent to deceive
element of inequitable conduct requires that the conduct at issue,
when considered with all the relevant evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, must exhibit sufficient culpability to demand
a finding of an intent to deceive the PTO. 213 The court noted that
the element of intent to deceive is generally inferred from the totality
of facts and circumstances surrounding applicant's conduct.2 4 The
court further noted that although its precedent urged caution in the
grant of summary judgment concerning inequitable conduct,2 1 5 the
grant is appropriate if the criteria for summary judgment are
met.1
216
Turning to the finding of inequitable conduct based on Paragon's
submission of Rule 132 affidavits during prosecution, the court
concluded that on the evidence of record the district court properly
held that there was no genuine dispute regarding the factors of
materiality or intent.2 7  The materiality of the affidavits was not
disputed.2 18  Concerning intent, the court noted that the
examiner's summary of an interview with Paragon's counsel indicated
that Paragon would provide a Rule 132 affidavit from a disinterested
third party on the point of nonobviousness over the prior art, and
that Paragon submitted three affidavits of professionals in the field
attesting to the advantages of the invention over prior art.
2 19
Paragon, however, failed to disclose to the examiner that each of the
affiants held stock in Paragon and one or all three had been paid
consultants for Paragon. 221 Moreover, each afflant averred, "with
what [to the court conveyed] the impression of deliberate artfulness
in light of their ownership interest in the patent," that they had not
1211. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566-67.
1212. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
1213. Id. (citing Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1884, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989)).
1214. Id. at 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (citing Kingsdwn, 863 F.2d at 876, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392).
1215. Id.
1216. Id.; see supra notes 222-53 and accompanying text (discussing criteria for summary
judgment).
1217. Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1190-91, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
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been employed and did not intend to be employed by Paragon, the
assignee.'2
The Federal Circuit, therefore, concluded that the inference of an
intent to deceive the PTO was strongly supported by the submission
of the deceptive affidavits. 22 2 The inference was said to arise not
only from the materiality of these affidavits, but also from the
applicant's affirmative acts of submitting them, the misleading
character of the affidavits, and the examiner's inability to investigate
the surrounding circumstances.2 23 Paragon also was successful in
its inferred effort to lead the examiner to believe that the affiants
were "disinterested" parties."' KLM, therefore, established a prima
facie case of inequitable conduct.122 Hence, the burden shifted to
Paragon to come forward with evidence to the contrary.
22 6
In response, Paragon had filed affidavits from both the inventor
and the attorney who had prosecuted the application before the PTO,
attesting to their good faith and lack of deceptive intent.22 7 The
Federal Circuit found that Paragon's affidavits amounted to no more
than a conclusory denial, which under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was
insufficient to create a genuine issue.1228  Considering the entire
record, the court reached the same conclusion as the district court
that the record led to only one conclusion, and held that inequitable
conduct was established by the evidence concerning the submission
of deceptive Rule 132 affidavits with intent to mislead or deceive the
PTO.
122
Concerning the second ground for inequitable conduct-the failure
of the applicant to disclose to the examiner the sales of the patented
device that occurred more than one year before the filing of the
application-Paragon asserted that the record showed a factual issue
respecting the element of intent to deceive 230 The court dis-
agreed.
The court observed that in a response denying a charge of
inequitable conduct, the patentee may set forth facts showing that









1229. Id. at 1192, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1230. Id.
1388
1993 ARFA SuMMARY: PATENTS
attorney, an inference of wrongful intent should not be drawn.' '
For example, facts explaining the nondisclosure due to a good-faith
mistake of law or fact or negligence may be enough to raise a factual
dispute regarding intent" 2 Without an explanation, however,
evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales that exhibit commercial
characteristics reasonably supports the inference that the prosecuting
attorney intended to mislead the PTO."z 3 In the present case, the
court found an absence of explanatory evidence to negate the
inference of intent to mislead.1
234
Paragon attempted to excuse the failure to disclose to the examiner
the pre-critical date sales by asserting that the attorney believed it was
proper for him to conclude that those sales were experimental and,
therefore, not disclose them to the PTO. 235 This argument, howev-
er, was not presented to the district court and had no support in the
record, and thus failed to establish that the district court erred in
finding no genuine issue concerning intent
23 6
Furthermore, the explanation for failing to disclose the sales in
Paragon's argument on appeal took a different approach than the
explanations in the attorney's affidavit and deposition of record.1
37
The attorney's affidavit stated that the invention was not reduced to
practice until after the pre-critical date sales, but the patent attorney
never averred that he mistakenly believed that reduction to practice
was required for application of the on-sale bar.1218 Contrasted with
the argument on appeal and the affidavit, the attorney's later
deposition testimony stated that he considered the facts to show that
the sales were experimental, even though he saw the promotional
material and knew that the sales were unrestricted and that no testing
1231. Id.
1232. Id.
1233. Id. at 1193, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569-70.
1234. See id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570 (finding that Paragon's explanation during appeal
was improper because argument not raised at trial and, therefore, lower court properly found
no genuine issue concerning intent).
1235. Id.
1236. Id. The argument indicated that the attorney relied on Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp.
v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1583, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Paragon
Podiaty, 984 F.2d at 1193, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. To avoid the potential misreading of
its precedent, the court clarified in dictum that the holding in Reactive Metals does not excuse a
patent attorney from disclosing pre-critical date sales based solely on the inventor's representa-
tions in the face of objective evidence that the sales were commercial. Id. at 1193 n.10, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570 n.10.
1237. Id. at 1193, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1238. Id. (citing UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1465, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (concluding that reduction to practice not required for application
of on-sale bar), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988)).
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records had been maintained.12 3 9
The court concluded that Paragon's inconsistent excuses did not
raise a genuine issue regarding good faith. 240 Consequently, the
court held that the prosecution history of the application, when
viewed as a whole, exhibited a clear pattern of misconduct sufficient
to support the finding of culpable intent by the district court and its
conclusion of inequitable conduct.'241
E. Shop Rights
In general, a "shop right" is an equitable right created at common
law, when demanded by the circumstances under principles of equity,
entitling an employer to use without charge an invention patented by
its employee without liability for infringement, essentially granting the
employer a nonexclusive license to use the invention.1 242 The court
observed in McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.1243 that "the
immense body of case law [concerning] 'shop rights' suggests that not
all courts agree as to the doctrinal basis for 'shop rights,"' and as a
result all courts do not agree as to the specific circumstances required
to give rise to a "shop right."' 2"
The Federal Circuit outlined an appropriate analysis for determin-
ing patent shop rights in McElmurry. After reviewing the charac-
terizations of shop rights and the analyses for resolving the question
adopted by other courts, the Federal Circuit held that the appropriate
methodology for analyzing "whether an employer has acquired a
'shop right' in a patented invention is to look to the totality of the
circumstances on a case by case basis and determine whether the facts
of a particular case demand, under principles of equity and fairness,
a finding that a 'shop right' exists." 12 45 The court indicated that
factors to be considered in such an analysis include the circumstances
surrounding the development of the patented invention and the
inventor's activities concerning that invention after develop-




1242. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 22.03[3], at 22-40 (1993) (discussing definition of
shop rights).
1243. 995 F.2d 1576, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1244. McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580-81, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1129, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court followed this observation with a summary of the
body of law on the issue. Id at 1581, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1245. Id. at 1581-82, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
1246. Id. at 1582, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
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type of analysis of the circumstances.
12 7
Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP & L) hired Bowman as a
consultant to assist in installing, maintaining, and operating electro-
static precipitators at one of AP & L's power stations.1 241 While
working for AP & L, Bowman designed a level detector for the
hopper of an electrostatic precipitator.1249 Upon successful testing,
AP & L had the new detectors installed in all units at the station,
paying all costs for testing and installing the new detectors. 12 °
Subsequently, Bowman formed a partnership, White Rivers
Technology (WRT), with McElmurry to market some of Bowman's
inventions, including the level detector for which a patent was later
obtained and assigned to WRT. lz 1 WRT contracted with AP & L
to install the detectors in the precipitator hoppers at a second AP &
L location, and the detectors were installed before the Bowman
patent was issued.'2 2 All costs were again paid by AP & L." 3
Based on the success of the detectors in the hoppers of the
precipitators, AP & L implemented a plan to install the level detector
in a hopper of a similar apparatus at the second facility.12 4 WRT
bid on the installation contract, but the contract was awarded to a
lower bidder.' 5 WRT subsequently filed suit for patent infringe-
ment.
1256
In granting summary judgment and determining that AP & L was
entitled under the shop-rights rule to reproduce and use the detectors
in its business, the district court considered the following factors: (1)
the contractual nature of the relationship between AP & L and
Bowman; (2) whether Bowman consented to AP & L's use of the level
detector; and (3) whether Bowman induced, acquiesced in, or assisted
AP & L in using the level detector."~7 Regarding the first factor,
the court found that although Bowman's consulting contract
indicated that he was an independent contractor, the law does not
limit shop rights to only the employer-employee relationship.1 -8
1247. Id.
1248. Id. at 1578, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
1249. Id. at 1579, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
1250. Id.
1251. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
1252. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1253. Id.
1254. Id. at 1579-80, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1255. Id. at 1580, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1256. Id.
1257. See i&. at 1582, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134 (referring to factors set forth in WRT's
Memorandum Brief in Support of Response to Motion for SummaryJudgment).
1258. Id. at 1583 n.15, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134-35 n.15 (citing Francklyn v. Guilford
Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-62, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
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The court noted that Bowman developed the patented level detector
while working at AP & L.1"9
Concerning the second and third factors, the court pointed out that
AP & L installed the detectors in the precipitator hoppers at its two
stations with Bowman's consent and participation.1260 The court
also noted that a number of the detectors had been installed at AP &
L's second site by a contractor other than WRT, with Bowman's and
WRT's knowledge and consent.1 261 Moreover, all expenses relating
to testing and installing the detectors had been borne by AP &
L.1262 Additionally, Bowman never required AP & L to obtain
permission to employ the detector nor did he seek remuneration
from AP & L for its use.1 26' Thus, the Federal Circuit held that AP
& L had acquired a shop right in the patented level detector.
126
The Federal Circuit dismissed as meritless WRT's argument that AP
& L's dissemination of specifications of the patented level detector to
potential contract bidders exceeded the scope of its shop right.
1265
The court found support in the law for the district court's conclusion
that the shop right entitled AP & L to duplicate and use the detector
in its business. 266 The Federal Circuit further found that the shop
right entitled AP & L to procure the level detector from outside
contractors. 1267 Thus, AP & L's successful shop-rights defense
precluded a finding of patent infringement.
F Doctrine of First Sale (Patent Exhaustion)
Intel Corporation v. ULSI System Technology, Inc.12' raised the issue
of whether ULSI was free from infringement liability because of the
"first sale" or "patent exhaustion" doctrine. According to this
doctrine, authorized sale of the patented product takes that product
outside the reach of the patent,1 269 thereby providing a defense to
infringement. This longstanding doctrine applies likewise to sale of
shop right not necessarily limited to conventional employer-employee relationship)).
1259. Id. at 1582-83, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.





1265. Id. The court noted that such action neither constituted patent infringement nor
rendered Bowman's patent worthless. Id.
1266. Id. (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1933)).
1267. Id. at 1584, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (citing Schmidt v. Central Foundry Co., 218
F. 466, 470 (D.NJ. 1914), affid on other grounds, 229 F. 157 (3d Cir. 1916)).
1268. 995 F.2d 1566, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1269. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136,
1138 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350-51 (1864)).
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the patented product that has been manufactured by a licensee who
is acting within the scope of its license.
12 70
Intel owned a patent directed to a numerical data processor for
math coprocessors used in personal computers. 1271  Intel and
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) entered into a cross-licensing
agreement under which they granted to each other an "irrevocable,
retroactive, nonexclusive, world-wide, royalty-free license" under all
patents and patent applications filed by a certain date, including the
patent in question, the license being effective for the terms of the
patents. 72
ULSI sold a coprocessor that competed with Intel's
coprocessor.1271 ULSI purchased the coprocessor from HP under
a "foundry" agreement providing that HP was to manufacture the
coprocessors for ULSI.' 274 Under this agreement, ULSI supplied
HP with design specifications and HP then produced and transported
the coprocessor chips to ULSI, who in turn resold them as ULSI
products.1 275 After Intel became aware of ULSI's coprocessor sales,
Intel filed suit against ULSI and filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction. 276 Opposing the motion, ULSI asserted HP was al-
lowed under the license to act as a foundry for ULSI, and the sale by
HP of the coprocessors to ULSI was a "first sale" that negated Intel's
patent rights regarding those coprocessors.1 277 The district court,
however, determined that the agreement did not grant HP the power
to sublicense the patent at issue, and granted Intel's motion for a
preliminary injunction.
1 278
To determine whether the preliminary injunction was properly
granted, the Federal Circuit first considered the issue of whether
ULSI was free from infringement, which tumed on whether there was
a sale of the coprocessors by HP to ULSI1 279 Contrary to Intel's
argument, the court, after reviewing the HP-ULSI foundry agreement,
concluded that the agreement did not merely provide for fabrication
services to ULSI, but that it was a contract for the manufacture and
1270. Id. (citing Unidisco, Inc. v. Schatmer, 824 F.2d 965, 968, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439,
1441 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988)).






1277. Id. at 1568, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1278. Id. The subject of preliminary injunctions is discussed in the next section.
1279. Id.
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sale of chips incorporating the patented coprocessor design.
1281
Nor did the court agree with Intel that the licensed seller of a
patented product must own intellectual property rights to the product
in order for there to be a sale. 128 1  After reviewing the licensing
agreement, the court rejected Intel's contention that HP's sale of
chips to ULSI constituted a "de facto sublicense" prohibited by the
agreement.12 2 Similarly, the court found it irrelevant that HP was
not authorized to sublicense to ULSI because HP did not grant a
sublicense, and instead, sold a product, which was designed by its
purchaser, ULSI.
1283
The court found that Intel's rights ended with the sale of the
patented product manufactured by the licensee acting within the
scope of its license, and that the cross-licensing agreement did not
restrict the manufacturer's rights to sell or serve as a foundry.'
28 4
The court concluded that ULSI was insulated from infringement
because the coprocessors were first sold to ULSI by HP, who was
authorized to do so under its license with Intel.' 285  Accordingly,
the court reversed the grant of the preliminary injunction because the




After a patentee clears the hurdle of establishing patent infringe-
ment, having avoided tripping over any obstacles the accused
infringer defensively threw on the track, the question left is what the
patentee will garner on the award-stand in the way of damages, as will
be discussed. But back at the starting blocks, the patentee may seek
to preliminarily enjoin the accused infringer from treading on the
patent rights, as discussed below.
A. Injunctions
Under 35 U.S.C. § 283, a court may grant an injunction in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
1280. Id. at 1569, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1281. Id.
1282. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1283. Id.
1284. Id. at 1570,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40 (distinguishing Intel Corp. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1285. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1286. Id.
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reasonable. s12 7  Thus, a court may preliminarily enjoin a party
accused of infringement, or permanently enjoin a party found to
infringe, from making, using, or selling a product alleged or adjudged
to be covered by a patent claim.12
1. Preliminary injunctions
In Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok International Ltd.,128 9 the court
reviewed under Tenth Circuit law' the district court's denial of
Reebok's motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to enjoin
Payless from making, using, or selling shoes that infringe Reebok's
U.S. design patents."' The Federal Circuit noted that a movant
seeking a preliminary injunction in the Tenth Circuit must show:
(1) substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on
the merits; (2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) proof that this threatened
injury outweighs any damage to the opposing party that the
proposed injunction may cause; and (4) a showing that the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. 
1 2
The district court concluded that Reebok had not established a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and, after weighing the
other preliminary-injunction factors, 1293 concluded that a prelimi-
nary injunction was ill-advised." 4
Regarding the first factor, the court found that the district court
failed to apply the proper infringement analysis for a design
patent."' 5 The Federal Circuit, therefore, held that the district
1287. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
1288. See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 988-89, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1516, 1518-19 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing factors for granting preliminary injunction for
patent infringement); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d
476, 479, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that permanent injunctions
may be granted to prevent patent infringement).
1289. 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1290. The court deferred to the law of the Tenth Circuit, as discussed in Part I.C.
1291. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 987, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1292. Id. at 987-88,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (citing Otero Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981)).
1293. Id. at 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. According to the Federal Circuit:
The court found that Payless would suffer significant financial hardship if the
preliminary injunction issued. On the other hand, the court found that the harm to
Reebok's reputation if the injunction was denied was belied by the fact that Payless had
sold some forms of the accused shoes .... The court also found that the likelihood
of irreparable harm to Reebok was diminished in view of the different market
channels. Lastly, the court found that the public interest favored keeping Payless'
lower priced shoes on the market.
Id.
1294. Id. at 987, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
1295. Id. at 990, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
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court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in determin-
ing that Reebok was not reasonably likely to succeed on the merits of
its claims of design patent infringement.
129 6
The court found that the district court's findings on the other
preliminary-injunction factors were apparently tainted by its clearly
erroneous finding on the likelihood of success., 7 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court failed to consider that selling
less expensive products does not justify patent infringement, and
noting that if it did, the majority of injunctions would then be denied,
simply because copiers universally price their products lower than
innovators."' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the district
court's order denying preliminary-injunctive relief based on Reebok's




In Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,i"' °
the Federal Circuit noted that a permanent injunction barring
violation of patent rights must comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.10 1 After finding that Adcon infringed Flowdata's
patent, the district court entered a permanent injunction against
Adcon because Adcon did not contest the validity of Flowdata's
patent.130 2 The injunction order stated that "[p]laintiff is forever
barred from infringing Flowdata's patent. This order is made with
the oral consent of ADCON'S Secretary Treasurer who appeared
before this Court in her official capacity."' 3
Reviewing the district court order, the Federal Circuit noted that
the requirements of Rule 65(d)-that every order granting an
injunction set forth the reasons for its issuance and describe in detail,
without reference to another document, the act to be re-
strained-were intended to avoid unnecessary and unwarranted
contempt proceedings against the enjoined party by providing specific
notice of the enjoined activity and the reason for the injunction.
6 0 4
1296. Id. at 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1297. Id.
1298. Id. Such an assertion is plausible because copiers get a free ride on the innovators'
costly research and development.
1299. Id.
1300. 986 F.2d 476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1301. Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 479, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1302. Id. at 477, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
1303. Id.
1304. Id. at 479-80, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.
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The Federal Circuit held that the simple two-sentence injunction in
this case did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 65 (d), and remand-
ed the case to the district court to issue an injunction satisfying the
provisions of Rule 65(d).30 5
The Federal Circuit also considered the propriety of the form and
scope of a permanent injunction in Jy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt,
Inc.3 "6  The district court entered judgment against Flakt for
infringement of Joy's patent claiming a process of desulfurizing flue
gas produced from combustion fuels, which included a step of
partially recycling the calcium hydroxide used therein. 30 7  In
granting Joy's post-trial motion for a permanent injunction, the
district court relied on the rationale in its Memorandum Opin-
ion. 303  In its memorandum opinion, "the district court discussed
enjoining Flakt from further direct infringement, contributory
infringement and inducement of infringement" by precluding Flakt,
for the remainder of the patent term, from contracting to sell or
construct any air pollution control system which was designed to carry
out the patented method. 1
31
The Federal Circuit found that the injunction issued by the district
court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 65(d) because
the order granting the injunction and the prohibitions set out in the
memorandum opinion were not a single document.310 The court
indicated that this defect would normally necessitate vacating and
remanding the injunctive order for compliance with the requirements
of form and specificity.13 11 Because, however, the intent of the
district court regarding the scope of the injunction was evident from
the memorandum opinion, the court reviewed the scope of the
injunction, which issue was dispositive of the appeal, for an abuse of
discretion. 2
Flakt argued on appeal that the order improperly enjoined Flakt
from acts that would not infringe Joy's patent.1 3  The Federal
Circuit agreed, explaining that Flakt's sale of equipment designed for
carrying out the patented process would not directly infringe Joy's
1305. Id. at 480, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.
1306. 6 F.3d 770, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1307. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 771, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
1308. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.




1313. a at 773, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
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patent.3 1  The court noted that "the law is unequivocal that selling
equipment to perform a process is not a sale of the process within the
meaning of [35 U.S.C.] § 271(a)," as highlighted by not only the case
law, but also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 1311 Moreover, the court noted that
the injunction was punitive, rather than remedial, to the extent it
placed Flakt in a position differing from other potential manufactur-
ers of the same equipment who could sell to purchasers who would
not practice the claimed invention during the term of Joy's pat-
ent.
1316
The court also pointed out that Flakt's sale of the equipment would
not constitute infringement absent direct infringement.3 7  The
court noted that for there to be liability under § 271 (b) or (c), which
respectively define inducement of infringement and contributory
infringement, there must be some act of direct infringement.
31 1
Finally, the court rejected Joy's argument that the scope of the
injunction was necessary to prevent use of the claimed process during
the term of its patent.3 l9 The court held that Flakt was improperly
precluded under the injunction from contracting even where there
would be no possibility of infringement during the patent term, and
therefore, no possibility of direct or indirect infringement.1 32 ' The
court observed that it was in Flakt's interest to take steps to prevent
direct infringement to avoid liability for infringement and con-
tempt.3 21 Reminding the district court that any injunction must
comply with Rule 65(d), the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction
and remanded the case for reconsideration.'
3 22
B. Monetary Damages
According to 35 U.S.C. § 284, "[u]pon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court."'32' As noted in BIC Leisure Prod-
1314. Id.
1315. Id. at 773-74, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381 (citing, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc.
v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 60 (1992)).
1316. Id. at 775, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
1317. Id. at 774, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
1318. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (1998).
1319. joy Technologies, 6 F.3d at 776, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383-84.
1320. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1321. Id. at 777, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1322. Id.
1323. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
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ucts, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc., 24 the amount of damag-
es for infringement is a question of fact on which the patentee has
the burden of proof. ' The district court fixes the amount, and




A patent owner may recover lost profits as opposed to a reasonable
royalty, by showing a reasonable probability that, "but for" the
infringement, the patent owner would have made the sales.13 27 In
BIC Leisure,13 28 the court considered the propriety of a district
court's grant of an award to Windsurfing of lost profits based on
Windsurfing's market share1329 and denial of award of lost profits
for alleged price erosion. 33  Regarding the lost profits awarded
under the market-share theory, the district court applied the Panduit
test, which requires the patentee to show: (1) a demand for the
patented product; (2) the absence of acceptable, noninfringing
alternatives; (3) the patentee's capacity to exploit the demand; and
(4) the amount of profits lost due to the infringement.133 1 The
lower court, however, modified the Panduit test by assuming that
Windsurfing would have captured a share of BIC's sales proportional
to its pre-existing share of the relevant market.3 32  The district
court, therefore, awarded lost profits to Windsurfing based on this pro
rata percentage of BIC's sales for each year of the period for damages.
1333
The Federal Circuit held that the district court, in awarding lost
profits, clearly erred by failing to apply the "but for" causation
test.133 4 The court found that the record did not show a reasonable
likelihood that Windsurfing would have made its pro rata share of
1324. 1 F.3d 1214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1325. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1217, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1671, 1673-94 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1326. Id. at 1217-18, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (citing Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1327. Id. at 1218, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1106 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968
(1988)).
1328. Id. at 1214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1329. See id. at 1217-20, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673-75 (discussing district court's award of
lost profits to Windsurfing based on its share of sailboard market).
1330. See id. at 1220, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (evaluating district court's denial of
Windsurfing's lost profits).
1331. Id. at 1217, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978)).
1332. Id.
1333. Id.
1334. Id at 1218, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
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BIC's sales had not BIC been in the market, because there were at
least fourteen other competitors competing during the damages
period for sales in the relevant market.' 35 Windsurfing's boards
differed fundamentally from BIC's boards, and their prices were also
disparate.""6 Additionally, the record contained uncontradicted
evidence that demand for sailboards was relatively elastic. 3 7 The
court found that the record indicated that without BIC in the market,
BIC's customers would have likely sought similarly-priced boards
available from other competitors.13 8  Furthermore, there was a
continual decline in Windsurfing's sales after the district court
enjoined BIC's infringement, evidence the court found to show that
Windsurfing did not capture its market share of the sales that
replaced BIC's sales.'
3 39
The court pointed out that the Panduit test, which is an acceptable,
though not an exclusive, test for determining "but for" causation
when properly applied, operates under the inherent assumption that
both the patent owner and the infringer market products sufficiently
alike so as to compete directly against each other in the same
market." That is, the patentee's and infringer's products must be
substitutes in a competitive market for the first two factors of the
Panduit test to meet the "but for" test.'
3 41
More specifically, the first Panduit factor-demand for the patented
product-assumes that the demand for the infringer's product and
the demand for the patentee's product are interchangeable. 3 42 If,
however, the products are not sufficiently alike to compete directly for
the same customers, in the absence of the infringer's product the
infringer's customers would not necessarily transfer their demand to
the patentee's product."M 3 In such a case, the demand for the
patented product factor does not operate to satisfy the "but for"
test. '
3
Likewise, the second Panduit factor-absence of acceptable,
noninfringing alternatives-assumes that the patentee and the
infringer sell substantially similar products in the same market. To be









1343. Id- at 1219, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
1344. Id.
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an elastic market, the alleged alternative "must not have a disparately
higher price than or possess characteristics significantly different from
the patented product."' 5
As an alternative to the second Panduit factor, the court indicated
that it has allowed proof of its market share instead of proof of the
absence of acceptable substitutes because the market-share approach
offers a reasonable probability of proof that the patent owner would
have made the sales "but for" the infringement. 346  The court
commented that this alternative to the second Panduit factor
nonetheless presupposes that the patent owner and the infringer
compete in the same market.
13 47
Here, however, the court found that the record revealed that
during the damages period not every competitor in the sailboard
market sold substantially the same product.13 4  Windsurfing and
BIC sold differing types of sailboards at varying prices to different
customers.'-1 9 The Court, thus, found that there was no "but for"
causation. 350 Finding no evidence to support Windsurfing's claim
of lost profits, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
award.
3 51
The court also noted that Windsurfing, having licensed the
patented technology to most companies supplying sailboards in the
United States without competing itself in most sailboat submarkets,
valued its patent in terms of royalties, and not in terms of profits it
could make by excluding others from the market. 5' The court
held that Windsurfing was entitled to receive lost royalties, i.e., the
amounts Windsurfing's licensees would have paid "but for" the
infringement 3 3 Regarding the lost royalties, BIC challenged the
district court's methodology of using the number of boards sold as
the royalty basis.' 54 The Federal Circuit found that the district
court had the discretion to use the chosen methodology.
1355
Concerning the district court's denial of an award of lost profits
under a price-erosion theory, the court found nothing clearly
1345. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (citing Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136,
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erroneous in the finding that the evidence on price erosion was too
speculative to support an award of price-erosion lost profits.'356
The court observed that the record reflected that other market
factors, not BIC, caused Windsurfing to lower sale prices.'357 These
forces, including new innovations in board designs and consumer
choices, reduced the demand for Windsurfing's boards and caused
many companies to discount their inventory of the patented boards
in order to stock the newer boards. 8  Moreover, Windsurfing,
having licensed many competitors who produced boards more
economically, exacerbated the price problem. 359 The court, there-
fore, concluded that Windsurfing did not prove that it could have




If the patent claimant is unable to prove the amount of compen-
satory damages as measured by lost profits, the court may award a
reasonable royalty. 3 61 As noted in Wang Laboratories Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp.,3 62 a reasonable royalty may be found by determining the
amount a licensee, in a hypothetical negotiation with a licensor,
would have been willing to pay as a royalty to practice the patented
invention and yet make a reasonable profit.
363
Wang Laboratories involved a question relating to calculating a
reasonable royalty, namely, whether the district court properly denied
Wang's motion to amend the royalty period to start from the date
infringement began, rather than from the date on which Wang gave
notice to Toshiba and NEC that their products infringed Wang's
patents.' The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by
its precedent that hypothetical negotiations are considered to have





1361. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event lcss than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.. . ."); see also Fromson v.
Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606, 1612 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (stating that when evidence is inadequate to establish actual damages, 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1988) allows court to award reasonable royalty).
1362. 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1363. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1778
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568,
224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 269 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1364. Id. at 869, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
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occurred when infringement began,36 s even though 35 U.S.C.
§ 286 mandates that the infringer is only liable for damages for the
six-year period before filing the infringement action.'
The Federal Circuit noted that limitations on the period for which
damages may be recovered, such as the failure to provide notice
according to 35 U.S.C. § 287, should not be confused with the time
when damages begin to accrue, which controls the determination of
a reasonable royalty based on hypothetical negotiations.367 The
court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying
Wang's motion to amend the judgment awarding damages.
136
3. Post-judgment interest
As noted in Goodwall Construction Co. v. Beers Construction Co.,
13 69
the interest rate for calculating postjudgment interest is set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a):
[I]nterest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the
judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average
accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United
States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the
judgment
L13 70
A district court may not choose a rate contrary to this statutory
rate.
1371
C. Enhanced Damages, Attorney Fees, and Costs
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a court may award the prevailing patent
owner up to three times the amount of damages found.3 72 A
showing of willful infringement or bad faith is necessary for an award
of enhanced damages, which are punitive in nature, rather than
compensatory.3 73  In exceptional cases, the court may award





1369. 991 F.2d 751, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1370. Goodwall Constr. Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751, 759, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1420, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988)).
1371. Id. (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840 (1990)
(vacating district court's award of postjudgment interest)).
1372. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) (mandating that, if damages are not set by jury, court may
award up to three times amount assessed).
1373. See Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410,413, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.1374
BIC Leisure involved review of the district court's finding of
non-willfulness and non-exceptionality based on a separate, three-day
trial on the issues of enhanced damages and attorney fees. 37 5
Windsurfing, the prevailing patent owner, had the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that BIC's infringement was willful
and therefore the case was exceptional.37
Observing that BIC received oral and written noninfringement
opinions from a competent and experienced patent attorney, the
court found that the record showed that BIC believed in good-faith
that Windsurfing's reissue patent was invalid, a belief strengthened by
the invalidation of Windsurfing's corresponding British patent.
3 71
Because the district court relied heavily on the testimony of six
witnesses and hundreds of documents, the Federal Circuit upheld the
district court's decision.
378
Similarly, the court held in Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Production
Tools, Inc.,1379 that the district court did not err or abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to award enhanced damages, attorney fees, and costs,
finding that the district court had thoroughly considered a variety of
factors in its decision.'38 . The Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's granting of JNOV and reinstated the jury's finding of
willfulness.' l Nonetheless, the court found the grant of JNOV to
be harmless error because the district court had "independently
determined that Delta-X had not shown entitlement to enhanced
damages, attorney fees, and costs."
1 38 2
Regarding the issue of willfulness or bad faith, the court noted that
"an infringer may generally avoid enhanced damages with a meritori-
ous good faith defense and a substantial challenge to infringe-
1374. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988). Whether a case is exceptional is a factual determination subject
to appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v.
ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1583, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821,824 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that, for
review of finding of exceptional circumstances, appellate courts must apply clearly erroneous
standard).
1375. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., I F.3d 1214, 1222-23, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1671, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1376. Id. at 1222, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
1377. Id. at 1223, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
1378. Id.
1379. 984 F.2d 410, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1880. Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 413-14, 25 U.S.P.Q,2d
(BNA) 1447, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1381. IL at 413, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
1382. Id.
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ment." 1383  Concerning the issue of attorney fees and costs, the
district court exercised its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 284 in
awarding of costs.138 4 The court explained that § 284 is similar to
Rule 54(d) in that both give the district court discretion in awarding
costs, but "section 284 requires a district court to follow Federal
Circuit precedent in establishing the bounds of its discretion."385
The court detected "no abuse of discretion in the district court's
denial of enhanced damages, attorney fees, and costs."1386 "Al-
though Baker[, the infringer,] had not obtained a competent opinion
of counsel regarding the probability of infringement, such a "failure
to obtain legal advice does not mandate a finding of willfulness or bad
faith," as correctly noted by the district court. 7 Moreover, the
record showed neither copying of Delta-X's patent nor intentional
infringement 388 Furthermore, "the record evidenced that Baker
had, in good faith, determined that its device did not infringe" and
that Baker had "mounted a substantial challenge to infringe-
ment."'.8 9 In addition to these factors, the district court considered
Delta-X's testimony on willfulness "based on recollections of a
conversation with an unidentified individual."'390  The Federal
Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's decision.1
l
The court overturned another finding of willfulness in Westvaco
Corp. v. International Paper Co.1392 The Federal Circuit agreed with
Westvaco that the lower court's conclusion of willfulness was clearly
erroneous because (1) Westvaco had relied, in good faith, "on timely
and competent opinions from [its] patent counsel" that there was no
infringement of International Paper Co.'s (IPC's) reissue patent and
(2) Westvaco attempted to design around IPC's product rather than
copy it.
1393
The Federal Circuit reiterated that objective evidence must be
considered in determining whether reliance on patent counsel's
advice was justified, that is, whether the patent counsel's opinion was
1383. Id. (citing Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 20, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591, 597-98 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1384. Id. at 414, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
1385. Id.
1386. Id.
1387. Id. (citing Nickson Indus. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795,800, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878,




1391. I1 at 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
1392. 991 F.2d 735, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1393. Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 743, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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competent.'3 94  Written opinions should be reviewed for their
overall tone, discussion of case law, and analyses of the necessary facts
and issues to determine whether they evidence an appropriate
foundation or are conclusory on their face.
3 95
Reviewing the record, the court found that counsel's opinions in
this case had an adequate foundation." 8 Each opinion began with
a statement that it was based on a review of the prosecution history
of the patent, the prior art of record, and additional prior art.3 97
The validity and infringement issues were analyzed in detail, including
discussions of the prior art, the accused device, and the claim
language.
39 8
IPC, relying on Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc.,1' 9 argued "that the
opinions [were] incompetent because they [did] not include a
separate discussion of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents."1" The Federal Circuit distinguished the opinions in the
present case from the conclusory opinion in Datascope, pointing out
that present opinions contained "enough other indicia of competence
so that counsel's failure to separately discuss infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents was not fatal."
1401
Nor were other factors considered by the district court fatal to
non-willfulness. Although the opinions were found to be equivocal,
the court noted that "[a]n honest opinion was more likely to speak
of probabilities than certainties." 4 2 The court also found that
Westvaco's act of obtaining an opinion from outside counsel was not
an "after-the-fact [effort] to justify [its] actions by encouraging
positive opinions from an initially uncertain outside counsel." 40 3
Westvaco sought advice of counsel before it originally began manufac-
turing the accused product and requested updated advice immediately
after it became aware of IPC's reissue patent.'4° A draft opinion,
which in-house counsel commented on before being finalized, did not
1394. Id. (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1437 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1395. Id. at 743-44, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360 (citing Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 829, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437; Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1396. Id. at 744, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
1397. Id.
1398. Id.
1399. 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024
(1990).
1400. Westvaco, 991 F.2d at 744, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
1401. Id.
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indicate that the outside counsel was initially uncertain about his
conclusions. 140 5 Furthermore, outside counsel declined Westvaco's
view regarding anticipation of the claims, independently concluding
to the contrary.1406  Thus, the court found that Westvaco was
justified in relying on the competent noninfringement opinions of
counsel.
407
The court further found that, contrary to the district court's
finding, Westvaco did not copy IPC's product, but instead legitimately
attempted to design around IPC's patent.14°8  Westvaco made
specific changes to its product so that it would not be a copy of IPC's
product.4 9  Although the court found this attempt to design
around IPC's patent to be unsuccessful, the court, finding the facts to
parallel those in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,1410 and applying its ratio-
nale in London v. Carson Pirie Scott &? Co.,' 411 concluded that this
failed attempt did not support a finding of willful infringement.4 2
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding
of willfulness and the enhancement of damages, and vacated the
award of attorney fees and costs as being influenced by the erroneous
finding of willfulness. 4 3
In contrast, in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's finding that Melville's infringe-
ment of L.A. Gear's design patent was not willful. 4  Melville
relied solely on counsel's obligations under Federal, Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 to support its position that it had a good-faith belief
that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. 4 ' As noted by the
court, however, a defensive pleading of invalidity or unenforceability
may pass muster under Rule 11, yet at the same time be inadequate
to defend a charge of willful infringement.4 1 6  The court noted
that Melville's pleaded defense of unenforceability was not pursued




1408. Id. at 745, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
1409. Id.
1410. 970 F.2d 816, 828, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1411. 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (asserting that
practice of designing around patents to make new inventions should be encouraged).
1412. Westvaco, 991 F.2d at 745, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
1413. Id. at 746, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362.
1414. L. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1126-27,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1919-20 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1415. Id. at 1126, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
1416. Id.
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present a close question of fact or law. 7  Thus, Rule 11 did not
shield Melville from a finding of willfulness.
Finding evidence of deliberate copying and no exculpatory evidence
of good faith, the court held that the facts in Avia Group International,
Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc.141 compelled a finding of willful-
ness.1419  Melville introduced no objective evidence of good faith,
such as an opinion of counsel that the patent was invalid or not in-
fringed.14 20 Furthermore, "Melville admitted copying [the patented
design], offering as its sole justification the proposition that copying
is prevalent in the fashion industry, [which, the court noted, is]
simply irrelevant to the issue of patent infringement."42 ' The
Federal Circuit, therefore, reversed the district court's ruling that the
infringement was not willful, and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of L.A. Gear's recovery of damages.
14 22
The district court further found in L.A. Gear that the case was not
exceptional. 4 23  Noting that willfulness of infringement is a suffi-
cient basis for finding a case exceptional, the Federal Circuit pointed
out that not every exceptional case warrants awarding attorney
fees. 14 24 Because the court's determination that Melville's infringe-
ment was willful changed the factual premises, the court remanded
for a redetermination of the issue of attorney fees.
142 5
The Federal Circuit also considered a finding of willfulness in
American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp. 6  On
appeal, Medical Engineering Corporation (MEC), relying on the
district court's statement that there was a lack of evidence of good
faith rather than explicit evidence of bad faith, argued that the
district court had applied the wrong standard.42 7 The court reject-
ed this argument, holding that the district court applied the proper
legal standard and had correctly considered the totality of the
1417. Id.
1418. 853 F.2d 1557, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1419. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1127, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
1420. Id. at 1126, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
1421. Id. at 1126-27, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
1422. Id. at 1127, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. The district court assessed damages based
on trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act, and did not assess separate damages under
35 U.S.C. § 289 for design patent infringement. Id.
1423. Id. at 1128, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1424. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920-21 (citing S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367, 369 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1425. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1426. 6 F.3d 1523, 1530-32, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1427. American Medical Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1530, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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circumstances in finding that MEG willfully infringed American
Medical Systems' (AMS') patent.
1428
In particular, the district court found that MEC knew of the patent
soon after issuance, that MEC had no reasonable good-faith belief to
justify its continued infringement because the opinions of counsel it
received were not credible or came too late, and that MEC had
deliberately copied the patented invention. 14' The Federal Circuit
rejected MEC's contention that the district court failed to consider
mitigating factors, including MEC's efforts to design a noninfringing
alternative and AMS' delay in giving notice of infringement.1430
The court indicated that simply because these factors were not
mentioned in the discussion on willfulness did not mean that they
were not considered, and noted that the factors raised by MEC were
discussed at some point in the district court's opinion.143 1  Conse-
quently, the court found that the district court had not abused its
discretion in awarding enhanced damages of 1.5 times the total
amount.
1432
In Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc.,14 13 EMS, the
accused infringer and prevailing party, appealed the district court's
denial of its motion for recovery of attorney fees.143 EMS argued
that the district court did not issue factual findings regarding whether
the case was an exceptional case and cited cases in which remand was
deemed necessary for further findings concerning the issue of
whether the case was exceptional.' The court distinguished the
cited cases from the present one, explaining that as opposed to the
cited cases, the present record, did provide a sufficient basis for
reviewing the exercise of the district court's discretion.
143 6
1428. Id. at 1530-31, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-26. The court criticized MEG for focusing
on one statement taken in isolation, stressing that it is judgments, not words, that are
appealable. Id. at 1531, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-26.
1429. Id. at 1531, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1430. Id.
1431. Id.
1432. Id. at 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1433. 15 F.3d 1573, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1434. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 3 F.3d 1573, 1583, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1435. Id. at 1580-81, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. In particular, EMS relied on Badalamenti
v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1967 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851
(1990), Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606
(Fed. Cir. 1988), and S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
1436. Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d at 1576-78, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (citing Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804,814, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (stating that "appellate court need not close its eyes to the record where ... there
is a way clearly open to affirm the district court's action")).
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Noting that EMS, as the party moving for attorney fees, had the
burden to prove the exceptional nature of the case by clear and
convincing evidence, the court found that EMS failed to demonstrate
error in the district court's conclusion that the circumstances
4 3 7
did not warrant a finding that this was an exceptional case. 43 8 The
court held that no remand was necessary because the district court
did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion.
4 3 9
The Federal Circuit penalized the "uncivil behavior" of counsel
when it awarded costs to the plaintiff in Katz v. Batavia Marine &
Sporting Supplies, Inc.1" Katz arranged with a third party, a
vice-president of Def-Tec, to appear at Def-Tec's plant in Ohio for
discovery related to Katz's suit against Batavia for patent infringe-
ment."4  Only after Katz appeared at the appointed place and
time was he informed that Def-Tec would not appear; a copy of
Def-Tec's motion to stay discovery was mailed, by regular mail, to Katz
two days before the scheduled appearance.
442
Noting the "unlikelihood that regular mail would be expected to be
delivered [to Katz] in New York the day [after it was] mail[ed] in
Ohio," the court found that Def-Tec's counsel acted improperly in
failing to timely notify Katz of Def-Tec's intention to dispute
discovery.1" 3 Consequently, the court awarded costs to Katz under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.1444
D. Limitations on Damages
Certain circumstances, such as the presence of "intervening rights"
concerning a reissue patent claim or the failure to provide patent
marking, may limit a recovery of damages.
1. Intervening rights
Section 252 of Title 35, which relates to the effect of a reissue
patent, provides for intervening rights. As noted in BIG Leisure
1437. EMS' "expert witness testified at trial that no reasonable person could find infringe-
ment, that Carroll Touch did not subscribe to its [asserted] interpretation of the [claims until
the] infringement suit, and that patent counsel for AMP[,I [Carroll Touch's parent company]
AMP management that the accused EMS devices did not infringe the ... patent." Id.
1438. Id. at 1578, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845-46.
1439. Id. at 1578-79, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1440. 984 F.2d 422, 425, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1547, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1441. Katz v. Batavia Marine & Sporting Supplies, Inc., 984 F.2d 422, 425, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
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Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc.,'445 "[t]he accused
infringer may raise the defense of intervening rights only when none
of the infringed claims of the reissue patent were present in the
original patent.""
"The second paragraph of section 252 provides for two separate and
distinct defenses under the doctrine of intervening rights: 'absolute'
intervening rights and 'equitable' intervening rights."1447 Concern-
ing the first sentence, which defines "absolute" intervening rights, the
court explained that it "provides an accused infringer with an absolute
right to use or sell a product that was made, used, or purchased
before the grant of the reissue patent, so long as this activity does not
infringe a claim of the reissue patent that was in the original
patent."14 48 The second sentence, which pertains to "equitable"
intervening rights, provides for a court to grant much broader rights
by permitting the "continued manufacture, use, or sale of additional
products covered by the reissue patent when the defendant made,
purchased, or used identical products, or made substantial prepara-
tions to make, use, or sell identical products, before the reissue
date." 449 This latter right, which is not absolute, is dictated by the
equities to protect investments made before reissue.
1 45 0
In BIC Leisure, Windsurfing challenged the propriety of the district
court's finding that absolute intervening rights limited damages on
the ground that BIC failed to litigate this issue during the liability
phase.1451  The Federal Circuit observed that BIC's absolute
intervening-rights defense addressed a damages issue-the identifica-
tion of the sales of BIC's sailboards that properly served to measure
Windsurfing's damages.452 Absolute intervening rights did not
become an issue until Windsurfing secured a liabilityjudgment against
BIC.1 45  The court noted that although BIC did not plead the
defense of absolute intervening rights, BIC provided Windsurfing with
ample notice of its intent to prove intervening rights, which prevented
prejudice to Windsurfing.14M The court held that the district court
properly admitted BIC's evidence relevant to the issue under Rule
1445. 1 F.3d 1214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1446. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1447. Id.
1448. Id. at 1220-21, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
1449. Id. at 1221, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
1450. Id.
1451. Id. at 1220, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
1452. Id. at 1221, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
1453. Id.
1454. Id. at 1221-22, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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15 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and committed no error
in considering BIC's absolute intervening-rights defense.
4 5-
The Federal Circuit also found no error in the district court's
application of intervening rights. 1456 After noting that no reissue
claim that BIC infringed was present in Windsurfing's original patent,
the court considered whether the remaining requirements for
invoking the defense of intervening rights were also met.1457 Before
the reissue date, BIC had a number of sailboards in inventory and was
bound to purchase a number of sailboards on order, all of which were
found to be properly excluded from the computation of damag-
es." 8 The Federal Circuit, therefore, sustained the district court's
ruling that BIC established the defense of absolute intervening rights
to damages on these sailboards.
1459
The court considered both absolute and equitable intervening
rights in Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co. 4'° Westvaco ap-
pealed the district court's denial of intervening rights and award of
damages for sales before the grant of the reissue patent. 146' The
district court rejected Westvaco's defense of intervening rights under
§ 252 based on its conclusions that: (1) the defense was inapplicable
because Westvaco's product infringed claims 5 and 6 of the reissue
patent, which were not substantially different from claims of the
original patent; and (2) assuming arguendo that Westvaco made out a
case for applying intervening rights, the factual circumstances tipped
the equities against allowing Westvaco to benefit by the defense.
4 62
The original patent included claims 1-14, which were carried over
into the reissue patent, with claims 1, 5, and 10 being amended. 1463
Claims 15-42 were newly added in the reissue patent."4 64  IPC
asserted claims 5, 6, 33, and 38 of the reissue patent against Westvaco;
of these, only claims 5 and 6 were also in the original patent, with
claim 6, which depended on claim 5, being unchanged from the
original patent.4 ' The court, therefore, analyzed claims 5 and 6
to determine whether they were, in terms of § 252, "identical" in
1455. Id.
1456. Id. at 1222, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
1457. Id.
1458. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78.
1459. Id., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
1460. 991 F.2d 735, 74143, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353, 1358-61 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1461. Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 74143, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1353, 1358-61 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1462. Id. at 740, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
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scope to any claims of the original patent, i.e., without substantive
change.
146
IPC amended the language of the original claim 5, which defined
a container for liquids containing essential oils and flavors constructed
from laminated layers, by changing the recitation that certain layers
are "coated on" or "co-extruded on" one another to a recitation that
they are "interior to" and "exterior to" one another.14 7  Westvaco
argued that the scope of reissue claim 5 was substantially broader than
that of original claim 5 because of the change in claim language, and
the Federal Circuit agreed."~
In contrast with the district court, the Federal Circuit did not
construe the changes as merely clarifying the original patent
claims.' The Federal Circuit interpreted the deletion from
original claim 5 of the requirement that various layers be "coated" or
"co-extruded" as removing a structural limitation.4 ' Moreover, the
addition of the terms "exterior to" and "interior to" was interpreted
to broaden claim 5 so that it could encompass a laminate having
layers disposed between the layers explicitly recited.'471 The court
also inferred from IPC's failure to sue Westvaco for infringement of
claims 5 and 6 of the original patent that IPC believed that the scope
of these claims had changed. 4 72
The court therefore concluded that the district court erred in
determining substantive identity between original and reissue claims
5 and 6.1' Consequently, absolute intervening rights barred IPC
from recovering damages accrued before the date of its reissue
patent. 1474
The court then turned to the question of equitable intervening
rights.475 "Westvaco [argued] that, because it spent in excess of
one million dollars in developing the accused product, it had made
the necessary 'substantial preparation,' which would entitle it to
equitable intervening rights [under section 252]. " 1476 The court
pointed out that such substantial preparation alone did not automati-
1466. Id. at 741, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358 (citing Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating &
Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827-28, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1467. Id. at 738, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
1468. Id. at 741, 26 U.S.P.Q.d (BNA) at 1358.
1469. Id. at 742, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
1470. Id. at 741-42, 26 U.S.P.Q.d (BNA) at 1358.
1471. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358-59.




1476. Id. at 743, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
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cally vest Westvaco with intervening rights, because "the plain
language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of section
252 indicates that it is within the district court's discretion to award
intervening rights."14" Because Westvaco had not shown, or even
alleged, that the district court's denial of equitable intervening rights
amounted to an abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
denial of equitable intervening rights.
478
2. Inadequate patent marking
The failure to properly mark a product to indicate that it is
patented may also limit a patentee's recovery from an infringer.
Section 287(a) provides that, in the event of failure to mark, no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event
damages may be recovered only for the infringement occurring after
such notice.
479
American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical Engineering Cop.148°
illuminates the consequences of failing to properly mark or provide
notice. The district court found that MEC infringed AMS' patent, but
limited the recoverable damages to those incurred after the filing of
the lawsuit due to AMS' failure to mark its patented products
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).'481 The patent in suit had product
claims directed to a packaged pre-filled and pre-sterilized prostheses
and method claims directed to a process of making and sterilizing the
packaged pre-filled and pre-sterilized prostheses. 4 2  Before the
patent issued, AMS shipped thousands of unmarked prostheses.
48 3
AMS shipped more unmarked prostheses after the patent issued, and
did not begin marking until about two months after the patent had
issued. 11 4 The district court concluded that § 287(a) obliged AMS
to have marked more than a de minimis number of unmarked
products after the patent issued. 1485
1477. Id.
1478. Id.
1479. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1988).
1480. 6 F.3d 1523, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1481. American Medical Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1534, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1482. Id. at 1527, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1483. Id. at 1534, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1484. Id.
1485. Id. at 1535, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
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On appeal, AMS argued that the district court erred in construing
§ 287(a). 6 AMS contended that it was entitled to damages from
the time it began consistently marking its product in compliance with
the statute. 4 8 7 Noting that the statute does not require marking to
begin within any particular time of patent issuance, 14 ' the Federal
Circuit agreed with AMS and held that § 287 (a) allows damages from
the time when marking begins in compliance with the statute or from
the time when actual notice is given. 489 The court emphasized,
however, "once marking has commenced, marking must be substan-
tially both consistent and continuous in order for the patentee to rely
upon the constructive notice provisions of the statute."1490 More-
over, the public cannot be put on notice if the patentee marks certain
products while continuing to ship unmarked products. 49'
The court, therefore, found that AMS was entitled to damages from
the earlier of when it began the required marking and when it
actually notified MEG of its infringement.1 492  Because actual
notice, which was not provided until the filing of the lawsuit, occurred
after marking, AMS was held entitled to damages from the time it
complied with the marking statute.4 93 The court remanded for a
determination of this time, i.e., the time when AMS consistently
marked substantially all of its patented products and was no longer
distributing unmarked products.1
494
With respect to the method claims, however, the court did not
agree with AMS that the district court erred in limiting recoverable
damages. 9 -5 Observing that the notice provisions of § 287, in
general, do not apply to patented methods, the court held that this
rule does not apply where, as here, the patent claims both a product
and a method of marking it, because there is a tangible item capable
of being marked to give notice of the method claims.4 6 In these
circumstances, a patentee is obliged to mark the product to avail itself
of the constructive notice provisions.1497  In the present case,
1486. Id.
1487. Id.
1488. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citing Win. Bros. Boiler & Mfg. v. Gibson-Stewart Co.,
312 F.2d 385, 386, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1963); Bros Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg.,
320 F.2d 594, 599, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1963)).
1489. Id. at 1536, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1490. Id. at 1537, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1491. Id. at 1538, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1492. Id. at 1537, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1493. Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-32.
1494. Id. at 1538, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1495. Id.
1496. Id.
1497. Id. at 1538-39, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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because a tangible product was made by the claimed method, the
Federal Circuit held that AMS was required to mark the product in




Although the Federal Circuit's decisions of 1993, for the most part,
did not cause major waves, some added interesting ripples marking
the law's continuous ebb and flow. The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, provided a clear beacon to correct the appellate court's
previous course of practice regarding vacatur of declaratory judg-
ments. The authors hope that this article will aid the'practitioner in
navigating through the body of patent law, guided by such
precedential landmarks.
1498. Id. at 1539, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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